Next Step : The Men Behind Russia’s President : Yeltsin survived a parliamentary challenge by shuffling his Cabinet. But security and military hawks still have his ear.

In a head-spinning turnaround, even for a country accustomed to whiplash, President Boris N. Yeltsin has been brought back from the political dead at a fateful juncture in Russia’s post-Communist era.

But his miraculous rebound from a period of costly bungling has only intensified rumors of backstage management of the ailing and erratic leader. At issue is his reliance on hawkish officials who control army, police and security forces.

After firing government ministers that he had publicly blamed for plunging Russia into its disastrous war with the rebellious republic of Chechnya, Yeltsin has shuffled the deck to create a new hierarchy in Moscow. But this command appears no more disposed to compromise and possible peace than its predecessor was when the brutal and politically debilitating war began in December.

Although Yeltsin survived a bloodless power struggle earlier this month with the lower house of Parliament, the Duma, the same shadowy security and military hawks blamed for his political troubles survived the shake-up and continue to have his ear.

* Defense Minister Pavel S. Grachev, the official held most responsible for the agony and atrocities of Chechnya, has retained his post, escaped high-level censure and hardened his opposition to withdrawing federal troops from the breakaway republic.

* Presidential Security Service chief Alexander V. Korzhakov, the former KGB general said to be Yeltsin’s closest adviser, remains in control of the inner circle and the flow of intelligence to the president.

* Viktor F. Yerin, the former Interior minister sent packing in the symbolic Cabinet shake-up June 30, re-emerged last week to assume a key espionage post as deputy chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

* In Yerin’s place at the Interior Ministry, whose troops have been accused of savagery against Chechen civilians, Yeltsin named Gen. Anatoly S. Kulikov, the commander of Moscow’s forces in the bloody, 7-month-old conflict.

Yeltsin’s triumph in neutralizing the unruly and oppositionist Duma has been heralded by political analysts as an encouraging sign of Russia’s growing political maturity. It marked the first time this century that a major power struggle in Moscow was resolved through constitutional procedures.

But the 64-year-old president continues to show signs of poor health, dependence on drugs or alcohol and unwavering loyalty to the so-called “party of war.” As a result, many political players here have begun to dread a reelection bid by Yeltsin next year almost as much as they once feared the prospect of a successor regime.

Yeltsin’s popularity has plummeted from the 1991 pinnacle when he rallied democratic forces in the failed coup against Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev. The longtime pol and populist has evolved from crusading Communist to democratic reform champion to unpredictable nationalist ever ready to play the military card.

And to keep the tanks revving in the background to underscore the risks of taking him on, Yeltsin is beholden, analysts say, to the generals and secret police chiefs of Russia’s vast defense and security empire.

Defense Minister Grachev “is absolutely safe for the time being, not because he has proven to be talented or efficient but because he has shown himself to be loyal,” said Nikolai K. Svanidze, chief political analyst for the nightly TV news program “Podrobnosti” (Details).

It was Grachev who delivered when Yeltsin called for federal troops and tanks to fire on the Russian Parliament building in October, 1993, crushing a political revolt in a battle that took at least 150 lives.

Alexander V. Minkin, political commentator for the daily Moskovsky Komsomolets, says Yeltsin’s allegiance to Grachev is a hedge against the armed forces being turned against him and an illustration of the president’s drift from political reality.

“People who commit crimes together come to depend on each other to get away with it,” Minkin said of the alliance between Yeltsin and Grachev. “They are as thick as thieves.”

While Grachev is widely despised and his bloody campaign in Chechnya a serious detriment to Yeltsin’s once-democratic image, “to move against a guy who sent tanks against Parliament once already is a very difficult decision to make,” Minkin said.

He also speculated that Yeltsin, with an approval rating around 4% in recent polls, may have written off his chances of reelection and delegated too much authority to his influential security entourage.

“He cannot do anything to change the situation and, if he really understands what is happening in the country now, this would explain his drinking,” Minkin said of recent public appearances in which the president was clearly under the influence of alcohol or drugs. “This is a classic Russian way of obliterating reality.”

While Grachev appeared secure in his job after the cosmetic shake-up, some political observers say the defense minister might be sacrificed closer to the June, 1996, presidential elections, especially if the Chechen conflict continues to smear Yeltsin’s popular standing.

