MIDDLE EAST : Hamas Combat: Both Political and Mortal

With the fatal bus bombing in Ramat Gan this week, the Islamic fundamentalist organization Hamas appears to have adopted a new tactic in its war against the Israeli-Palestinian peace accord: Kill, but don’t cop to it.

The explosion that left six Israelis dead and 31 wounded appears to be the work of the militant group, as an anonymous caller to Israeli radio claimed. But for the first time, Hamas has not officially taken responsibility or made a public martyr of the suicide bomber.

Political analysts speculate that this signals a split in Hamas--which views the 1993 peace accord between Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin as a sellout--or that perhaps the attack was not ordered from the top. Israeli security officials suspect that the attack was carried out by the group’s Jordanian chapter without the knowledge of the leadership in the Gaza Strip.

What seems more likely, many analysts say, is that the Hamas leadership wants to pursue a two-pronged strategy of armed struggle against Israel and political combat to defeat Arafat. Or at least to keep its options open.

An unsigned attack allows Hamas to flex its muscles without forcing Arafat into a confrontation--and leaves the door ajar for participating in Palestinian elections after an Israeli pullout from the West Bank.

“From their perspective, this is a multidimensional strategy,” said Elie Rekhess, a researcher in Palestinian affairs at Tel Aviv University’s Dayan Center. “Political? Yes. An occasional terrorist attack? The two are not mutually exclusive.”

Israel has answered terrorist assaults by closing off most traffic in and out of the isolated Gaza Strip. The squeeze has showed Palestinians, many of whom could not get to their jobs in Israel, the connection between the violence and their own economic suffering. Support for killing Jews has eroded.

Hamas took a three-month “military” break, and its political leaders began talking about forming a legal political party to compete in elections. Arafat, meanwhile, launched his own two-pronged strategy of negotiation and arrests. According to Ghazi Hamad, the editor of the Hamas newspaper, Al Watan, about 120 Hamas activists were jailed.

Hamad maintained that Hamas was still committed in principle to using violence against Israeli occupation, but he added that the group would refrain for the time being. “Arafat considers [the fundamentalists’] military actions to be the main obstacle in the peace process,” he said. “Hamas is not the main obstacle--Israel is. But we will give Arafat a chance to go ahead and see.”

Less than a week later, an unidentified man in his 30s exploded a pipe bomb on the Ramat Gan bus.

Why Hamas would choose now to resume its attacks is a source of speculation. One possibility is retribution for the arrests; another is that Hamas saw Arafat and the Israelis sidelining its interests in the ongoing negotiations--threatening to leave Hamas prisoners in jail while releasing Arafat’s allies--and wanted to make the point that Hamas is still a player.

Exactly what kind of player remains to be seen. Paradoxically, one of those considered most amenable to a political track over terrorist attacks is Mousa abu Marzuk, the Hamas leader detained in New York this week and awaiting possible extradition to Israel.

“He is the leader of the most pragmatic wing of Hamas,” said Khalil Shikaki, director of the Center for Palestinian Research and Studies in Nablus. “Without him, it would be difficult for Hamas to make the fundamental move into a political force. Without him, there are a lot of radicals who would take over.”

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In some 1997 stories, and stories from 2001 onward, Mousa abu Marzuk is referred to as Mousa abu Marzook.

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