Algeria Is a New Bosnia in the Making Unless the U.S. Gets Off the Policy Dime

As the world scrambles on Bosnia, too late to help 200,000 killed, another crisis looms ever larger across the Mediterranean in Algeria.

The signs, by all accounts, are more than ominous. By twilight, the labyrinthine streets of the seaside capital and its legendary casbah are bare due to both fear and a curfew. Gunfire erratically pierces the night.

Dawn usually reveals one or more bodies, often with throats slit--a tactic adopted by both Islamic militants and pro-government death squads. More than 2,000 have already died.

During the day, security fears give way to economic despondency. Shortages have produced long food lines; medical supplies are scarce. Housing problems--up to three generations in two-room flats--long ago past the crisis stage. Soaring unemployment and inflation can no longer be accurately measured.

The turning point for Algeria’s rulers occurred last month when a reconciliation summit failed to attract enough parties to have credibility. It was supposed to elect a new president.

Instead, the five-man junta, which has ruled Algeria since a 1992 coup ended democracy, simply appointed its own man. Defense Minister Lamine Zeroual will run a three-year transition, ending in 1997 elections.

The government has now exposed itself as a total sham.

It violates Algeria’s constitution. It doesn’t even have the pseudo-legitimacy of one-party elections that marked the three decades after Algeria’s independence from France in 1962.

And, barring a miracle, prospects for a return to constitutional rule look marginal to nil, for three reasons.

First, the promise rings hollow. After it aborted the country’s first democratic parliamentary poll, the junta promised it would only be a transition until scheduled presidential elections in 1993. They, of course, were never held.

Second, the regime has little hope of easing the economic woes that triggered widespread discontent and resulted in a stunning win for the Islamic Salvation Front in 1992, which led a panicked military to seize power. Some figures indicate Algeria may not even have sufficient funds to service its staggering $26-billion foreign debt, much less pay for development to alleviate poverty.

Finally, the military has gone too far to ensure future significant support. It’s having a hard time just keeping troops loyal. Since 1992, it has banned the party that was winning a democratic election. It has detained, tortured and applied summary justice to thousands. Outside Iraq, Algeria had the highest number of political executions in the Mideast last year, according to Middle East Watch.

The Islamists are far from innocent. After initially targeting government and military personnel, they have increasingly gone after civilians and, since last fall, foreigners.

In a letter to Middle East Watch, the Islamic Salvation Front called on all parties to renounce violence against Algerians--civilians and military--and foreigners not taking direct part in security operations. “The conflict has reached such a dimension that it is important for our people to continue acting in a responsible manner in respecting the rights for which they are fighting. Only through doing so can we allay the fears of those who believe that political Islam cannot be democratic,” the group wrote.

Unfortunately, even more militant groups--the Armed Islamic Group and Armed Islamic Movement--may now be supplanting the Islamic Front in directing the anti-government campaign.

The crisis has thus reached a critical threshold. So has Western policy.

In his State of the Union Address, President Bill Clinton said--nine times--that promoting democracy abroad was one of six U.S. priorities for 1994.

One place to start is Algeria. Its crisis is critical on its own, but also because the challenge to undemocratic and inept rule represents the next crisis in the region.

Almost unbelievably, Algeria has been allowed to happen, mainly out of fear of the Islamic alternative. “Algeria’s creditors and allies have largely failed to press publicly for improvements in Algeria’s human-rights record and a resumption of the democratic process,” Middle East Watch concludes in a new report.

France, which colonized Algeria, and other Europeans bear primary responsibility. But Washington is culpable, too. Its criticism of the Algerian government has been mostly lip service. Economically, it has helped the regime.

For at least two years, Algeria was the leading client of the Department of Agriculture’s Commodity Credit Corp. Its credits this year are expected to total $550 million.

The Export-Import Bank has loan guarantees to U.S. corporations in Algeria worth $2.2 billion. Last fall, it was the bank’s fourth largest exposure, after Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil.

And the World Bank, in which Washington has a strong vote, has an outstanding loan balance with Algeria of roughly $1 billion. Most embarrassing is the annual U.S. grant of $150,000 that allows Algeria to participate in Washington’s International Military Education and Training Program.

A recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, while recognizing the threat posed by Islamic extremism in North Africa, warned that the cancellation of democratic elections and installation of a junta in Algeria “have undermined stability and hurt U.S. efforts to encourage democracy and respect for human rights in the region.”

The time has come for a more deliberate policy through either economic or political options, or both. The only way to prevent extremists from seizing power is to get democracy back on course in Algeria. Ignoring the country, or condoning its regime, will simply ensure prolonged bloodshed in another country.

Middle East Watch called on Washington to tell Algiers publicly that it will link future Commodity Credit Corp. and Eximbank programs to the country’s progress on democracy and human rights. It’s the least thing Washington should do.

Somalia fell apart while no one was watching. Bosnians have been slaughtered because no one wanted to deal with a disintegrating state. In the end, acting after the fact turns out to be more costly. Action must be taken in Algeria now, before the limited opportunity still available is squandered.