On U.S. Human-Rights Issue, China Was Not First Blow

Bill Clinton’s recent reversal of the U.S. position on human rights in China was not his Administration’s first blow against human rights. Long before the debate about most- favored-nation treatment for China began to escalate, the Administration’s human-rights agenda had suffered two powerful blows.

The first was the decision to choose Boris N. Yeltsin over the Russian Parliament--even to the point of applauding the decision to fire on the Russian White House. In a democratic system, laws and institutions must take precedence over individuals in temporary advantage.

But the Clinton Administration, repeating the mistake of the Bush Administration, was determined to promote the fortunes of a single man rather than undertake the more difficult, long-term task of promoting democratic institutions. This decision, of course, backfired on the Administration tragically when the Russian people elected a Parliament worse than the one Yeltsin had bombed.

Another disturbing sign is the Administration’s new timid position on U.N. peacekeeping. Stung by its own mismanagement of U.S. involvement in Somalia, the Administration began to retreat from the position that the United States should use its power for humanitarian goals through the United Nations. Instead, it began to pronounce a new doctrine of national interest, under which Washington would neither participate in nor finance U.N. peacekeeping operations unless clear U.S. national interests were involved.

There has been almost no public debate about the significance of this shift. The fundamental understanding on which the United Nations is based is that permanent members of the Security Council have global responsibilities, reaching beyond the narrowest definition of national interest. If they do not accept those responsibilities, there is no justification for a country like the United States to have a permanent seat on the Security Council and a veto over U.N. actions in the fields of peace and security. By adopting this new position, the Clinton Administration may have begun the process of de-legitimizing the privileged role the United States has enjoyed in the international system since World War II.

Damage, then, has been done to the cause of human rights in the last few years. The Administration says the right things but it takes decisions that undermine the goals it says it is pursuing.

Was there an alternative route? In fairness, Congress and the media should admit they were cheering the decision to support Yeltsin to the hilt. And the same Congress and media that pressed the Bush Administration to enter Somalia for the pursuit of humanitarian goals was denouncing the Clinton Administration for not getting U.S. troops out earlier.

Finally, there is no denying that a strong moral argument can be made that the Administration’s decision to concentrate on domestic problems is correct after the exertions of the Cold War. Our only compensation is that things are far worse in the land of our former antagonists. But the issue is one of balance.

One should also acknowledge that, unlike George Bush, Clinton has had the misfortune to be in office when the realities of the post-Cold War world are beginning to dawn on most Americans. When the Berlin Wall came down, the Warsaw Pact disappeared and the Soviet Union disintegrated, many Americans believed Washington could run the world.

On columnist announced the arrival of “the unipolar moment”--when the United States could tell the world how to govern itself. He was not the only one. During the presidential campaign, both Bush and Clinton joined him. Clinton called on America to “lead a global alliance for democracy as united and steadfast as the global alliance that defeated communism.” Bush called for a new world order “where the strong protect the weak (and) where people are governed by the rule of law and not by the tyranny of despots.”

What both men, and the country, did not realize is that the willingness of other states to follow U.S. leadership on controversial issues like democracy or human rights was related to their dependence on Washington to stand up to the Soviets. When that was no longer necessary, other countries felt freer to defy not only the United States but other powers.

A symbol of this new world order is tiny Singapore’s decision to reject Clinton’s request that an 18-year-old American convicted of vandalism not be flogged. Does this mean that U.S. power can no longer serve the cause of human rights? Not at all. But Washington policy-makers are going to have to be more cautious in their actions and more controlled in their rhetoric.

But in one respect, U.S. human-rights policy has been a spectacular success: The issue is now on the international agenda. Most governments are responsive, to some degree, to international concern and criticism. Even in the midst of a bitter civil war in Bosnia, combatants allowed international observers into their POW camps when inhumane conditions were exposed. China has not lived up to international demands for human-rights reform, but it has also not been unresponsive to international criticism.

Because U.S. policy has been successful, there is hope that the decline in U.S. leverage will be offset at least in part by rising international involvement. Non-governmental organizations have developed a far greater voice in human rights over the last 20 years. These organizations can be encouraged and better financed.

Another source of hope is the growing tendency of international financial organizations to take human-rights considerations into account when offering help. It is increasingly being recognized that a poorly run polity is unlikely to have a well-run economy.

The relationship is not one to one--too many successful authoritarian states in Asia demonstrate otherwise. But even here, growing respect for human rights is one aspect of their success. China is repressive, but compared with conditions under the Cultural Revolution, it has become a free country and the improved political conditions have been attributed to its spectacular economic success. Americans have to believe that China’s further development will continue to open up that critical country.

In the future, progress in human rights will be uneven. We will have more leverage on some countries than others. There will be serious setbacks--particularly during civil wars, when almost all restraint seems to disappear. But among established governments the direction of progress seems clear. Overall, the trend is toward greater respect, not less for the values that Americans hold dear.*