U.S. Intensifies Efforts to Topple Iraqi Regime : Diplomacy: Goals are to squeeze Hussein from outside, foster defections and strife. But limits of outcome seen.

In a major effort to accelerate the downfall of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the Clinton Administration has launched a campaign to tighten the economic and political squeeze on Baghdad.

The two-track U.S. strategy centers on beefing up international opposition to Hussein’s regime while trying to further erode his internal base, particularly within his strife-riddled family, officials said. Potential candidates for defection have already been identified.

“We hope insiders will be inspired by what they see happening outside,” a senior U.S. official said Saturday.

The Administration’s leverage is greater now than at any point since the triumphal windup to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, because U.S. intelligence was proven right on Iraq’s secret weapons programs--and the prestigious International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, and the United Nations were wrong.

But key U.S. officials say they are under no illusions about their ability to orchestrate events in Iraq. In a sobering assessment, the Administration has concluded that the recent defection of major Iraqi officials and Baghdad’s sudden burst of cooperation with the United Nations do not necessarily signal the beginning of the end for Hussein.

Even in the event of his political demise, new leadership is likely to amount to little more than “Saddamism without Saddam,” the replacement of one ruthless military leader by another, some observers say.

But at that point, the Administration argues, the foundation of any new regime would be so weakened that the United States and its allies might be able to influence the course of events and open the way to real change.

The Administration’s goal is to “deepen the panic” that has beset the inner circle since the Aug. 8 defection of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Majid, along with several other family members and friends of the Iraqi leader.

Majid was a key architect of Iraq’s war machine, and his defection prompted Baghdad to hand over a mass of military documents to the United Nations in an attempt to lessen the impact of Majid’s disclosures.

The high-profile defections also bared deep, sometimes deadly divisions within Hussein’s family. Even the president’s son Uday is seeking to topple his father, some reports say.

The Clinton Administration hopes these revelations of Hussein’s vulnerabilities will encourage Iraqi factions to take steps to oust him.

Covert broadcasts by opposition groups, such as the CIA-funded Iraqi National Congress based in Kurdish northern Iraq, are scheduled to increase, as will the activities and visibility of all exiled groups and figures, including Majid, U.S. officials said.

“Opposition activity [against Hussein] is now as vigorous as any in the Arab world,” the senior official said.

The Administration also has moved to prevent Hussein from re-exerting control over Iraq’s Kurdish north and Shiite-dominated south. During talks outside Dublin, Ireland, earlier this month, U.S. officials mediated a cease-fire between warring Kurdish parties so they could focus on Baghdad rather than each other.

And joint U.S.-Kuwaiti military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf that began last week have shored up Iraq’s southern zone, from which Iraqi warplanes and elite troops are banned.

The burst of U.S. diplomatic energy follows revelations that Iraq was still covering up information about its programs to develop ballistic missiles as well as nuclear, chemical and biological arms--bearing out the fears of U.S. intelligence experts and proving wrong the United Nations and IAEA. Both those agencies were willing to accept that Baghdad had adequately reported on its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.

At the United Nations, the Administration is now reasserting its leadership to block indefinitely French and Russian attempts to ease economic sanctions imposed during the Gulf crisis. Some officials say Baghdad stands no chance of a reprieve before 1997.

“There is no way that any serious discussion of lifting sanctions will happen for a serious amount of time,” one official said. “If there is any weak point in the revelations, it is the wimpy IAEA report, which was almost blase about Iraq’s capabilities. And they’re a tremendous embarrassment for the French, who said Iraq’s earlier claims should be rewarded.”

On Friday, key Administration insiders said sanctions should not be lifted as long as Hussein still rules. This was the postwar U.S. position, but it had effectively been worn down by allied resistance.

In the Middle East, Washington is orchestrating moves to tighten the stranglehold on the Iraqi economy, mainly by engineering a rapprochement between Jordan and the monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Jordan backed Hussein during the Gulf War.

Trade contacts are expected, including an agreement by one or more of the Gulf regimes to provide Jordan with oil at the same discounted rates it paid to Iraq. Other breakthroughs are expected to facilitate air links and the flow of workers and to reduce bottlenecks at borders, U.S. officials said.

The moves are expected as a pay-back for Jordanian King Hussein’s gradual backing away from his support of Iraq.

“Jordan’s actions are the most important move in the region since 1990, because it provides Iraq’s one economic lifeline,” said a Pentagon official. Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are not “going to follow a made-in-Washington script. They have time-honored patterns of how to kiss and make up. We’re just trying to nudge them along the road a little faster.”

The overall thrust is to intensify the squeeze on Iraq and end the four-year political impasse that has allowed Hussein not only to rebuild his regime but to again threaten his neighbors. One of Majid’s revelations was that Baghdad had plans to attack Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Even if Hussein was ousted, Iraq’s political climate is so volatile that the nation’s future would remain uncertain.

But if the Administration’s efforts do play a part in toppling the Iraqi leader, his successor would have to take note.

“At that moment, we will have tremendous leverage over this new Iraqi dictator who will also want sanctions removed. His power will be new and fragile,” the Pentagon official said.

Specifically, the United States could push the new regime to widen its political base by allowing exiles to return and to honor a 1975 treaty on Kurdish autonomy.

“Democracy is a term that is hard to apply to the Iraqi situation, but a gradual broadening of the political process is possible,” the official added.

And to prevent future Iraqi aggression, the United States could insist that a new regime comply with all the U.N. resolutions ending the Gulf War--from full and final disclosure of its secret arms programs to formal steps to reassure Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Administration sources go to great lengths to point out that Washington wants to prevent a “made in the USA” outcome to the Iraqi crisis.

“There’s a lot of uncertainty ahead, and we have to learn to live with that. We will never have a clear picture of how this will play out,” the senior official said.

And in contrast to the heady postwar period, when the CIA predicted that Hussein would be out within six months, the Administration is cautious about its long-term prospects.

“Saddam is still in tight control and will probably have excellent control until a heartbeat before he goes,” the source added.

But for the Administration, the recent defections are viewed as a badly needed jump-start for a flagging Iraqi policy.

Said the Pentagon official, “August, 1995, is the worst month for Saddam since he lost the war.”