PERSPECTIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST : Arafat Must Have His Altalena : Israel and the Palestinians will make no progress until each side takes action against its own extremists.

On June 20, 1948, a ship named the Altalena appeared off the coast of Tel Aviv, just over a month after Israel declared its independence. Loaded with arms intended for the Irgun Zva’i Leumi, the right-wing underground army under Menachem Begin, the ship constituted the most serious challenge to the sovereignty of the the new Israeli government. When negotiations between Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and the Irgun broke down, Ben Gurion ordered that the ship be sunk, despite the threat of civil war in the middle of Israel’s desperate war for survival. Although Jewish lives were lost and valuable arms destroyed, Ben Gurion’s action saved the new Jewish state from extreme elements that might have ultimately torpedoed it.

Every revolution has its Altalena. In 1921, Lenin did not hesitate to fire on Soviet sailors in Kronstad who demanded a more radical revolution. Revolutions by their nature arouse extreme groups to undertake extreme actions. Yet, the readiness of revolutionary leaders to suppress their extreme allies is a test of their ability to move from struggle to statecraft. Without Altalena, there follows anarchy.

Today, Yasser Arafat faces his Altalena. The Islamic fundamentalist Hamas is not satisfied with the compromise course of the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization and it will shun no act of terror to sabotage it. A hideous car bombing in Afula and a shooting in Ashdod were the latest fruits of this terror.

If Arafat wants to lead a state and not just a revolution, he must not only condemn, but vigorously--even violently--destroy these rejectionists. His failure to even condemn the Afula bombing is an ominous sign not only of a moral failure, but, more important, of a failure of political will.

All of the excuses for Arafat’s silence have been heard before: He is already besieged by opponents and cannot risk alienating them further. And, how can he condemn such violence when his people live under occupation, themselves victims of continuing depredations and degradations, whether from right-wing settlers or from the Israeli army itself.

All this is true. It is also beside the point. Arafat will not have his state if he will not first have his Altalena.

The Gaza-Jericho agreement, for all its flaws, provides Arafat with the opportunity not to only condemn but also to act. This is the most compelling reason for both Israel and the PLO to move as quickly as possible toward implementing the accord and withdrawing the Israeli army from these territories. The result may well be civil war between the Palestinians, but if it is, it is in Israel’s--and the world’s--interest to make sure it is a civil war that the PLO wins.

Arafat is not the only one who faces his Altalena. Yitzhak Rabin also confronts a racial element that will do everything to sabotage the nascent peace. The settlers in Hebron and Kiryat Araba are preparing for a modern-day Masada in the event that Rabin decides to force them out of their provocative and counter-productive settlements. Rabin has so far taken some small, but significant actions against the most extreme of the settlers; he has also condemned Jewish violence in terms that might serve Arafat as a model. But the real test for Rabin--and for Israel as a society--is still to come. Predictions of full-scale civil war may be exaggerated, but there is little doubt that significant violence is highly probable.

For both sides to have their Altalena today requires some faith that the other side is worth the sacrifice. If Israel risks civil war for peace with the Palestinians, will the Palestinians be able to keep their end? And, if the PLO destroys the Hamas, will it get what it wants--a Palestinian state--from the Israelis? Each side can only create the trust in the other by undertaking actions against its own extremists. Verbal condemnations of terrorism by one’s own compatriots are only the first step. Concrete actions are just as important.

In 1948, one of the commanders who gave the direct order to fire on the Altalena was a young officer of the Israeli army, Yitzhak Rabin. Will he have the courage to give a similar order, if necessary, today? But at least Rabin has a clear record in this regard. Arafat is a greater enigma and, on the basis of his record to date, we may justifiably wonder if he can rise to the challenge.