The Dangers of Mission Creep in Bosnia : Administration advocates push for a wider involvement that could prolong U.S. engagement.

In its full-court press to win congressional and popular support for its Bosnian policy, the Clinton Administration has rightly stressed the finite nature of its objectives: a strict 12-month time limit; no mission creep; no Somali-like nation-building. This is exactly as it should be. Success depends crucially on the degree to which American purposes in Bosnia are kept within realizable bounds.

Unfortunately, an insidious campaign is already under way in Washington that would open the door to a dramatic expansion of the American role in Bosnia. Friends of the Bosnian government, among them former Reagan Administration officials such as Richard Perle and Jeane Kirkpatrick, are insistently urging that the U.S. government should take on unilateral responsibility for providing American arms and American trainers to the post-settlement Bosnian government.

America’s European allies are adamantly opposed to these ideas. Alarmingly, however, the Clinton Administration shows signs of succumbing to these blandishments. Defense Secretary William J. Perry has already voiced his sympathy.

What, it may be asked, is wrong with giving Bosnia the means to defend itself? Is this not the sovereign right of every nation? In normal circumstances, the answer would of course be yes. But in the highly abnormal circumstances of Bosnia, a surer way both to undo the success of Dayton and to propel the United States into an untenable position in the Balkans cannot be imagined.

The prime reason behind this dreary calculation lies in an argument that the Administration itself has been using in private and public briefings about the Dayton accords. When challenged on apparent weaknesses--such as the provisions for the return of refugees or policing--Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke has wisely conceded that the agreement is not perfect. Whether it brings lasting peace or not, he has repeatedly stressed, depends on the good will of the warring parties to work out contentious points sensibly among themselves. The agreement’s military annex spells out this thought in words of one syllable.

Simply put, are the parties ready to put aside their maximalist objectives in favor of “strenuous efforts to cooperate with each other?” Specifically, does the Bosnia government realize that, for the time being, its demand for a unitary state with a strong central government needs to be approached with kid gloves? For their part, do the Bosnian Serbs acknowledge that ambitions of ethnically pure self-determination have to go onto the back burner?

To date, the evidence is sadly negative. Doing the rounds of Washington at end of last week, Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic spoke contemptuously of the Serbs, saying that they were on the wrong side of history, that they were living “in a different film.”

In the meantime, the Bosnian Serbs have taken to the streets to protest the Dayton agreement. Openly rejecting the concept of reconciliation, Serb residents are moving out of the Sarajevo suburbs that are due to come under Bosnian government control.

It is as though the belligerents had learned nothing from nearly four years of war. Both Muslims and Serbs seem simply to be coiling themselves for their next strike. The proposal to inject American arms and trainers into this combustible mix risks a double disaster.

First, the Dayton agreement deliberately prescribes a complex system of constitutional checks and balances. The immediate requirement is for the post-settlement government of Bosnia to gain the consent of the governed. Given that the failure to do this in 1990-91 was one of the major original causes of the Bosnian war, the process of building consent will demand political skills of a very high order. An inflow of American (or any other) arms is the diametric opposite of what is required for this purpose.

Second, in arming the central authorities, the United States would, for practical purposes, be committing itself to the very task it professes to want to avoid, namely nation-building. This could suck the United States into the Balkans, not just for 12 months, but for 12 years.

The sensible course for the Administration is to nip this dangerous talk of an arms buildup in the bud. It should tell all the sides in Bosnia that their primary task is reconciliation. Once the new government has been elected and is showing signs of gaining the confidence of all sections of the Bosnian population, then it may be appropriate to talk about arms. But for the time being, the subject is off-limits.