Oil and Politics Make For Dangerous Mix in Nigeria

Notwithstanding President Bill Clinton’s heartfelt words that “Africa matters to the United States,” the 1990s may become the decade of U.S. disengagement from Africa. Much of what happens in Africa is simply of no major consequence to U.S. strategic or economic interests.

Nigeria--and its struggle for democracy--should be the exception. With 90 million people and abundant natural resources, it looms as both a regional and continental military power looked to by other African states to provide Pan-African security and stability.

In the 15 months since the military government of Gen. Sani Abacha annulled the results of the country’s first free civilian elections in more than a decade and jailed the apparent winner, Nigeria has been in an economic and political tailspin. Its two powerful oil unions have undertaken a general strike to protest the continued rule of Abacha and the imprisonment of President-elect Moshood K.O. Abiola. Simply put, the oil workers have demanded the reinstatement of the election results, the unconditional release of Abiola and a series of industry-related reforms. Their weapon of choice--withholding labor from the nation’s premier industry--was a potentially devastating tactic, given the Nigerian government’s near-total dependence on oil revenues for subsistence.

Last week, the unions unexpectedly suspended their strike, handing the Abacha government a temporary victory. But now the story may take a new turn, intersecting the goals of the Clinton Administration and the economic interests of U.S. oil companies.

During the course of the strike, all foreign oil companies were repeatedly asked by union leaders to suspend their operations in deference to, if not solidarity with, the Nigerian oil unions. Both U.S. and British companies rejected the request. Their operations allowed the military government to maintain a steady trickle (reduced from a stream) of oil revenue. In the eyes of the leaders of the National Union of Petroleum and National Gas Workers, the oil companies are equally, if not more, culpable for the loss of life incurred by striking workers.

In a broadcast in August, Abacha thanked “our major partners in the oil industry, and others, who under very strenuous and difficult circumstances have stood resolutely by us. We urge you to continue in this spirit.” Apparently, Abacha’s paean to U.S. and other foreign oil companies was sufficient to clear their corporate consciences of any responsibility for supporting a repressive regime.

Indeed, it appears U.S. oil companies operating in Nigeria have demonstrated little concern for anything other than their bottom lines. Most consider their posture and practice to be apolitical. But human-rights and pro-democracy groups and unions have accused them of ignoring workers rights and of polluting the environment. A U.S. petroleum executive conceded that foreign companies can operate in Nigeria in ways they cannot do just a few miles off the coast of California.

The implications of oil-company complicity in Abacha’s repression emerge into full relief against the backdrop of the Clinton Administration’s policy toward Nigeria. The Administration, recognizing that something must be done to end the crisis, has imposed limited sanctions, including restrictions on foreign aid. High-level envoys have been, or will be, sent to pursue talks with Abacha. The cooling of U.S.-Nigeria relations is likely to continue as long as Abacha’s regime remains in power and refuses to acknowledge and respond to the tide of democratic yearning sweeping his country.

Rep. Donald M. Payne (D-N.J.), a leading member of the House Africa Committee and the next likely chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, has directed the Government Accounting Office to determine the potential effects a U.S. embargo on Nigerian oil would have on loosening Abacha’s grip. The study’s preliminary findings indicate that an embargo would not adversely affect the supply of oil in the United States. Any loss of Nigerian oil could readily be replaced with petroleum from the Baltics. As for its impact on Nigeria, the study concludes that U.S. action must be coupled with multilateral action to accomplish the intended result.

Meantime, Abacha, buoyed by his apparent victory over the Nigerian oil workers, has begun to rule by decree. In the 24-hour period following the strike’s suspension, he issued five decrees, one abolishing several newspapers, another allowing for detention without charge or trial and a third declaring himself the ultimate and absolute authority with jurisdiction over all courts.

Some Africa experts caution against unrealistic expectations for the success of U.S. sanctions or diplomatic measures. For a diplomatic resolution to occur, each party must have exhausted its best efforts at achieving its objectives, creating an impasse. Those conditions were present two weeks ago; they are not today. Stronger measures may be necessary.

No one is sure whether the Nigerian oil workers will resume their struggle for democracy--time will tell. If we remember anything about the strike, it should be that the oil workers struck until the empty bellies of their children could no longer allow them to continue. The pennies more we now pay at the gas pump is a much smaller price, and far smaller tribute, than their efforts deserve.