PERSPECTIVE ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE : Why Provoke the Arab World? : Legislation to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem is the kind of gratuitous political blunder that has backfired before.

As Congress considers legislation introduced by Republican leaders to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, members should reflect on a congressional resolution passed in haste in March, 1990, declaring Jerusalem the unified capital of Israel. Although the resolution was barely noticed in the United States, Sen. Bob Dole, one of its co-sponsors, was startled enough by reactions he heard during a trip to the Middle East to declare: “Let me do something we don’t do much around here--admit I made a mistake. I should have said more loudly, wait a second, let’s look at this. I certainly shouldn’t have signed on this resolution.”

The mistake was costly. Within weeks, at a meeting of Arab leaders, Saddam Hussein exploited rising anti-American sentiments in the region for his own ambitious ends. Ultimately, his naked aggression against Kuwait the following August was partly based on the assumption that the Arabs would not cooperate in any U.S. attempt to thwart him. Fortunately, this was a miscalculation, as his act was so transparent and threatening that Arab leaders could not allow him to succeed.

This time, congressional leaders do not have to visit Arab and Muslim countries to ascertain the potential consequences of the new legislation, which, in yet another turnabout, presidential aspirant Dole is sponsoring. Discussions with members of the Israeli government will do. Although Israelis are unified in the depth of their feelings toward Jerusalem, many understand how deeply Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims also feel about the city. That is why negotiating its status was postponed by the Palestinian-Israeli agreement. Any change in the status quo in the meantime will jeopardize the Arab-Israeli peace process, which is now in a state of stalemate, halted by terrorism on the one hand and by continued Israeli settlement in Jerusalem and the vicinity on the other.

The issue of Jerusalem is bigger than Palestinian-Israeli relations; it is an Islamic issue as well. It affects the regional tensions between U.S.-supported governments and radical Islamic movements. It also has the potential of slowing Jordanian-Israeli normalization and delaying the Syrian-Israeli peace.

It is tempting to assume that public sentiments do not matter in the Middle East where states have no apparent options besides accepting the status quo. But, as in 1990, there are always those who will exploit despair and frustration for their own ends, and there are always surprises: No one predicted the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait before it was imminent. And in 1973, Egypt and Syria defied conventional wisdom by launching a war against Israel that they knew they could not win. When people feel that they have been left with only bad options, they often choose the wrong bad option. The U.S. task should be not to devalue the possibilities for peace in Arab and Israeli eyes, but to help both sides see its potential benefits.

It should be obvious to members of Congress that the proposed legislation will have a negative effect on the prospects for Arab-Israeli peace. Perhaps not so obvious is the likely effect on Israeli politics in ways that would not serve U.S. interests. Although the Rabin government is unenthusiastic about the timing of this legislation, it cannot say so publicly; it cannot appear less committed to Jerusalem than the U.S. Congress. Yet what Congress is doingplays into the hands of the opposition parties who wish to undermine the Palestinian-Israeli agreement. It leaves the Israeli government in a no-win situation.

The trick of leadership is to anticipate policy consequences beforehand, and then do what’s right. The right thing in this case is to keep Jerusalem out of U.S. politics. The costs may be too high for U.S. interests--and for the next President.