LOS ANGELES TIMES INTERVIEW : Dmitri Ryurikov Creating a National-Security System for a New Democracy That Is Russia

Since Russia emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union, Dmitri B. Ryurikov has been directed to convert the national-security apparatus of a totalitarian state for use by a new democracy. An unprecedented task, it includes everything from revising the mandate of the famed KGB’s espionage network to redefining a former superpower’s foreign policy.

It’s also an unenviable assignment. Ryurikov has no blueprints or models to work from. And he couldn’t begin from scratch by dumping the staff or structures of the old state. Russia’s economic overhaul limits resources--and maneuverability. And, since Communist Party membership was, for 70 years, usually a requisite for the best education and government jobs, Russia has no alternative pool of experienced personnel. Indeed, even Ryurikov is a former Communist. So the soft-spoken Russian has had to craft the new from the old.

Ryurikov, easily identifiable by his red hair and mustache, was an unusual choice for an unusual job. His appointment also gives “right place, right time” new meaning. In July, 1991, he was asked to take a job that looked like it wouldn’t amount to much. As assistant to Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin for national-security affairs, his position would be overshadowed by his Soviet counterparts. Russia didn’t then have an independent foreign policy.

But within a month, the abortive Moscow coup marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union--and the emergence of a powerful Russia. By the time Ryurikov stepped into the job, on Aug. 26, it was one of the most important foreign-policy positions in the world. At the time, he was only 44.

A graduate of the Moscow Institute of International Relations, Ryurikov’s background is in South Asia, not the United States, Europe or China--the three most important regions for Russia. But he was recommended to Yeltsin by longtime friend Vladimir P. Lukin, now Russian ambassador to Washington.

Ryurikov, Lukin and Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev make up the powerful young triad directing foreign relations. Ryurikov was Yeltsin’s right-hand man at the Vancouver summit with President George Bush and at the Moscow meeting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He is now at the center of constructing Russia’s ties with its former rival. Among those Ryurikov has consulted about national security in a democratic state are National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and CIA Director R. James Woolsey.

He spoke in Washington soon after the wedding of his daughter, Anastasia, an artist, to former Soviet dissident, Dmitri Simes. His wife, Natalia, is a film critic.

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Question: How is democratic Russia building a new national-security apparatus? How much of the structures and policies is it simply taking over from the communist Soviet Union?

Answer: We did not begin from scratch. We did not have to create institutions like a Ministry of Security or Intelligence or Ministry of Foreign Affairs or a Defense Ministry. Everything was there.

There were certain structural changes. For example, the KGB--responsible both for domestic security and intelligence activities--was separated into two offices. One was the Ministry of Security and the other, the Agency for Foreign Intelligence.

But the main change that took place was not functional or structural, but political and ideological. This is, I think, the most important thing to understand--because these institutions that were in the service of global confrontation and suppression of political dissent at home, it was decided to make them quite different institutions.

It is too short a time to evaluate the effectiveness of this approach. But the people in these institutions were aware of the necessity of change, and they are (now) serving in their professional capacity under fundamentally new guidelines.

Q: Which are what?

A: Democracy, rule of law, private property, human rights. Everything is different from the society we had two years ago . . . .

Changes are fundamental. During one year and a half, you can record fundamental achievements such as, for example, turning former adversaries into partners, giving a serious boost to reduction of nuclear weapons and missile arsenals to two-thirds, fundamental agreements with the United States. There were principal changes in relations with major democratic countries. We became partners and set a goal of friendship.

Russia became a member of the democratic community of states. All this in a short period of time, and achieved largely by a foreign policy that is a policy of a different state--that is striving to become a democratic state . . . .

We (also) did away very decisively with the looming ghosts of the past. Russia condemned the invasions by the Soviet Union of Poland and Hungary in 1956, of Czechoslovakia in 1968. We disclosed materials we had at (our) disposal on the Korean airliner incident, on the tragic events in Katin in Byelorussia--a place where several thousand Polish officers, the creme de la creme of the Polish army, were executed. We tried to keep to the promise Mr. Yeltsin made in the United States last year--that we shall never lie again.

All this contributed to our security because the outside world turned from an insecure world full of enemies and threats to a place where Russia feels secure and feels no threat from former adversaries that became partners.

Q: How does your system differ from the U.S. national-security structure?

