Reckoning Time in Bosnia : Bombs and bullets, along with strong words, will get the Serbs’ attention and force them to stop their aggressive ways. But does the West have the guts to stand fast?

The crisis in Bosnia has reached a long overdue turning point. Serb capture of hundreds of U.N. peacekeepers underscores the absurdity of dropping light ly armed troops into the middle of a war zone and telling them to keep the peace. The downing of a U.S. aircraft forces the Clinton Administration to take a stand on whether Americans should be prepared to die for Bosnia. Time and again, the United States and its NATO allies have threatened to punish the Serbs if they continue efforts to carve up Bosnia and attack civilian centers and the U.N. troops supposedly protecting them. Time and again, the Serbs have shown these threats hollow and made a mockery of the Western powers and their institutions.

NATO allies can no longer hide behind the illusion that maintaining a token U.N. force in Bosnia and dropping an occasional bomb on the Serbs are better than doing nothing. They are not. The war is being prolonged. The Bosnian Muslims continue to hold out, buoyed by the prospect of outside help that is not forthcoming. The gap between Western rhetoric and Western action is eating away at the fabric of Europe and whatever is left of a transatlantic community of civil, democratic states.

NATO allies now have to choose between two options. They must either come clean about the limits of their willingness to use force in Bosnia and let the Serbs have their way, which will at least stop the charade even if it rewards Serb aggression. Or they must up the ante, giving U.N. troops the ability to protect themselves and carrying out a sustained air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs aimed at pressing them to accept a negotiated settlement. The second course is far preferable. But it requires what has thus far been most lacking among NATO allies: determination and guts.

The Serbs have all along threatened to retaliate against U.N. peacekeepers in response to NATO attacks on Serb positions. Now that they have done so, a continuation of the status quo is untenable. Confronted with the prospect of a hostage crisis after each air strike, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can no longer credibly claim that it will retaliate against Serb attacks on Bosnia’s designated “safe areas.” NATO’s strategy of coercive diplomacy, already undermined by repeated bouts of unanswered Serb aggression, has been defanged.

Because the Serbs have called NATO’s bluff, members of the Atlantic Alliance must do some serious soul-searching. Is the fate of Bosnia important enough to justify deeper military involvement and the consequent risks? Will not NATO and the European Union lose popular support and relevance in the post-Cold War landscape if they punt on Bosnia? Are American, British and French leaders prepared to stay the course and see through a strategy of escalation even when their soldiers die and domestic criticism mounts?

Unless policy-makers in NATO countries can affirm with confidence that they are prepared to stand up to Serb resolve, it is time to throw in the towel. It is far better to assert that the interests at stake in Bosnia do not warrant further Western involvement than to continue undermining Western institutions and cohesion by shrinking from the challenge every time the Serbs test NATO. And the Bosnian Muslims need to hear that they are on their own--if that is indeed the case. Otherwise, they will continue to assume that the West is behind them and wait for a better deal.

No harm will be done if U.N. peacekeepers are left in Bosnia as a fig leaf--delivering food and medicine whenever Serb forces are in the mood to allow it. But NATO’s empty threats to defend them and the safe areas will have to end. And so will any hope of winning more land for the Bosnian Muslims and foiling the forces of virulent nationalism that will have succeeded in creating a Greater Serbia.

If NATO is unprepared to cut and run, it has only one other option: a strategy of graduated escalation and coercive diplomacy aimed at punishing the Serbs and forcing their hand at the negotiating table. In light of Bosnia’s proximity to areas of vital interest to NATO members, the potential for the war to spread if Serb aggression goes unchecked, and the damaging effect that inaction is having on the West and its institutions, this strategy is far preferable. But NATO should pursue it if, and only if, its members are willing to accept the risks involved and put their troops’ lives on the line to return peace to the Balkans.

A strategy of graduated escalation should be implemented in three phases. During phase one, U.N. forces in Bosnia should be redeployed to concentrated, fortified positions. At the same time, they should be reinforced in number and provided the armor and rules of engagement that would enable them to defend against Serb attack. The smaller U.N. contingents in remote areas would have to be withdrawn and redeployed to these more defensible positions. The United States should be prepared to introduce ground troops into Bosnia to help U.N. units move to the new posts.

Implicit in the relocation of U.N. peacekeepers would be a change in their overall mission. They would not be charged with conducting a full-scale ground war in Bosnia, but they would be freed from the absurd restrictions currently placed on their operations. Instead, these forces would defend select zones and be given a robust combat capability to respond with force when challenged. Humanitarian relief missions, if they continue, would be protected by the necessary armor and heavy weaponry. To achieve these goals, the forces should be removed from U.N. command and put under the operational control of NATO or of an ad hoc command staffed by the countries with troops on the ground.

If countries now contributing troops to the U.N. force object to this more ambitious mission, they should withdraw their soldiers--even if doing so eventually leads to complete removal of outside forces from Bosnia. For far too long, the presence of exposed U.N. troops has prevented a more firm NATO response to Serb aggression. And although U.N. forces have saved lives and provided supplies to isolated communities, they are like Band-Aids, dealing only with the symptoms of the disease that is ravaging Bosnia, not its cause. If NATO is prepared to carry out a more sustained air campaign against the Serbs and the presence of U.N. peacekeepers continues to block such action, it is time for the United Nations to get out of the way.

After U.N. forces have been either redeployed or withdrawn, NATO would respond to further Serb aggression through a sustained campaign of air strikes against Serb positions. During this second phase of operations, the Atlantic Alliance would bomb not just isolated artillery pieces or ammunition dumps, but a wide range of targets. The severity and scope of its attacks would increase over time, in step with Serb behavior. Initial targets would include military installations and supply depots. If necessary, NATO air attacks would expand to include command-and-control centers, bridges and other transportation infrastructure.

NATO will not be able to defeat the Bosnian Serbs from the air. But it is capable of punishing Serb behavior and making Serb aggression far more costly. At present, the Serbs have no reason to make territorial concessions; they hold virtually all the cards. The tables will turn, however, when the Serbs themselves come under prolonged and wide-ranging attack. As the costs of intransigence mount, a negotiated settlement will look more and more attractive.

Phase three entails lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. Should the Serbs fail to moderate their demands when faced with NATO air attacks or respond by stepping up “ethnic cleansing,” Western powers should give the Muslims the ability to defend themselves. NATO countries have rightly determined that the interests at stake in Bosnia do not warrant the deployment of large numbers of NATO troops in a combat role. But that judgment, unless NATO is willing to write off Bosnia, obligates NATO members to help the Bosnian Muslims defend themselves.

President Bill Clinton will have his work cut out for him if he is to persuade the European allies to lift the arms embargo. And he must do so before NATO embarks on a strategy of graduated escalation. NATO cannot afford to challenge Serb defiance, only to find itself again backing away because of disagreement among the allies or because NATO members lack the nerve to make good on their promises.

This three-phase strategy offers the best hope for long-term peace in the former Yugoslavia and for eradicating the aggressive strains of nationalism that have infected the Serbs. It will also revitalize NATO and the European Union at a time when Western institutions desperately need direction and purpose.

It is, however, a course that requires more determination and nerve than NATO members have thus far been able to muster. If that nerve is still in short supply, NATO should come clean and call it a day in Bosnia. The options are clear. So is the right choice. Let’s hope the United States and its allies are up to it.