NEWS ANALYSIS : Inman Seen as a Possible Drag on Clinton’s Plans

When President Clinton picked Bobby Ray Inman to replace Defense Secretary Les Aspin last month, the choice was widely hailed as just what the President needed to win credibility with the military and its backers on Capitol Hill.

The 62-year-old retired Navy admiral had acquired broad experience in the national security arena and an awesome reputation as a bureaucratic infighter. He was all but an idol to conservatives in Congress.

But now, as the blunt-spoken former intelligence officer prepares for a Senate confirmation hearing on Jan. 25, some analysts are beginning to wonder whether Clinton may find Inman to be too much of a good thing.

Although he is expected to be a team player publicly, experts say he could prove to be a drag on the President’s push to reshape U.S. foreign policy--particularly on how much to cut Pentagon spending and when to send U.S. troops to international trouble spots.

While Aspin--who often seemed cowed by the President’s national security team--was reluctant to press his views too vigorously, some expect Inman to prove a formidable advocate who could challenge Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the National Security Council.

“One of the dangers is that they (the Administration) may have gotten more than what they thought they got,” said Don Snider, military and political affairs director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Some of them will consider it disruptive.”

Inman rankled some White House loyalists when, as the President announced the nomination last month, he asserted that he had agreed to serve as defense secretary only on his own terms.

“As you know,” he told Clinton at a nationally televised press conference, “I had to reach a level of comfort that we could work together, that I would be very comfortable in your role as commander in chief--President--while I was secretary of defense.”

“I have found that level of comfort,” he said.

Not everyone in Washington is as comfortable with Inman.

Liberals have criticized Inman for rushing to the defense of James Guerin, a one-time U.S. businessman and CIA intelligence source who was convicted of transferring military technology to Iraq and South Africa. Inman tried--unsuccessfully--to win Guerin a shortened sentence.

Inman also caused a minor flap in Washington when the White House conceded just after his nomination that he had failed to pay Social Security taxes for domestic help even though he knew such conduct was illegal. He paid $6,000 to the IRS only after he was nominated.

And although he has boasted of his successful days in business, Inman’s stints in the commercial world ended in disaster. Tracor Inc., a defense contracting firm he ran, fell into bankruptcy in 1991. Westmark Systems, an investment firm he headed, became mired in debt during his stewardship.

On another level, some critics have suggested Inman has too much of a Cold War mentality to preside successfully over the Pentagon’s transition to a post-Cold War world. Most of Inman’s jobs in the Navy were in the intelligence arena.

Critics also contend that Inman consistently has proved himself a quitter.

He resigned as CIA deputy director in 1982 after a spat with then-director William J. Casey, quit as a consultant to the House Intelligence Committee that same year after the panel was critical of the U.S. intelligence community, and left Westmark in disarray in 1989.

But none of these is expected to pose any major impediment to the nomination.

The White House blunted the flap over Social Security taxes by contending that Inman did not pay them because he wanted to see whether Congress was going to change the law governing such levies.

And Inman’s falling-out with Casey came over some of the director’s more questionable covert operations. “They were just cut from two different bolts of cloth,” an Inman friend said.

Inman intimates scoff at any notion that he is too imbued with a Cold War-era mentality.

Robert M. Gates, the former CIA director whose nomination Inman helped rescue after Gates was being pilloried by Democrats in 1989, points out that Inman was the prime mover behind a CIA decision in the mid-1980s to shift more of its attention to the Third World.

“He’s going to be a look-ahead-to-the-medium-term kind of person,” Gates said, dismissing as “nonsense” suggestions that Inman has been too closely tied to the intelligence community. “He has had very broad exposure to defense issues,” Gates said.

William H. Webster, another former CIA director, agreed. “One of Bobby’s strengths is to look out into the future and make a case for what is going to be needed,” Webster said. “He will be received as a very professional individual and will speak with credibility.”

Inman’s main impact is expected to be felt internally, both in helping to shape the Administration’s foreign policy and in the day-to-day running of the Pentagon.

In sharp contrast to Aspin, who had difficulty with the administrative aspects of his job, Inman has shown himself able to run a large, structured bureaucracy as well as highly articulate and skillful at influencing other policy-makers. He has also amassed a record as a master of political manipulation, adept at swaying both Congress and the press.

He has remained silent on defense issues pending his Senate confirmation hearings. But a survey of his recent writings and conversations with his intimates offers some insights:

* Spending: Although Inman fully accepts the proposition that the nation must continue to shrink the size of its military Establishment, he is unlikely to accept steep budget cuts as readily as Aspin did--and may well have the clout to blunt them.

Inman reportedly has no major quarrel with the finding of Aspin’s “bottom-up review” that America must be prepared to fight two major regional wars simultaneously. But he worries that the current budget may not be adequate to do the job, and he is expected to push for more.

* Intervention: Inman is a firm believer in sending troops to intervene abroad when the national interest requires, but he is likely to insist more firmly than Aspin did that they have adequate equipment and support, a well-defined mission and a plan for getting out.

He is also expected to push Clinton to formulate a firm national military strategy for the post-Cold War world that spells out when the United States should intervene and under what conditions.

* Social issues: Inman is no troglodyte--he overturned policy at the National Security Agency to enable a homosexual to keep his post--but he is expected to be cautious in putting Clinton’s policies on gays and women in the military into effect.

One reason: To avoid stirring up contentious new battles on Capitol Hill. “His freedom of movement on these issues is sharply limited by Congress,” one insider said. “He’ll work hard behind the scenes to effect change, but he’s likely to take it slow.”

* Defense conversion: Inman is already an ardent backer of the Aspin Pentagon’s efforts to reform the military procurement process and to ease the burden on defense contractors, both by loosening regulations and by subsidizing industries needed for their critical skills.

He also supports moving away from buying big-ticket weapons--such as new generations of aircraft and missiles--and channeling more to research and development, an approach that enables the military to keep up on technology without having to spend as much.

Inman is certain to face a full platter of issues when he steps into Aspin’s shoes later this month.

In addition to the budget squeeze, he will have to put Aspin’s new policies affecting women and homosexuals into effect. He will also have to decide how to revamp America’s nuclear forces for the post-Cold War era.

“His biggest challenge will be in trying to figure out what the President really wants the defense Establishment to do--what the military’s mission really is under this Administration,” said Robert W. Gaskin, a former Pentagon strategist. “There really hasn’t been any clue.”