Foes of Troop Deployment to Bosnia Not Upholding GOP Pledge on NATO

Many Republican members of Congress are on the verge of voting to break, or at least eviscerate, one of the promises they made last year in their famed “contract with America.” Their action will be roundabout and probably unintentional, but the impact will be the same as if they had publicly repudiated their pledge.

The contract contains only one promise that directly involves foreign policy--a commitment to rapid expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Republican candidates in last year’s congressional elections pledged that if they were elected, Congress would push to obtain NATO membership for Eastern European countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Now, many of these same legislators seem to be prepared to vote to reject any U.S. participation in the NATO military deployment to Bosnia. Leave it to the Europeans, many say. Why should American troops have to take part?

“This [Bosnia] is in Europe’s backyard,” declares Patrick J. Buchanan, the GOP presidential candidate whose “America first” philosophy is echoed by many of these Republican lawmakers. “It has never been in the vital interest of the United States.”

That is a coherent point of view, but one that is totally inconsistent with the idea of expanding NATO. You can’t claim to be in favor of extending NATO’s--and therefore America’s--security protections to Poles, Czechs and Hungarians and also be against sending American troops to be part of the NATO deployment to Bosnia. That is, in practical terms, a contradiction.

It is possible to imagine a new form of NATO--maybe it could be renamed “No-Go”--in which the United States takes part in all military missions except those that involve ground troops. Indeed, that is just what Buchanan is suggesting.

“I believe the United States should become the strategic reserve of Western civilization, [with] air and naval power supporting the interests of the democratic republics,” he said in one television interview earlier this month. He called for “an updated version of the Nixon doctrine”--the Vietnam War-era idea that the United States should provide support for other governments, but ask them to supply the ground troops to defend themselves.

What Buchanan did not mention was that the Nixon doctrine was intended for Asia, not Europe. Needless to say, President Nixon did not believe in pulling out of NATO.

A NATO in which America opted out from supplying ground forces would be an entirely different alliance from the one that has operated in Europe for nearly five decades. Countries such as the Czech Republic or Poland could be brought into NATO, but the security protections they would obtain would be far weaker than the ones Western European governments had during the Cold War. They might be like the empty security guarantees Central Europe had between World War I and World War II--ones that were nice on paper but didn’t mean much.

Indeed, some of the members of Congress now opposing the Bosnian mission openly acknowledge their lack of commitment to NATO. “I think that [NATO] is up for discussion,” Rep. Sue Myrick (R-N.C.), one of the leaders of the House freshman class, said recently when asked whether the United States should stay in its military alliance. Such sentiments are certainly honest but seem to run contrary to the pledge in the contract with America to expand NATO.

The close connection between the Bosnia deployment and NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe does not seem to be recognized in Washington, particularly among opponents of the deployment. But that link was evident at the annual winter meeting of NATO foreign ministers, held here last week.

Eastern European officials now come to these NATO sessions, eager to become part of the Western military alliance. They want NATO membership quickly. That is, after all, why supporters of Eastern Europe in the United States lobbied last year to get a pledge of NATO expansion included in the GOP contract with America.

The desire for NATO membership also explains why countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine are preparing to send troops to take part in enforcing the Bosnia peace.

During one session at NATO headquarters last week between Secretary of State Warren Christopher and officials from Central European and Baltic governments, a reporter asked the Eastern Europeans whether they thought the NATO expansion was proceeding at too slow a pace. Their response was polite but clear.

“If you compare it with our desires, it’s too slow,” replied Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu. He then acknowledged, somewhat mournfully, that perhaps the slow pace of NATO expansion was realistic because Eastern European countries aren’t ready yet.

For now, even those governments that will probably be the first to be admitted to NATO--the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary--are being told they will have to wait a while longer. Last week, NATO approved a plan under which, during the coming year, prospective members will be subjected to intensive grilling to see if they understand what will be expected of them in the military alliance.

This process amounts to perhaps the world’s most extensive and prolonged series of membership interviews. By the end of 1996, U.S. and NATO officials say, they may be ready to think about exactly who in Eastern Europe will be admitted to the Western alliance and when.

One reason for the slow pace is simply caution about taking such a big step. Another factor is the slim hope that Russian officials can, somehow, be persuaded over time to overcome their intense opposition to NATO expansion, which they see as violating assurances by then-Secretary of State James A. Baker III that the alliance would not expand eastward if the Soviet Union agreed to German reunification.

In a recent article in the National Review, Peter W. Rodman, a former National Security Council aide in the Nixon administration, claimed that the Clinton administration has quietly promised to put off NATO expansion in exchange for Russia’s support of the Bosnia peace settlement.

Clinton administration officials strongly deny that they have made any such deal. During last week’s meetings here, Christopher--standing alongside Russian Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev--maintained that NATO expansion is on a “steady, deliberate course . . . not faster nor slower than we have indicated in the past.” That seems to put to rest the idea that the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe has been put permanently on the shelf.

Yet there does seem to have been a conscious effort, both by the Clinton administration and by other Western governments, to hold off on NATO expansion during 1996.

The main reason is that there will be Russian parliamentary elections later this month and presidential elections next spring. In Washington, Russian Ambassador Yuli M. Vorontsov has been warning publicly that the United States would be, in his words, “helping the enemies of democracy” inside Russia by pushing NATO expansion on the eve of these elections. The Clinton administration seems to be heeding his admonitions.

The second factor behind the slow pace of NATO expansion is that there will, of course, be elections in the United States next year as well. Any attempt to expand the Western alliance into Eastern Europe, giving new security guarantees in the process, will demand a strong commitment from the president of the United States. It will require a president with the time and ability to carry out the intensive diplomacy necessary to mollify Russia. It is a job easier to accomplish after a presidential election, rather than during one.

And there will be congressional elections next year. Maybe those lawmakers who promised voters last year to expand the Western alliance, but who now seek to keep America out of the NATO mission to the Balkans, can be asked to explain what they really meant in that part of the contract with America. Was it a commitment to Eastern Europe, or just a bunch of words?

The International Outlook column appears here every other Monday.