PERSPECTIVES ON RUSSIA : A Failure of Leadership--but Fixable : Yeltsin’s lapses allowed the hard-liners to stall democracy. Now, he must build a political majority.

The dissolution of the Russian legislature by Boris N. Yeltsin could yet turn out to be a step toward strengthening freedom and democracy in Russia, but to welcome it as such is premature. It is the action of a man who has proved to be much less effective as president than he was as leader of the opposition.

If Yeltsin had acted sooner--before early 1992--to get a new constitution adopted and a date set for fresh parliamentary elections, he could have carried the legislature with him. Since then, his popularity and authority have tumbled and he has spent far too little time wooing the centrist members of the legislature. Yeltsin’s inaccessibility to parliamentarians other than those already committed to him allowed Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan I. Khasbulatov to build up a majority for his spoiling activities.

The dissolution of the Russian Parliament reflects failure not only of Khasbulatov and Vice President Alexander V. Rutskoi to abandon the harsh rhetoric and irreconcilable political style of times past, but also of Yeltsin. In Yeltsin’s case, the crisis reflects his inability to comprehend that the presidential power to persuade could have been more potent--and safer in the long run--than the power to issue drastic decrees. If new elections take place on schedule after a free election campaign, Yeltsin may have to learn that lesson all over again, for the existing Russian Parliament has lost popularity even more precipitously than the president, whereas a new assembly with a fresh mandate might be a more effective critic of the executive. In the meantime, Russia does not have the constitutional provisions or electoral law to allow fresh elections for a new assembly. Yeltsin can issue a new electoral law and a “provisional constitution” by decree. If the law is fair and free elections ensue, then Yeltsin’s action on Tuesday will probably be seen as politically and morally, if not constitutionally, justified. The impasse between executive and legislature could not go on indefinitely without inflicting further damage on respect for democracy in Russia, quite apart from the harm it has been doing to the economy. The “dual power” of Parliament and presidency had created a stalemate in which the legislature passed laws and the president issued decrees, with each contradicting the other. This resulted in scant obedience of either laws or decrees.

But whether the case for Yeltsin’s drastic action will be seen as convincing depends on what happens over the next few months. The logic of it is likely to involve him in censoring radio and television, which as recently as last week broadcast a Khasbulatov speech critical of Yeltsin. The press, most of which is dependent on state subsidies, may find it harder to maintain its precarious liberty. The development of freedom and democracy in Russia is an even bigger issue than the speed of privatization, and Yeltsin’s place in history is likely to depend more on whether he advances the former than on how fast he accelerates the latter.

In August, 1991, when Yeltsin led the resistance to the attempt of Soviet hard-liners to turn back the clock of history, the issues were much more clear-cut. Yeltsin was plainly defending liberty and democracy as well as his own position as recently elected president. Today, one must hope that he is defending the same values, albeit in a more roundabout way. The West should, however, be clear that (insofar as its influence counts for anything in contemporary Russia) it supports the preservation of political freedom and the advancement of democracy, and Yeltsin insofar as he upholds these principles. That is not the same thing as supporting whatever Yeltsin does.

The strongest desire of most Russians today is for someone to restore order, peacefully. The army wants to know who is in charge. To the extent that Yeltsin looks the most likely person to remain on top, he may be able to count on the conditional loyalty of the military. Together with a rational desire to avoid armed conflict, the other main factor working in Yeltsin’s favor is the extent to which people are tired of bitter political infighting. Relative indifference has its own dangers, but sometimes it may be safer than high passion.

Recent Russian surveys show that people have reported a lower level of participation in political life and less interest in politics in each year since 1989. There is also a general decline in trust in all politicians. Thus, apathy and disillusion may be the allies of peaceful change in the present crisis, but they are hardly the best foundations on which to build a Russian democracy.