Data-Gathering Flaws Cited for Failed Waco Raid

Federal agents who carried out the raid that led to a 51-day siege of a religious sect’s fortified compound two years ago near Waco, Tex., were unsuccessful because of unreliable intelligence and inadequate communication, experts testified on Thursday.

Donald A. Bassett, a former crisis-management specialist for the FBI, testified on the second day of congressional hearings on events at Waco that the raid was doomed. The raid could not have succeeded without the element of surprise, he said.

The faulty gathering and dissemination of intelligence, Bassett said, failed to alert officials that members of the Branch Davidian sect had been forewarned of the raid.

Bassett, who had studied the matter in 1993 on behalf of the Treasury Department, called the breakdown in intelligence gathering a major concern. His conclusions were shared Thursday by Wade Y. Ishimoto, a counterterrorism consultant who contributed to the Treasury Department’s 1993 review.

Bassett also testified that authorities “would have greatly reduced the risks” of the February, 1993, raid if they had arrested sect leader David Koresh during one of his trips away from the heavily armed compound.

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As the hearings continued into the 51-day confrontation that left four federal agents and more than 80 sect members dead, Republicans and Democrats continued to clash over law enforcement’s performance. Their imbroglio has amounted to a partisan role reversal:

Democrats, seeking to protect the Clinton Administration from criticism for the Waco tragedy, defended the actions of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Republicans--most of whom have opposed stronger gun controls--complained about what they depicted as overreaching by the ATF and other law enforcement officials.

Yet the Republicans excused Ishimoto as a witness without asking him to comment on his earlier finding that ATF communications during the raid were harmed by the agency’s use of military helicopters.

Ishimoto had written in a September, 1993, Treasury Department report on the Waco siege that ATF officials erred by not staying with their original plan to use helicopters provided by the U.S. Customs Service. The ATF flew National Guard helicopters instead.

In his written criticism, Ishimoto indicated that ATF officials were unwilling to share the spotlight with Customs for what would be a highly visible action. Customs is also an agency within the Treasury Department.

“The decision not to use U.S. Customs helicopters ostensibly stemmed from a concern” over keeping the mission secure, Ishimoto wrote. “I am of the opinion that it was due more to interagency rivalry. . . . The use of Customs helicopters and crews offer several advantages [including telephone] communications capabilities not found on the National Guard helicopters and the ability to fire from the helicopters.”

Rep. Steven H. Schiff (R-N.M.) voiced frustration at attention devoted to testimony regarding Koresh’s child molestation. The focus of the hearings, Schiff said, should be whether federal agents and their superiors followed the law at Waco.

“David Koresh did not work for the federal government in 1993,” Schiff said.

Schiff and others assailed the basis upon which ATF officials gained the free use of the National Guard helicopters and training facilities, at Ft. Hood, Tex. Agents used the helicopters, provided by the Texas Army National Guard, during the initial raid.

With few exceptions, including pursuit of illegal drugs, federal law prohibits the free use of U.S. military equipment in civilian law enforcement matters. The military assistance was granted in Texas at no cost to the ATF because the agency argued that a drug, methamphetamine, was being produced inside the Branch Davidians’ compound.

Ishimoto said that the ATF used “outdated information” to claim, inaccurately, that a drug “nexus” existed at the compound.

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However, a procession of military officials called before the committee pointed out that even without the presence of illegal drug activity, the military assistance could have been provided, so long as the ATF was required to pay for it. No military personnel participated in either the February, 1993, raid or the siege that followed. It ended tragically with the incineration of the Davidian compound.

Committee members differed over the significance of the testimony. “They didn’t need to have to lie in the first place,” said Rep. Steve Buyer (R-Ind.). “That is what we learned today.”

Rep. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) countered that the testimony “dismisses as kind of paranoid complaints that the military is taking over America.”

(BEGIN TEXT OF INFOBOX / INFOGRAPHIC)

The Questions

The issues being investigated by Two House subcommittees looking into the 1993 Branch Davidian disaster in Waco, Tex.

Could David Koresh have been apprehended outside of the compound?

Once the “element of surprise” was lost, should the raid have been delayed?

Why was so much force used? Was it excessive?

Should the FBI negotiation have been given more time to succeed?

Researched by D’JAMILA SALEM / Los Angeles Times