NEWS ANALYSIS : Balkan Negotiators Face Huge Hurdles to Peace : Bosnia: Parties are far apart on many issues, including future of Sarajevo. U.S. talks begin this week.

As they meet this week at an Air Force base in Ohio, the enemies in the Balkan conflict and their American mediators face innumerable hurdles that could derail peace talks in a minute’s time.

In negotiations that one U.S. official said are laid with thousands of “land mines and deal-breakers,” the presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia will be presented with a draft peace agreement and an outline of a proposed constitution.

But the problems to be debated starting Wednesday far outnumber the points the disputing parties have agreed to thus far, in many cases reflecting diametrically opposed views, experts say.

Will the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo be a united city, or will it be divided into Muslim and Serbian sectors? Can Eastern Slavonia, the last piece of Serb-controlled land within Croatia, be reincorporated peacefully, or is military intervention inevitable? Will the Muslim-led Bosnian government relinquish its demand for control over the town of Brcko and the Posavina corridor, a vital supply route for the Serbs? Will the Serbs relinquish their demand to be allowed to secede from the newly constituted Bosnia-Herzegovina?

The Bosnian government and the separatist Serbs, in exhausting negotiations led by U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke, have agreed to form two states within a single Bosnia, dividing the territory roughly in half. But questions about who gets exactly what and how power will be shared remain unresolved. The sides are far apart as they head for Dayton, Ohio, for open-ended talks.

“It will be a very rough road,” Holbrooke said in an interview during his last trip to Sarajevo before the talks. The Muslim and Serbian sides were using the run-up to the meetings to stake out tougher positions, he said.

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, in a speech last week, set forth 21 new and old demands that he is carrying to the discussions, including an insistence that war criminals be barred from running in eventual elections. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has been indicted on war-crimes charges, and such a ban would prevent his candidacy.

Western sources say the Bosnian government has privately told U.S. mediators that there are three points on which they will not compromise: Sarajevo; the eastern enclave of Gorazde, and the Serb-held city of Brcko.

Of these, the least probable for compromise seems to be Brcko, the Serbian foothold in the northeast that keeps the east-west Posavina supply route open to the Serbs at its narrowest point. Losing control of the corridor would cripple them and is something they cannot be expected to concede.

By far, the most emotional issue after 3 1/2 years of war is the status of Sarajevo, of weighty symbolic importance to both sides.

The government controls most of the capital, including the historic old town where mosques and an Orthodox Christian church--that is the Serbs’ faith--share the same cobblestoned blocks.

The Serbs control several Sarajevo suburbs, including Grbavica and Ilidza. In some parts, Muslim and Serbian enemies are separated by only a few hundred yards, barricades formed by overturned hulls of buses or deserted fields.

While the Serbs insist on retaining their portion, the government insists on a united city.

“I cannot imagine that at the end of the 20th Century, the West would accept a new Berlin Wall,” Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said recently.

During a visit this month to Grbavica, where the Serbian leadership only rarely allows Western reporters, people spoke of hope that the war might be ending but expressed deep cynicism that they would ever be able to live again with their Muslim neighbors. A divided city, they said, is the only answer.

The idea of making Sarajevo a U.N.-administered protectorate has also been floated, although Izetbegovic has said he is opposed to the arrangement.

“The Bosnian Serbs desperately want Sarajevo; the government desperately wants a unified city,” said a European diplomat based in the Bosnian capital. “Do you make it an international protectorate? The international community doesn’t want that. They want a final solution. They want it settled. Would it be better as a divided city? It’s a selection between cholera and the plague.”

The Serbs, meanwhile, used a meeting of their self-styled parliament last week to harden their own negotiating position, demanding the right to secede from Bosnia and to hold a referendum on the matter one year after the war ends.

Asserting their demand for autonomy, the Serbs seemed to be saying that they are still holding out for their long-held vision of a Greater Serbia.

The government is adamantly opposed to giving Serbs such rights of secession and unlimited autonomy, arguing that this would only whittle away at Bosnia as a nation.

The Serbs also declared their desire for veto power over the deployment of multinational forces on Serbian territory--an operation that will undoubtedly include Americans--and their demand for the return of much of the land taken by Muslim-Croat forces during the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization bombing raids. They also want access to the sea.