“I think Grachev is doomed. He will be needed as a big sacrifice for the whole crisis in Chechnya,” said Vyacheslav A. Nikonov, a Duma deputy from the liberal Party of Russian Unity and Accord.

Yeltsin was all but written off as a serious contender for reelection after the Chechen hostage-taking episode in the Russian town of Budennovsk last month in which more than 120 people were killed. The president drew widespread scorn for flying off to an economic summit of world leaders in Canada, where he alternately frolicked and fumed while Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin dealt with the crisis at home.

Yet Yeltsin emerged a changed man after a few days of lying low upon his return. Rather than taking a symbolic no-confidence vote by the Duma in stride, he invoked a constitutional device to challenge the legislators to withdraw the denunciation or reaffirm it and face dissolution and early elections.

The president fired Interior Minister Yerin, intelligence chief Sergei V. Stepashin and a deputy prime minister, Nikolai D. Yegorov, to appear compliant with the Duma. But his refusal to reprimand Grachev and his immediate appointment of Yerin to an espionage post restored the hard-line status quo days after the Duma standoff.

It was a masterstroke of defiance that forced the parliamentary rivals to back down out of fear they would fare poorly in elections without the perquisites of incumbency, such as chauffeured cars, fax machines, telephones and a platform in the media limelight.

Some analysts believe Yeltsin recognized the desperate state of his reputation upon his return from Canada and maneuvered, in the interests of preserving reform and democracy, to position Chernomyrdin as a possible successor.

“It would be a tremendous legacy if he does decide to step aside and create the first peaceful transfer of power” in modern-day Russia, said Michael McFaul, a Stanford University political science professor here on a fellowship with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “It is rare in history when big, powerful politicians have recognized the wisdom in stepping down before they have to.”

But McFaul and other analysts also fear that the president has no such intention and warn that another term of office for him could be a smoke screen for figures such as Korzhakov, the security service chief, to run the country from behind the scenes.

“Five years is a long time for a guy who already looks like Brezhnev,” McFaul said of Yeltsin, comparing his recent bouts of incoherence with the latter days of Soviet-era leader Leonid I. Brezhnev. “I worry about the guys who might actually be running the country--guys like Korzhakov.”

Despite the weak Duma, a government wholly dependent on Yeltsin and his proclivity for strange behavior, few believe Grachev and others in the “party of war” controlling security and military affairs would risk staging a military coup against the constitutional powers with the armed forces in such disarray.

The Russian government, forced to stay within its budget by the international lending community, has fallen into arrears in funds for military districts in its efforts to gather up money for the costly campaign against Chechnya. Moscow media have reported that food supplies to some units have been cut off because the army is delinquent in paying its suppliers.

The army is considered too fractured in the upper echelon and too apathetic in the rank and file for a successful move against an elected government.

Mass desertions from the Chechnya campaign forces and epidemic draft-dodging have made clear even to the most bellicose generals that their troops cannot be counted on in a grab for power.

Another curb on the possible rise of a junta is the powerful Presidential Security Service led by Korzhakov, who has used his position as Yeltsin’s chief bodyguard and most trusted adviser to expand his empire to engulf rival security forces within the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Russian media also claim he wields tremendous power in the arms industry and is benefiting financially from prolongation of the Chechnya war.

Jane’s Intelligence Review reported in March that Korzhakov, a strong proponent of the Chechnya crackdown that has taken an estimated 20,000 lives, prevented Yeltsin from seeing reports advising against the December invasion.

The hold of Yerin, the sacked Interior minister, on Yeltsin is considered more a personal bond. The career police officer is a favorite tennis partner of the president. But even Kremlin insiders were surprised by the lateral transfer given to Yerin after his Interior Ministry troops were accused of committing atrocities in Chechnya.

By sacking Yerin only to rescue his career a few days later, Yeltsin--and the “power ministers” who stand behind him--reminded political rivals of the force they tried to contend with while preserving the Duma and the trappings of a constitutional state.

“Without the Duma, Russia is not a democratic country,” said Moskovsky Komsomolets’ Minkin, arguing that it is hardly a democracy anyway but needs the facade to maintain support from abroad. “The Duma may be ineffective and irresponsible, but it is a very important piece of decoration for the West.”