Pakistan, India Negotiate -- But Tensions Increase : South Asia: The two countries talk about the future of Kashmir, then launch into a war of words. Neither side truly wants a solution.

Their differences include a decade-old war atop a Himalayanglacier, accusations of cross-border terrorism and the specter of human-rights violations by the Indian army in what Pakistan has termed “occupied Kashmir.” Neither side is without obstinate views on these issues. Indeed, neither side has softened its stance since partition and the end of British colonialism in 1947.

Talks earlier this month between the two countries’ foreign secretaries resulted in little progress. But it was the first time in 14 months that India and Pakistan have agreed to sit down and talk about their differences--and the first time Kashmir was on the agenda. With each side adhering to its long-held stance on Kashmir, it became evident that neither has the political will or domestic strength required to end the low-intensity battle between India’s armed forces and the Muslim Kashmiris, whose fight for independence intensified in 1990. An estimated 8,300 people have died in the conflict in the past three years.

“They cannot pronounce that this (territory) is part of India and still say that we want to negotiate,” said Shaharyar M. Khan, the Pakistani foreign minister two days after the talks. In his office is a life-sized portrait of Pakistan’s founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who first proposed partition from India and the creation of a Muslim state. “How can you begin to negotiate if the other party says this territory is non-negotiable.”

Indian officials contend that Kashmir--the northwest mountainous region given to India by the Maharajah Hari Singh in 1947--is an integral part of India. The conflict, they say, represents a domestic law-and-order problem. They accuse Pakistan of aiding the militants. In response, Pakistani leaders claim that the people of Kashmir must decide in a plebiscite whether they want to remain with India or become a part of Pakistan, as envisioned by the 1949 U.N. resolutions on the settlement of Kashmir.

With little new to say, the talks seemed doomed from the start. Public statements issued from Islamabad before the meeting came across as antagonistic. Senate resolutions virtually tied the hands of Pakistan’s negotiators. “An impression was created that the obituary of the talks was being written before they were even held,” said India’s High Commissioner to Pakistan, S.K. Lambah. “In spite of that we decided to go ahead with the talks.”

At a joint news conference, the foreign secretaries proclaimed the talks a small step forward in Indo-Pak relations. Within a week, however, a war of words erupted across the border.

Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao said, in reference to Pakistan, that India was ready to combat any external threat at any time. Pakistan’s foreign minister, Sardar Assef Ahmad Ali, warned that a nuclear war might engulf South Asia if Pakistan’s territorial dispute with India weren’t resolved. Negotiations seemed only to inflame tensions between the two countries.

So why did India and Pakistan agree to talks on Kashmir? Both sides apparently agreed to meet to appease growing international pressure. India wants a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. Instigating talks with Pakistan would show the international organization that it is serious about defusing the tension in Kashmir, where it is accused of violating human rights.

Pakistan wants to improve relations with the United States. Late last year, it agreed to withdraw a U.N. resolution criticizing India’s human-rights violations in Kashmir, and to talk with India, at the behest of the United States. In October, 1990, the United States froze relations, along with aid, to Pakistan when it became apparent that Pakistan was capable of building a nuclear bomb.

The United States sees a solution to Kashmir as a first step toward solving nuclear non-proliferation in the region. Pakistan agrees the two issues are related. “We feel insecure, because we are the smaller of the two, and for 40 years we have gotten the short end of the stick. If Kashmir is settled, then this issue of non-proliferation is easy to solve,” said Pakistan’s High Commissioner to India Riaz Khokar. “Our insecurity results because of our fear of India. We have a major problem that is outstanding with them.”

But India does not want to see the nuclear issue linked to negotiations on Kashmir. It would not view a Pakistan offer to allow inspections of its nuclear plants as a concession, according to senior Pakistani officials. India needs to maintain its nuclear threat to balance power with China to its north. If Pakistan agrees to inspections, India also might be pressured to agree to inspections with no guarantee that China will do the same.

The real reason for the hardening of positions after the recent talks was a concern for public opinion back home. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto received heat from her opposition in Parliament for agreeing to withdraw the U.N. resolution against India and sit down to talks. The Muslim League began a campaign to paint her fledgling government as having betrayed the people of Kashmir and sacrificing Pakistan’s interests.

The talks lack public support in Pakistan, where the issue of Kashmir is integrally linked to Pakistani national identity. The entire justification for partition rests on the premise that Muslims need a separate homeland to escape Hindu domination.

Pakistan’s Senate passed a resolution, even before the foreign secretaries began talking, urging the government not to enter into any separate agreements on Siachen glacier, where thousands of Indian and Pakistani troops have been engaged in an expensive battle for more than a decade.

Each year, more soldiers die as a result of avalanches and frostbite than they do from enemy fire. Hopes were high that progress would be made on Siachen because both sides would benefit financially from ending this conflict, but now both sides are backtracking away from agreements.

If Pakistan were serious about a breakthrough, it would be discussing independence as a third option for the Kashmiris, but Bhutto has made it clear there are only two options: integration with India or integration with Pakistan.

Public outcry also would erupt in India should its negotiators concede anything on Kashmir. If India were to agree to a plebiscite in Kashmir, other separatist movements might gain momentum.

In both India and Pakistan the emotional attachment to Kashmir is too strong for any major progress to take place at the foreign-secretary level. At that level, the spotlight is on both parties to take a hard line. If the two sides had really wanted a breakthrough, more behind-the-scenes negotiations would have taken place at a lower level so that the foreign secretaries could simply finalize the agreements.

Why should the international community be concerned that the talks failed and that tensions are once again high between India and Pakistan? For one, the dispute remains a flash point with the potential for confrontation. Both sides have nuclear capability and, on more than one occasion, they have threatened nuclear war.

At present, it seems unlikely that the two sides will return to the negotiating table. The tactics being used are designed to win support at home and abroad, not to resolve the conflict.

The Pakistani foreign minister’s statement that nuclear war could sweep Asia, should the conflict not be resolved, is designed to draw the United States and others into bilateral dispute and raise international concern about the plight of the Kashmiris.

Later this month, Bhutto plans to be in Switzerland, where she may lead a delegation to Geneva to table a resolution against India at a meeting of the U.N. Human-Rights Commission. Such a move may score points at home, but will speed resumption of talks between the two powers, which represent nearly one-fifth of the world’s population. For this reason, we should be concerned.