Judge, Attorneys Weigh King Jury Instructions : Trial: Wording of deliberation guidelines is debated. Judge blasts news reports of statement regarding possible deadlock, saying they misrepresented his opinion.

On the eve of closing arguments in the Rodney G. King civil rights trial, the federal judge presiding over the case rejected a proposal Wednesday for a jury instruction that would almost certainly have allowed the lead defendant to go free.

The jury instruction requested by Ira Salzman, attorney for Sgt. Stacey C. Koon, involved the definition of “official custody,” which he said is central to Koon’s defense.

Salzman argued that the charges against his client require the prosecution to prove that unreasonable force was used while King was in official custody--which the lawyer said is defined as after King was handcuffed. There is no evidence that King was struck after he was in handcuffs, and Salzman maintained that the charges against his client are therefore faulty.

The issue would only apply to Koon because he is charged separately from the other three defendants. But U.S. District Judge John G. Davies rejected the request, saying that King was in custody from the moment that he was no longer free to leave the scene.

“I’ve heard your argument; you’ve made your point,” Davies said after Salzman completed a long harangue on the topic. “I’m not going to rule in your favor.”

That decision marked a clear setback for Koon’s case; Salzman had hoped that a ruling in his favor would have prevented the jury from convicting his client. But Davies’ other rulings Wednesday appeared to give the defendants some ground on the question of how jurors will be instructed on the use of excessive force.

In addition, Davies set off a mild uproar with a remark that appeared to some people to suggest that he was bracing for the possibility of jurors deadlocking on some of the counts. During the morning session, the judge asked lawyers why none of them had included a proposed instruction to deal with a possible deadlock, and he questioned whether one ought to be added.

“I foresee difficulties,” Davies said. “What can we do to minimize the difficulties?”

Assistant U.S. Atty. Steven D. Clymer, one of two lead prosecutors in the case, said it would be premature to inform jurors how to break a deadlock before they started deliberations and that it might be “reversible error” for the judge to give such an instruction at the start. Salzman agreed, and Davies dropped the topic.

In a federal criminal case, a judge is allowed to prod a jury to continue deliberating after jurors inform him that they have been unable to reach a verdict, said Peter Arenella, a UCLA criminal law professor. But a long line of cases dictates that the judge cannot take the step until the jurors have told him they are deadlocked, said Stanley Greenberg, a veteran Los Angeles criminal defense lawyer and former federal prosecutor.

Laurie Levenson, a Loyola University law professor and former federal prosecutor, said a number of restrictions have been placed on what a judge can say to jurors when he gives them the so-called Allen instruction, which also is known as the “dynamite charge” because many lawyers view it as overly coercive.

Although Davies did not pursue the issue of an Allen instruction after first mentioning it, his comments were picked up by a number of news organizations. During an afternoon break, Michael P. Stone, the lawyer for Officer Laurence M. Powell, told Davies that some radio stations were broadcasting that the judge anticipated a hung jury.

Davies angrily disputed the reports and chastised the media from the bench. His comments, Davies said, had been “twisted, distorted, embellished, disguised and then broadcast.”

“I haven’t any idea of what’s going to happen in this case,” he said. “I don’t think any of us do.”

Davies appeared to be on the verge of ejecting reporters from the remaining discussions about jury instructions, saying that the reports of his remarks were “a good argument for keeping these proceedings confidential.” But he then demurred, allowing reporters to remain.

Salzman said later that he, too, believed Davies’ comments had been misinterpreted, and he called the issue a “tempest in a teapot.”

That fracas overshadowed a grueling, six-hour examination of the proposed instructions that jurors in the trial will receive when the case goes to them, which could be as early as Friday.

Davies deferred a final decision on what may be the most hotly contested element of the offense that the four officers are charged with committing: Prosecutors must prove that the officers used unreasonable force against King and also that they acted “willfully.”

The issue of their intent distinguishes the case from last year’s state trial, but the precise definition of what constitutes the required intent is bitterly contested by lawyers on opposite sides of the federal case.

In their proposed jury instructions, prosecutors suggested that jurors be told that they only need to find that the officers intentionally used unreasonable force. Jurors would not have to find that the defendants were thinking in Constitutional terms, according to government lawyers.

Essentially, that means that the prosecution would have to prove that the officers used unreasonable force and did so even knowing that it was unreasonable. But they would not have to show that the officers knew that their actions violated King’s constitutionally protected rights.

Davies appeared to accept much of that reasoning, but lawyers for the officers raised objections to language suggesting that jurors could infer that people ordinarily intend the consequences of their actions. That touched off a lively debate that Davies had not resolved by day’s end.

On another issue, however, the defense attorneys appeared to make significant headway. They argued that jurors should be instructed to view the incident from the perspective of a reasonable police officer under similar circumstances--a proposal that is central to their contention that the defendants handled the volatile situation as well as they could. They also asked Davies to remind jurors that officers often have to make quick decisions under stressful circumstances.

Alan Tieger, a Justice Department lawyer and a member of the prosecution team, objected to some of the defense’s proposed language in that instruction. But the judge again declined to make a final ruling, saying he would draft the language himself and deliver it to the lawyers this morning.