A: It’s very much different. The decision-making process is less complicated than the American one. That is the necessity of times, because you have to make decisions quickly. That is also the desire of the leadership to have the least bureaucracy possible. If we compare our system with the American’s, ours is much simpler. But it doesn’t mean ours is better.

Q: We’ve watched debates in the Congress of Peoples Deputies about what fundamental principles Russian policy ought to be--like what is the sphere of influence; should Russia give priority to matters along borders of the former Soviet Union; and what is Russia’s role in the world. What are your views on these? And how seriously should Americans take these debates? Should we be worried?

A: Well, I think that, of course, you should be worried. But I hope that it is not necessary to take these debates very seriously, very close to heart.

In certain cases--for example, the decision to postpone ratification of some disarmament treaties signed by the United States--it influenced foreign policy. But in general, I do not think that the Supreme Council contributed much to foreign policy, which largely remained in the hands of the president.

Of course, the priority of Russian foreign policy is relations with neighbors, because there we have the largest economic interests. There we have large numbers of ethnic Russians who consider themselves to be Russian and want to live where they live but, at the same time, be considered as Russians and maybe have a relation with a Russian state. So to ensure the rights of these people, Russia really tries a lot to secure with some of the states agreements on double citizenship, which is a solution to the problem . . . .

As far as the economy is concerned, we also think that the basic idea that led to the creation of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) was to let each state determine freely its will to have a greater or smaller degree of integration, or to disintegrate (disengage) from the CIS and to live outside the community.

I think it is now giving fruits. If you watch the events in the CIS, you will see that there is a definite trend toward more cooperation or, I would say, less disintegration, because the ties within the Soviet Union were, to a great extent, artificial. Now the states freely determine what they are interested in, what they want to preserve and which things they want to get rid of. The trend to greater cooperation is quite evident in many spheres in the economy--in banking, in the military sphere, in customs. I think that was really the aim of those who decided that there should be no Soviet Union, but there should be a community of free states. That is, I think, the major concern of the Russian foreign policy.

Q: If you look at some of the potential crisis points among your neighbors--Latvia, Ukraine, Tajikistan--which worry you the most when you think about the security and stability of Russia?

A: Well, I think from the point of view of security, it is difficult to imagine a situation when Russia can be challenged militarily. But the main danger for Russian security may come from domestic situations within these states--when refugees, for example, would like to find a place in Russia. And Russia will have to accommodate them for humanitarian reasons. That will cause a lot of problems, a lot of strain for Russia, which is not desirable, because the situation in Russia is tense enough without these conflicts.

So we are trying to persuade and to articulate our position to these countries so that the interests of Russia, as far as the Russian or ethnic Russian citizens are concerned, should be kept under control.

Q: Has the United States been doing everything it can to help both democracy and security in Russia? What more would you like to see the United States do?

A: The United States proposed two packages. One is $1.6 billion, which doesn’t need to be approved by Congress, and the other is $1.8 billion, which has to be approved. These are encouraging. If implemented, it will be a substantial support for Russian democracy.

I think that the United States is engaged in the support of Russia in international financial institutions, which is also an important feature of the support. We hope, and we know, that the United States is also active in supporting the Russian democracy within the Group of Seven. I think it is clear evidence of the United States involvement in supporting the Russian democracy.

But, of course, we would not mind some additional programs and some additional allocations be made and implemented with the help of the United States. But, of course, we understand that each country has its problems and difficulties. We are grateful for any support you can offer.

The most important thing to be done by the United States for Russia is to repeal the legislation which is related to the Soviet Union as a communist state. Russia is not a communist state any more, and we hope this work will be done in a most effective way, as it was promised, because we would like to offer our products to the United States on a fair basis.

The United States can do a lot to influence other countries to do the same. Also to lift the discrimination from any other structures, like COCOM (Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls), because if we have free access on the world markets, without discrimination and unfair restrictions, it would be much more useful than the assistance from other countries, including the United States. It would be important not only from an economic and financial point of view, but also an important boost for the morale of Russian industrialists--industries--because it will help Russians to enter the world competition on a fair basis and to learn new rules of the game and to learn to win and to lose. That would be the most important step the United States can make to help Russia.

Q: What prepared you for this job?

A: I was not prepared for this job, especially when I was offered (it), but I try to do my best to be fit for the job. The fact that the President tolerates me for about two years gives me some hope.*