Somalia Casts Shadow on U.S. Foreign Policy : Africa: Analysts say the mission may prove an exception to the pattern of U.S. action abroad.

The U.S. intervention in Somalia, once heralded as a sequel to the Persian Gulf War against Iraq in shaping the new world order, may turn out instead to be the exception rather than a precedent for U.S. policy in the post-Cold War world.

In a low-key, anticlimactic end to the lifesaving drama launched by President George Bush 14 months ago under the glare of television lights, the United States on Tuesday began the final month of withdrawing its troops.

The Defense Department says it hopes to have virtually all American ground forces--3,273 of them were still left as of Thursday--out of the country by March 25, six days before the deadline set by Congress.

The haunting initial images of stick-thin women and children have been replaced by pictures of dead American soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. And the anarchy and wanton violence that elicited intervention in the first place appear to be returning now that U.S. and European troops are leaving.

For many, the Somali experience has become Exhibit A in the case for staying out of foreign quarrels, no matter how heart-rending.

It is casting shadows over U.S. intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti.

“It will clearly influence and make the United States more reluctant about decisions to undertake missions of this kind elsewhere in the world,’ former Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci said.

Most analysts differentiate, however, between the U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope, a humanitarian mission that lasted five months, and the subsequent U.N.-directed operation, which pursued more ambitious goals over the last nine months.

“In terms of the humanitarian mission, I’d say it achieved its initial purpose,” Carlucci said. “But when the mandate changed to nation-building--an impossible task, especially for a multilateral organization--I’d have to give it an ‘F.’ ”

Mohammed Sahnoun, U.N. envoy to Somalia before the U.S. intervention, agreed that Operation Restore Hope succeeded.

“It established a security framework for emergency relief and demonstrated that a well-organized endeavor by the United States for humanitarian purposes can have a positive impact,” he said.

Somalia also offers several other lessons:

* Overseas missions need more precisely defined goals.

This was easy during the Cold War, when most foreign operations centered on the singular goal of containing Communist influence.

By contrast, Somalia symbolizes the absence of answers to basic questions, including long-term U.S. goals and the boundaries and rules of intervention.

“Somalia was set up for failure by the terms of reference,” former U.N. Ambassador Donald McHenry said. “Anyone who was naive enough to believe we could go in and simply feed people and then pull out was fooling themselves. To follow that course would have ensured the same conditions that forced us to go in would reoccur.”

When the United States intervened in Somalia, analysts said, it failed to look ahead to how it would get out.

“We need greater selectivity and care in defining missions and to make sure they’re finite,” said Robert Oakley, U.S. special envoy for Somalia and a former ambassador to that country.

* The United Nations cannot be counted on as an alternative or fall-back when unilateral involvement does not work, and the United States and United Nations must redefine their relationship to fit the post-Cold War world.

“Somalia was the first test for U.N. leadership in these kinds of crises of failed states, and it overreached,” Oakley said. “The objective in Somalia became too encompassing and too intrusive and more than the United Nations could handle.”

Since 1989, the United Nations has launched 17 peacekeeping missions around the world, compared with 13 during the entire four decades of the Cold War. Its capacities, manpower and finances are now stretched thin.

The stickiest issue in the U.S.-U.N. relationship is an international force.

“If we don’t want to be the policemen of the world, and we don’t want to take criticism for the failure of action in places like Somalia or Bosnia, then we have to come up with some kind of credible international force as an alternative,” McHenry said.

This means that the United States must face up to such uncomfortable situations as putting U.S. forces under foreign command and contributing to a U.N. reserve fund to meet crises as they develop, he said.

Consequently, he added, the United States is blocking movement toward an international force, even though such a force is in the U.S. interest.

* The longer the delay in doing something about the kind of crises represented by Somalia, the higher the costs.

“In these kinds of crises, the international community needs to get in early,” said Michael Clough, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Somalia would never have happened if attention had been paid at the time (former President Mohamed Siad) Barre fell in 1990. Everyone saw the total collapse of order coming. But everyone cut and ran.

“All it would have taken is a little serious political involvement and sending the right signals to the players on the ground. Instead, the reverse message was sent: Fight it out and whoever wins gets to be the government. So it took off.”

* As cases of crumbling states increase, the United States should not be seen to take sides.

The neutrality of the U.S.-dominated U.N. force was compromised after confrontations between U.N. troops and gunmen believed to be supporters of Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid.

U.N. envoy Jonathan Howe, a retired U.S. admiral and former deputy national security adviser to Bush, ordered an ultimately unsuccessful manhunt for Aidid, complete with a reward.

Singling out Aidid, Sahnoun said, inadvertently boosted his image and following within Somalia and changed the dimensions of the operation. And the U.N. mission was seen to be assuming sovereign powers rather than allowing Somalis to judge and settle their problems.

* In the post-Cold War world, U.S. leadership or preeminence can be a liability in high-profile military operations.

“We are going to have to play a major role,” McHenry said. “But to the extent the operation is seen as an American operation, we will be the one embroiled in political difficulties when they arise, whether internationally or locally.”