“In the future process of separation between the Muslims and ourselves, we will try to keep traditional historic Serb territories as much as possible,” Momcilo Krajisnik, a senior Bosnian Serb official, was quoted as saying.

As per Izetbegovic, the government wants to be able to order up a contingent of peace enforcers from Muslim countries if Russian troops--traditional allies of the Serbs--are deployed in Bosnia.

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More than specific issues, there are serious questions about the parties represented that could trip up peace talks.

A fundamental of the entire peace process is the Muslim-Croat federation, a U.S.-created alliance of the Sarajevo government and other Muslims and the Bosnian Croats. The two fought a bitter war in 1993 but for now are working together against their common Serbian enemy.

The alliance is fragile at best, riddled with mutual mistrust that makes a permanent cooperation unlikely. The fear is that once a peace agreement is reached that gives half of Bosnia to the federation, the Croats will be annexed by Croatia, leaving behind a weak rump Bosnia.

Taken alone, the Bosnian government is problematic for negotiators because it often speaks with many contradicting voices.

And then there are the leaders. Izetbegovic, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman--each has his political foils at home to deal with.

Milosevic especially has a restive, angry flank of nationalists who believe he has betrayed the Serbian cause by agreeing to negotiate with Bosnia’s Muslim-led government.

But, generally, Milosevic and Tudjman rule with iron fists and are able to control the various factions of their governments, including the military.

The Bosnian government, however, is divided between a small group that still supports the vision of a multiethnic state and a more powerful group of hard-liners who are stalwarts in the Islamic party that Izetbegovic leads.

Further, although Izetbegovic is the titular head, the presidency of Bosnia is in fact a board of seven members, some representing other ethnic groups, including Serbs and Croats. This tends to dilute Izetbegovic’s authority, analysts say. “The Bosnian government, by definition, is weak,” a senior Western official said.

As for Milosevic, his ability to deliver the Bosnian Serbs has remained a question ever since he was appointed to represent them in negotiations. The Serbian president is a problematic figure. Widely blamed for the nationalistic fervor that spawned the brutal warfare, he is now eager to appear as a peace broker who can force his onetime proteges, the Bosnian Serbs, to heel.

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But mounting evidence suggests that even as he cast himself as a pivotal figure in the peace process, paramilitary units under his command were committing some of the worst atrocities of the war. The fall of the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica in July, for example, led to a horrific episode of “ethnic cleansing,” including the reported slaughter of several thousand Muslim men, that Milosevic must have been aware of, according to diplomats.

And 2,000 to 3,000 other Muslim men are missing following a similar wave of expulsions from the northwest Banja Luka area. Again, the fear is they have been executed under the direction of a warlord loyal to Milosevic.

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The Balkan Triumvirate

Slobodan Milosevic, President Serbia

Former Communist Party stalwart who rode theme of ultranationalism to greater power. Motivated by single goal--lifting of crippling international economic sanctions imposed against his country for its role in fomenting war. Therefore an eager negotiator, is willing to agree to concessions--especially those extracted from onetime proteges, the Bosnian Serbs. Somewhat mysterious leader who rarely speaks in public in capital of Belgrade. Regarded by those who have mediated in former Yugoslav republic as most clever of Balkan politicians, but cleverness has not always translated into trustworthiness.

Alija Izetbegovic, President Bosnia-Herzegovina

Regarded by many of region’s mediators as Balkan leader most difficult to negotiate with. He was shaped by two long stints in jail in Communist Yugoslavia because of organizing Muslims. Less a politician, more a contemplative figure. Saddled with collective-presidency system that produces government that often gives mixed signals and whose members contradict each other. Under enormous pressure to achieve best deal possible for Bosnia, which stands to lose most in negotiations. Only one of the three Balkan presidents who never was a Communist.

Franjo Tudjman, President Croatia

Military historian and former Communist Party official. Driven by a messianic view of himself as true leader of Croatia, deliverer of Croatian state. He has great desire now to be regarded as part of modern, democratic Europe. Wrapped in almost religious nationalism, he built formidable army, despite arms embargo. Flouted world opinion to militarily seize parts of his country held by rebel Serbs. By most accounts, he moved too slowly to curb atrocities that followed. His government has been criticized for reviving national symbols used by World War II Croatian regime, which collaborated with Nazis.