Mr. President--Is This Really What America Wants to Do? : A Haiti invasion alone hardly makes sense; a tough sell for Clinton tonight

President Clinton will address the nation tonight on a possible U.S. invasion of Haiti. As in the past when a commitment of military power appeared imminent, the President can no doubt count on the initial support of the American people, who at such times instinctively rally behind both the commander in chief and the men and women he is putting in harm’s way. But in the case of Haiti, Clinton has a special obligation to be candid and forceful in discussing why such a profoundly serious step--one involving the almost inevitable loss of lives among U.S. military personnel and the Haitians who engage them--is necessary. For, as Wednesday’s Senate debate on Haiti clearly showed, there is great doubt regarding not just the need for U.S. military action but the very wisdom of trying to impose any coercive resolution to Haiti’s long political crisis.

A good argument can be made for using force to oust the military junta in Port-au-Prince. Its members are an extremely unpleasant lot who three years ago arrested and exiled the first popularly elected president in the nation’s history, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Since then they have resisted U.N. efforts to restore Aristide that used both the carrot of diplomacy and the stick of economic sanctions. A year ago the junta even went so far as to sign and then arrogantly reject a U.N. agreement for Aristide to return. In the meantime the junta has harshly suppressed the Haitian people, killing hundreds and driving thousands more into desperate exile in the United States and elsewhere.

The best argument Clinton has for using U.S. power to restore Aristide is the fact that during the nine months the former Roman Catholic priest was in the presidency the flow of illegal immigrants from Haiti to the United States declined. That is no small achievement, especially when viewed from states like California and Florida that feel the impact of illegal immigration most directly. So while Aristide may be a controversial figure in the United States, he was so popular in Haiti that he was elected with more than 67% of the vote and was so admired that he inspired many poor Haitians to stay home rather than flee abroad.

While Aristide clearly should be returned to the presidency to which he was honestly and openly elected, the tougher question facing Clinton would be how to keep Aristide in power once U.S. military forces achieved the initial objective of defeating the junta. No serious military analyst doubts U.S. forces could easily overwhelm Haiti’s military. And while U.S. casualties of any number would be painful, most experts believe they would be light. The real military challenge that Haiti poses is what to do once we’re there. In other words, getting in would be relatively easy; getting out may be hard.

Clinton must not forget that the last time U.S. troops intervened in a Haitian political crisis, in 1915, they wound up staying for 19 years. And 60 years after the last U.S. troops left Haiti there is precious little evidence the troubled nation is better off for that U.S. intervention.

It is possible, of course, that all the invasion preparations are a bluff--aimed at pushing the junta’s leaders into fleeing to exile like other Caribbean dictators before them. If so, we fervently hope it works. But before any fighting begins, the Administration should explain what U.S. forces would do once the violence ended. What plan, for instance, does it have to assist Aristide in nation-building once he is restored?

The only real guarantee the American public will have that U.S. troops won’t have to intervene in Haiti again, sometime in the next century, is for that nation to be transformed from the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere to a stable democracy with a modicum of prosperity for its people. That’s a much tougher task than defeating a ragtag army.

An invasion per se is doable--and maybe even justifiable, but it is hard to see how it would solve Haiti’s deep political and economic problems. In the final analysis, President Clinton needs to lay out a far more convincing long-range game plan than he has to date.