Poor Leadership Doomed Raid on Cult, Probe Finds

Lax supervision by senior federal officials and serious mistakes by inexperienced field commanders were blamed Thursday for the botched raid last February on the Branch Davidian compound near Waco, Tex.

A team of 30 investigators from various federal agencies concluded that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms assault on the compound on Feb. 28 failed because of poor planning, bad supervision and a refusal to stop the raid after the cult was warned that agents were coming.

The report, which had been ordered by President Clinton, accused senior ATF officials of misleading investigators and the public after the raid in an attempt to cover up the errors. A Justice Department analysis of the fiery assault that ended the 51-day siege of the cult by federal agents is expected to be made public next Tuesday.

Five of those officials were placed on leave with pay Thursday pending further hearings. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen said that some of the individual cases may be referred to the Justice Department for possible criminal investigation.

“Mistakes and errors in judgment were made,” said Bentsen, whose department includes the bureau. “Numerous officials were less than truthful about the facts.”

Bentsen brought in an outsider--John Magaw, head of the Secret Service--as the new director of the agency. He replaces Stephen E. Higgins, who said Monday that he was resigning over differences with Treasury Department officials concerning the report.

The incident began when ATF agents tried to arrest cult leader David Koresh on weapons charges and search the compound for massive stocks of illegal weapons and explosives. It ended in a standoff that lasted 51 days.

On April 19, the FBI pumped tear gas into the compound. Authorities say cult members then started a fire that quickly consumed the wooden structure, killing most of those inside.

The rest were shot to death by fellow cult members, authorities say. As many as 86 members of the cult, including Koresh, died.

The Treasury Department report provides the most detailed account yet of how the largest tactical operation in ATF history turned into the bloody prelude of an even greater disaster.

It depicts an agency in which field commanders had no experience in launching a major armed assault and superiors in Washington were content to watch rather than actively supervise.

Federal investigators interviewed more than 400 people over four months. Their findings were analyzed by three independent reviewers: Los Angeles Police Chief Willie L. Williams, USC journalism professor and former Times national editor Edwin O. Guthman and Henry S. Ruth Jr., a former Justice Department attorney and chief Watergate prosecutor.

Ample justification existed for the attempt to arrest Koresh after officials received information that he was assembling an arsenal of illegal weapons inside the fortified compound, the report said.

“Unfortunately, the investigation also found disturbing evidence of flawed decision-making, inadequate intelligence gathering, miscommunication, supervisory failures and deliberately misleading post-raid statements,” it said.

The findings faulted the bureau for not trying to arrest Koresh away from the compound and said that the high-risk assault was carried out without adequate planning and training.

As recounted in the report, the descent to tragedy began the Sunday morning of the raid. The key element was catching the Branch Davidians by surprise. An ATF agent, Robert Rodriguez, was inside the compound to report on any suspicious activity before the raid.

A few miles away, a TV cameraman who had learned of the impending raid stopped a mail carrier to ask directions to the compound, telling the man that there was to be an assault on the cult.

The mail carrier was cult member David Jones, who sped back to the compound and alerted Koresh. Rodriguez was standing next to Koresh after he heard the news. Koresh dropped his Bible and began to shake as he turned and said that the ATF and National Guard were coming to get him.

“They’re coming, Robert, the time has come,” Koresh said. “They’re coming.”

Rodriguez left immediately and telephoned his supervisors, Phillip J. Chojancki and Charles D. Sarabyn, at the ATF command post nine miles from the compound. He was upset and warned that Koresh had been tipped off.

Bentsen said Treasury Department officials had received assurances from ATF authorities that the raid would not go forward if the element of surprise was lost.

Rather than stop, however, 61 ATF agents told investigators that they heard Sarabyn say: “Hurry up. They know we’re coming.” When Chojancki phoned the ATF command center in Washington, he did not mention that Koresh had been warned, the report said.

Forty minutes later, teams of ATF agents concealed in cattle trailers were driven inside the compound. As they began to emerge, Koresh appeared at the main door and yelled: “What’s going on?”

When he was ordered to freeze, the report said he slammed the door and gunfire erupted.

In the ensuing 90-minute firefight, four ATF agents were killed and 20 were wounded. Six cult members were killed, and the scene was set for the standoff that ended with the deadly conflagration in April.

In the aftermath, Chojancki and Sarabyn both denied that they had been warned about the tip-off to Koresh, according to the report. They were also charged with altering the written plan for the raid after an investigation began.

Also accused of making misleading statements and suspended were Daniel M. Hartnett, associate director of the bureau; Edward C. Conroy, deputy associate director, and David C. Troy, chief of ATF intelligence.

Attempts to reach them Thursday were unsuccessful.