The Real Nuclear Issue: Reunification Anxiety

Nearly six months later, the controversial nuclear accord between the United States and North Korea appears to many like Samuel Johnson’s description of second marriages: a triumph of hope over experience. The accord halted North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program in exchange for a package of economic and diplomatic rewards, but snags over a key part of the deal threaten to unravel it.

U.S.-North Korea talks foundered last week when Pyongyang tried to marginalize South Korea’s role in the $4-billion light-water reactor project, demanded more aid and hinted it might unfreeze its nuclear ambitions if a contract for the new reactors is not reached by April 21, as the accord calls for.

Pyongyang’s brinkmanship is expected but its refusal to accept South Korea’s role in the reactor project reveals a larger, potentially dangerous game between the two Koreas that could lead to conflict.

The United States has set up a consortium, the Korean Energy Development Organization, to finance and build the reactors. Seoul, with an eye toward eventual unification, and fearful of a collapse in the North, has agreed to ante up $2 billion. Japan will contribute $1 billion, with the remainder coming from other Asian and European nations.

Clearly, South Korea will not foot half its cost and then allow the North to dictate the project’s terms. U.S. negotiators say that North Korea has begun to be more flexible on this point. But all the political wrangling reflects quite different views of the Korean nuclear issue, which explain why the accord may be in trouble.

Throughout, North Korea has viewed its nuclear program as the ultimate bargaining chip of an outmoded, isolated communist regime with a failing econo- my. In Pyongyang’s eyes, the United States is key to its quest for survival. The North Koreans have sought diplomatic ties with Washington to win legitimacy, to reduce a perceived military threat from the South and to obtain economic aid and international investment.

Above all, North Korea has endeavored to use the United States to gain leverage over South Korea. This is why it has consistently defined the nuclear-weapons dispute as one solely between it and Washington. A flawed U.S. policy, which has concentrated on putting out the fire of the nuclear crisis, has allowed Pyongyang to get away with it, putting Washington into the middle of issues that ultimately must be resolved between North and South in their quest for national reconciliation and reunification.

This dynamic has allowed the North to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea. The popular view from Seoul is that Washington has pushed it aside and kept it out of the negotiating room. The prospect of Japanese food aid to and diplomatic recognition of North Korea deepens the anxiety. No amount of U.S.-South Korean consultation can compensate for this feeling of exclusion.

The weight of public opinion, amplified by the country’s new identity as a young democracy, is heavy on the Kim Young Sam administration. Under ordinary circumstances, deciding how to deal with the North is vexing. With major elections in June, the North Korean problem can become overwhelming for the South.

Consider North Korea’s history: It started the Korean War in 1950, which left millions of Koreans dead. It engaged in a series of terrorist acts, including the assassinations of top South Korean officials, in 1983, and the bombing of a South Korean airliner, in 1987. The result is unrelenting hostility and suspicion in the South toward the North.

Yet, reunification is a powerful emotional force for all Koreans, and for both North and South, the nuclear issue is but one part of this larger drama. Both sides have unveiled plans for a gradual, phased-in reconciliation. But the larger problem is that South Korea has yet to decide how to deal with the North.

Some in the South, understandably, see the North as an organization of thugs that should be eliminated. But if the North is pushed until it breaks, as these South Koreans would like, Pyongyang may launch a desperate military attack. Others, particularly in the business community, want to create a “soft landing” for reunification by building economic and social ties and reducing arms.

These conflicting views make it difficult for Seoul to pursue a clear and steady course. President Kim’s occasional blasts at Washington testify to such pressures, which are magnified by the upcoming parliamentary and regional elections.

Since North Korea will continue to play its leverage games, the United States and South Korea need to conduct some soul-searching discussions on how to fold the nuclear accord into a larger strategy for North-South detente and reconciliation. The logic of the nuclear deal is a “buyout” of the North. It also assumes that the North sees its least bad choice as modernizing its economy and engaging Seoul and the West. But this requires winding down 40 years of confrontation.

Until both North and South get past their zero-sum gamesmanship, the nuclear accord will remain a surrogate for larger, unresolved issues.