FAA Considered Effect of 757 Ruling on Boeing Sales : Aviation: Perception of firm was weighed, documents show. Agency official says discussion was appropriate.
Federal Aviation Administration officials were concerned about the economic well-being and image of the Boeing company when they pondered whether to adopt measures to prevent accidents caused by potentially deadly wake turbulence from Boeing 757 jetliners, internal documents show.
In January, as the FAA was deciding what to do about 757 turbulence after the phenomenon had been linked to two fatal crashes, agency officials expressed concerns about how new safety measures would affect sales of the popular, fuel-efficient jetliner.
“It is probably desirable to coordinate with Boeing before this change is made,” the agency’s then-chief scientist Robert E. Machol wrote on Jan. 12, referring to a proposal to require smaller planes to stay an additional mile behind 757s on final approaches. “It could have an adverse effect on the sale of 757s, and while I am not a lawyer I suppose there is even some possibility that they could sue us.”
On a list of pros and cons drawn up in an analysis of possible consequences of the FAA’s taking action, a Jan. 25 chart lists as a con “Boeing’s perception.”
Contained in thousands of pages of documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, the references involving Boeing raise questions about a commonly leveled criticism that the FAA sometimes favors the well-being of the industry over public safety in its decision-making process.
Deputy FAA Administrator Linda Hall Daschle said Wednesday it was “appropriate” for the agency to seek out all sides of the issue.
“That is what due process is all about,” Daschle said. “What would be inappropriate,” she said, would be to give greater weight to Boeing’s view, and “that was not done.”
Boeing communications manager Jerry Johnson said Wednesday that he had not seen the documents and therefore could not comment on whether it was appropriate for the FAA to consider Boeing’s interests in a safety matter.
“The FAA is the one that determines the regulations,” Johnson said. “Safety is first and foremost our greatest concern on any issue.”
Machol, who retired as FAA chief scientist April 30, said Wednesday that he had expressed concern about the possibility of Boeing suing the FAA because he “thought it was a consideration.”
Machol emphasized that he did not intend to suggest that Boeing be allowed undue influence over the decision-making process. “I know there’s a feeling out there that the FAA doesn’t consider safety,” he said. “The truth is we try to get along well--and we do get along well--especially with Boeing.”
Released this week over objections from some within the FAA, the previously undisclosed documents also indicate:
* Beginning as far back as 1988 and continuing until recently, Boeing had lobbied against increased spacing for aircraft landing behind 757s even though aviation officials had pushed for such a measure in the interest of safety.
* The FAA’s Flight Standards Office recognized that there was something unique about the 757’s turbulence as far back as 1987.
In addition, in April, 1988, the Air Line Pilots Assn. red-flagged the issue in a letter to the FAA and formally requested that the agency test the sleek-bodied 757 to determine why pilots were reporting that it seemed to produce much stronger wake turbulence than other airplanes in its weight class.
An earlier set of FAA documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act suggested that the agency had only become aware of the 757 phenomenon in mid-1990. The FAA never responded to the pilots association letter or its request; the kinds of tests it sought are under way.
* Concerns within the agency about its image, the threat of lawsuits and airport capacity appeared, at times, to eclipse concerns about safety.
“We really have very little choice on this,” Machol wrote on Jan. 14, a month after five people died in Santa Ana when a corporate jet encountered 757 wake turbulence, and 13 months after a similar crash in Billings, Mont., killed eight people. “We are under pressure from the media.”
The FAA’s Daschle said perception is a legitimate part of the decision-making process, especially on controversial issues.
* Although some FAA officials believed that action was unnecessary, others noted the organization’s lack of response on the 757 issue.
Referring to a list of safety concerns and recommendations promulgated by Machol in October, 1992--before any of the fatal accidents--one unidentified official scribbled on a route slip: “Shouldn’t we urge/promote implementation of those (recommendations) we know he’s right on, and sponsor research where questions remain?
“I’m a bit nervous just ‘sitting’ on this stuff,” the official wrote.
In February, air crew program manager Glenn Holmbeck wrote to the Office of Accident Investigation in the Recommendation and Quality Assurance division: “Daily, we are risking the traveling public by not addressing the B-757 wake turbulence problem.
“Any good safety program has got to be proactive (preventive), not reactive. Our customers are the traveling public (taxpayers), who pay our salaries and not the industry that we are supposed to be regulating.”
The revelations have surfaced after an internal review that concluded that the FAA may have mishandled reports that 757s cause unusual turbulence, and that the agency should view the 757 issue as a “wake-up call” to reform the way it handles potential safety hazards.
A congressional subcommittee is scheduled to take up the agency’s handling of the 757 issue today, as well as the larger issue of the agency’s ability to identify and act upon safety concerns.
Only after five incidents, including two that claimed 13 lives, did the FAA institute measures designed to prevent accidents caused by 757 turbulence. Announced by FAA Administrator David R. Hinson in May, the new program includes an aggressive education requirement for pilots and air traffic controllers, and a requirement that smaller planes flying under instrument flight rules--those being guided by controllers--remain four miles, instead of the standard three miles, behind 757s during landings.
Pilots flying under visual flight rules, which generally call for the pilot to determine how closely he or she follows a leading plane, are urged to keep the longer distance.
Although officials disagree on the level of danger, the 757’s smooth body and wing design appears to make it capable of producing unusually potent wake turbulence--volatile funnels of air with hurricane-force winds that emanate from each wingtip.
The FAA has concluded that until recently there was insufficient evidence to make any changes relating to 757s, and that nothing it could have done would have prevented the 13 fatalities.
“The reality,” Daschle said, “is that up until (a recent crash in) Charlotte, you had 27 months where more than a billion people flew without an accident involving a major commercial airline.”
The FAA for years has resisted efforts to call attention to the 757 issue or increase separation distances because it could potentially decrease the number of flights at major airports, which could cut into airline revenues. By law, the agency is bound to promote the airline industry and ensure safety--missions that many believe are contradictory.
Daschle acknowledged that the FAA’s twin responsibilities sometimes put it in a position of asking itself some hard questions, but she maintained that the agency performs both tasks well.
“We have been able to accomplish the job that Congress gave to us,” she said. “I’ve seen more occasions where safety has come first.”
Among other things, the newly released documents indicate that Boeing has been involved in the 757 decision-making process from early on, and that FAA officials were sympathetic to how the controversy would affect the company.
The papers include:
* A handwritten report indicating that Boeing officials participated in a wake turbulence meeting in January at which it was decided that the FAA should “avoid” characterizing the wake turbulence hazard as a problem associated with a particular plane, such as the Boeing 757.
* An October, 1992, memo from Anthony Broderick, the FAA’s associate administrator for regulation and certification, saying: “We will most certainly antagonize Boeing by moving their ‘large’ B-757 into the ‘heavy’ or some special weight category.”
Broderick was referring to the weight classification scheme used to determine landing distances between planes. Some safety experts have said the 757, now classified as “large,” belongs in the “heavy” category, which would mean that smaller planes would have to stay five or six miles back instead of four miles.
