O.C. Jet Crash Tape Indicates Pilot Knew Risk

The pilot of a corporate jet that crashed in Santa Ana on Dec. 15, killing all aboard, knew he might encounter turbulence from a jet landing ahead of him but believed he could “do it,” transcripts of cockpit conversation reveal.

The documents show that the doomed flight of the twin-engine Westwind carrying the top two executives of the In-N-Out Burger Chain appeared normal until the plane suddenly spun out of control and dove to the ground near the Santa Ana Auto Mall.

The transcripts provided to The Times were made as part of the National Transportation Safety Board’s ongoing investigation of the crash.

They indicate that about a minute before the crash, co-pilot John O. McDaniel, 49, suggested that the Westwind was “kinda close” to the Boeing jet landing in front of them.

Although neither McDaniel nor pilot Stephen R. Barkin, 46, knew it at the time, the Boeing was a 757, a plane that has been shown to cause unusually powerful wake turbulence for an aircraft its size.

Aside from the discussion of whether they were too close to the bigger jet, cockpit communications appeared uneventful until the “sound of a deep breath” is heard from Barkin’s microphone, and McDaniel urged, “keep it going . . . keep it going around.” One second later, an expletive is heard; two seconds later, the cockpit tape ends.

The NTSB has yet to identify the cause of the accident, but turbulence from the United Airlines Boeing 757 that touched down safely in front of the Westwind at John Wayne Airport is suspected to have played a role.

Although aviation safety experts disagree on the level of danger involved, the 757’s narrow body and long, sleek wing design creates invisible “horizontal tornadoes” emanating from each wingtip that can be more potent and last longer than those made by other aircraft its size.

Wake turbulence poses the greatest danger during landing and takeoff, because the affected plane does not have enough airspace to carry out defensive maneuvers.

The Santa Ana accident has figured prominently in the deliberations of the NTSB and the Federal Aviation Administration, which subsequently have made safety recommendations and rule changes to try to prevent such accidents. In addition to the Westwind crash, in which five people died, at least four other 757-related accidents and incidents, claiming 13 lives, have occurred since December, 1992.

Since the Santa Ana crash, The Times has obtained hundreds of pages of documents from federal agencies, including the FAA, indicating that even FAA scientists began issuing warnings on the potential danger of 757 wake turbulence as far back as five years ago. Researchers and safety officials have recommended that trailing planes, especially smaller ones, be kept farther behind 757s than they had been until just recently.

Since the accidents, the Department of Transportation has been conducting a review to determine if the FAA ignored safety warnings about the 757 wake turbulence. The same subject will be taken up by a congressional subcommittee at a hearing scheduled for later this month.

The transcripts of cockpit and tower communications and other documents obtained by The Times revealed and confirmed new facts about the Westwind crash.

The Westwind jet was traveling faster than the 757, but Barkin and McDaniel intended to stay safely above and behind it.

In actuality, the Westwind was 400 feet below the flight path of the 757 when the smaller plane became hopelessly entangled in the 757’s wake turbulence.

In the moments before the crash, Barkin and McDaniel engaged in mostly mundane banter, including observations about the clear weather and the “nice lighting” on their plane.

But with the Westwind in landing configuration and in sight of the airport, McDaniel noted that the 757 was taking a steep approach, a situation that is especially dangerous to trailing aircraft, which generally must stay above the flight path of leading aircraft to avoid wake turbulence.

“He’s a little too high,” McDaniel said a minute and a half before the crash.

“Yeah, we’ll just sit here and slow down,” replied Barkin, who also indicated he would take a higher approach to avoid trouble.

A few seconds later, McDaniel again alluded to the hazardous situation they were in.

McDaniel: “Yeah, we might still get a little wake turbulence there . . . looks kinda close.”

Barkin: “Yeah, it’s close, but I think we’ll be OK.”

Just 38 seconds later, Barkin is heard taking a “deep breath,” perhaps indicating the precise moment when the Westwind rolled 360 degrees and plummeted to earth on a 45-degree angle.

The last sound on the cockpit tape came from McDaniel, who said, “Oh (expletive),” two seconds before the recording ends.

The transcripts, letters, reports, diagrams and other documents also:

* Confirm that air traffic controllers, while cautioning the Westwind to slow and make “S-turns” if necessary to stay far enough away from the 757, did not inform Barkin and McDaniel that they were following a 757. While that was not a requirement at the time, controllers now warn pilots of smaller planes if the plane in front of them is a 757.

* Show that weather conditions helped set the stage for the accident. With virtually no wind, the wake turbulence did not dissipate as fast as it would have if the wind was blowing.

* Indicate that both McDaniel and Barkin were experienced pilots, with approximately 5,400 and 8,200 flight hours, respectively.

At the time of the accident, the Westwind was 2.1 miles behind the 757. Starting July 1, the FAA began instructing its controllers to keep smaller planes like the Westwind four miles behind 757s on final approach. The rule change only applies when controllers are guiding planes in for landing, however; the Westwind was flying under visual flight rules, which meant that the pilot bore the primary responsibility for maintaining a safe-enough distance.

Yet, friends and relatives of the dead pilots and colleagues have maintained that, if the FAA had told pilots what it knew about the nature of 757 wake turbulence and instituted the same recently adopted safety measures earlier, then Barkin and McDaniel would have been more prudent.

The NTSB is expected to release its final report on the accident before the end of the year. In a preliminary report released in March, the agency’s accident investigators concluded that the crash could have been prevented if the pilot or air controllers had kept an adequate safety cushion between the Westwind and the 757.