PERSPECTIVES ON BOSNIA : Russia Steps Into the Fray . . . : While the West is right to be wary, a Balkan settlement that includes Moscow has a better chance of enduring.

While the West paid almost no attention, Balkan politics underwent a major shift of terrain last week: Russia has just weighed in for the first time on the Bosnian fray, an event laden with implications for the future of NATO policy, Russia’s world role and Russian internal politics.

First, while NATO and Washington express pleasure that “their” Bosnian policy is beginning to work--with the Serbs’ apparent pullback from their brutal siege of Sarajevo--it is in fact due to the Russians that such an event has come about. The Russians have overnight become a key player in the politics of the former Yugoslavia, where they had been shut out ever since the end of World War II.

Russia is the first external player to have any clout with the Serbs, so its role could well fill a gap in a useful way. To those deeply suspicious of Russian imperial intentions, however, this is bad news, for it could indicate that the Russian bear has now “extended its claws” into Eastern Europe for the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

It is vastly premature, however, to make any call about “the Russian bear.” While Russian democracy is far from perfect and Russia is indeed in economic turmoil, there is no real evidence of reversion to the old Cold War ideological split or a Russian challenge to the West in the old sense. There are wild imperialists in Russia--Vladimir Zhirinovsky being the most flagrant example. But Russia is a great power, and it will certainly have great-power interests in its neighborhood and beyond. The question is, what kind of a Russia will it be? Will its motivations be reasonably compatible with those of the West? So far, these interests of Russia cannot be described as incompatible, even in NATO and Washington eyes. That could change, however, if Russian politics should lurch into ultra-nationalist visions and authoritarian methods.

Boris N. Yeltsin has probably strengthened his domestic position by this stunning decision to weigh in on Bosnia. He has been under pressure from the right to go beyond simple pursuit of “me-tooism” policies that agree with the West on all major issues. He has probably restored some element of Russian pride. Many Russians--hardly all of them zealots--believe that Russia should have elements of an “independent” foreign policy, based on its own unique interests.

But what are those interests? Serbia shares with Russia both Eastern Orthodox Christianity and a Slav tradition--although Croats and Bosnians are Slavs, too. Is this enough? Is Serbia really of critical interest to Russia? Can Serbia outweigh economic interests or relations with Germany or good economic ties with the Czechs and Hungarians? Does Russia merely want to champion a client, or to play a broader and more constructive game in the region?

The likely answer is that Russia still is casting about in foreign-policy confusion following the collapse of its empire and finds that this is at least one area where it still has clout. Russians want to be perceived as a significant player--and they can now do so for the first time in East European politics.

Washington and NATO have thus been delivered a fait accompli in Bosnia. Russia’s role may be positive; done right, Russian activism in Bosnia and the Security Council could be constructive. A Balkan settlement that includes Russia may be harder to reach, but it may also be more enduring if Russia can influence the key players, the Serbs, and as long as Moscow’s purpose is not simply to blindly check Western policies.

We are likely to see significant other new departures in Russian foreign policy, gradually revealing the face of the new Russia--and, it is hoped, demonstrating policies different from those during the Cold War. These developments do not have to be bad news for the West, but the West will not be wrong in feeling ambivalence about this important event.