THE WORLD : A Paradox in a Fog: Stablization, Russian-Style

Four years after the August revolution that brought about the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism, Russia is approaching parliamentary--and, soon afterward, presidential--elections at a time when exhaustion, cynicism and impoverishment seem to be competing with a growing civil society, political stabilization and prosperity. Indeed, the picture is so contradictory that informed prediction is next to impossible.

Cynicism toward anything having to do with government runs so deep that even a reasonable precaution like checkpoints and roadblocks to guard against terrorist attacks, especially after the bloody hostage-taking in Budennovsk, was greeted with suspicion. Some commentators suggested that the real reason paratroopers were deployed in the city was to intimidate Parliament as it contemplated sacking the Chernomyrdin government and impeaching President Boris N. Yeltsin. The government survived, and the attacks, though promised by Chechen dissident Shamil Basayev, never took place. Yet, the energy and intensity of today’s Moscow are so great that the presence of what clearly must have been a formidable alien force was largely a sideshow.

Perhaps even more remarkable for a city anticipating a terrorist attack--and with many of its young still pinned down in Chechnya--was that a majority of Muscovites considered the actions of the terrorists who had seized the town of Budennovsk “understandable,” according to an informal poll conducted by a popular radio station. Referring to the poll results, Emil A. Pain, one of Yeltsin’s more liberal and far-sighted advisers on problems of ethnicity and nationalism, exclaimed: “Just imagine such a response from the Israeli public in the wake of a terrorist attack in some settlement!”

In Pain’s opinion, Russians still do not perceive themselves as a unified national community and feel distant and alienated from their state. As a result, for many, the war in the Caucasus was, if not exactly unjust, then unjustified. The new and, for the most part, fiercely independent Russian media made it easier for the Muscovites to identify with the suffering of the Chechens than with the reason the government invaded. Those who see in Russian society a trend toward a more aggressive nationalism will do well to examine these public attitudes toward the war in Chechnya.

Many a politician and opinion-maker reaching for a popular platitude would decry the cynicism and self-seeking materialism of contemporary youth. Yet, statistics for the entrance examinations at Moscow’s colleges and universities indicate an unprecedented competition for admission--eight to 12 applicants vying for one place--into various liberal-arts programs. All this at a time when a teaching job in liberal arts may buy one little more than the proverbial subway ticket. Competition for slots leading to what would seem to be a more promising career--business and finance--is much less intense.

An overabundance of conspiracy theories points to another contradiction: Such theories impute to the government a far higher degree of intelligence than warranted by its performance. Take the attempt by federal law enforcement to prosecute the producers of the political satire “The Puppets,” on the Independent TV channel, for portraying Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin as itinerant beggars. Even sober minds believed this action was calculated not to intimidate Independent TV, owned by a critic of Yeltsin’s government, but to arouse public sympathy for the liberal media and its powerful “underdog.” A far more likely scenario is that the prosecutor--in the words of the now popular aphorism attributed to Chernomyrdin--”wished to do a better job but ended up with the same old junk.”

Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s many attempts at resignation notwithstanding, the political culture of Russia, along with the economic calculus, do not encourage politicians or government officials to submit a resignation when their policies fail or become unpopular. So it was an unusual day, indeed--and a happy one for those who would like Russian politics to be more Western--when two of the three “power ministers” were allowed to quit. Moscow’s intellectual and political elite had every reason to feel elated. But their attitude changed to chagrin as soon as Yeltsin appointed the loyal commander of the Government Protection Service as head of the Foreign Security Service. Yeltsin may simply be consolidating his power. Yet, by appointing a man so clearly unqualified to run such a complex agency, the Russian president may have only weakened himself.

Still, nowhere do the contradictions of the pre-election Russia manifest themselves more than in the country’s system--or better, pile--of taxes. For a company or individual to operate strictly by the book would mean surrendering virtually all profits and going out of business. Add to the tax situation the proliferation of organized crime and corrupt officials who collect their own “tax”--and the climate for business would seem lethal. Yet, one need not be an economics expert to see that Moscow is a real boom town. Traffic alone, thanks largely to the increase in private automobile ownership, has been growing exponentially. With only 40% of individual income derived from salaries--15% less than a year ago--it appears that small businesses are proliferating at unprecedented rates. Conclusion: Tax evasion is a universal phenomenon.

“The people are honest; it’s the tax laws that are crooked,” said Alexander N. Yakovlev, the veteran of perestroika and still an influential force in the Yeltsin government. A prolific and provocative author with a keen political mind and distinctive style, he is often invited to speak abroad. “I once said to Chernomyrdin,” Yakovlev said, “when I receive a speaking fee abroad, why should I pay more than 80% in taxes to the state? The state did not buy me a ticket; it did not pay me a salary to write my lectures and books. Why, then, should I give up what I earned?”

Chernomyrdin was incredulous, Yakovlev reported. At that point, the First Deputy Premier Oleg N. Soskovets walked into the room. “Is it true what Alexander Yakovlevich has been telling me?” asked Chernomyrdin. Soskovets, according to Yakovlev, blushed and answered in the affirmative. “Chernomyrdin and his party cannot go into the elections with these crazy tax laws; they will change,” predicted Yakovlev.

Debates about taxation, parliamentary elections, the give-and-take between the government and the press, a skeptical public, uncensored education, opportunity and a thriving business culture are the achievements the people who made the revolution four years ago hoped to see only in the distant future. Crime, deteriorating social services, deep poverty, government corruption, the fragility of the new democratic institutions and the ease with which the state resorts to force are on the other side of the scale. The elections in December will show which weighs heavier.*