RUSSIA : Yeltsin Looking More Like the Comeback Kid

The latest terrorist action by fanatical Chechen rebels in Dagestan and the violent, if inept, reaction to it by the Kremlin have re-energized the debate over President Boris N. Yeltsin’s political future and the prospects for Russia’s reforms. Yeltsin’s prompt decision to shoot first and ask questions later has produced a storm of criticism along the Russian political spectrum, with ultranationalist Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky the lone voice of support for the president. Having watched his approval ratings plummet to single digits since the beginning of the war in Chechnya a year ago, Yeltsin is now given a near-zero chance of winning reelection.

The carnage in Pervomayskaya and the threat of a seemingly permanent terrorist campaign have also rekindled palpable fears of increasing instability, widening ethnic conflicts and destabilizing separatist movements, particularly among Russian Muslims, that were rampant at the height of the war in Chechnya, but had since abated. This has fed speculation, reinforced by the results of the recent parliamentary elections, that Russia may revert to authoritarian ways, perhaps under the sway of its surly and humiliated generals, or maybe even disintegrate, as the Soviet empire did.

But there is mounting evidence pointing to a radically different interpretation of the current situation and Yeltsin’s prospects. According to this view, the Chechen rebels are being driven to mindless terrorism out of weakness and desperation; they no longer present a credible challenge to Moscow. Moreover, their actions have alienated not only the vast majority of Russians, but many of their Muslim brethren as well, making their struggle irrelevant politically. For example, the taking of hostages in Kizlyar, which began the current crisis, set off anti-Chechen demonstrations by Dagestani Muslims, a first. There is also little doubt that despite the regrettable losses of hostages and innocent villagers in the assault, Yeltsin’s blunt-force action against the Chechens is welcomed by ordinary Russians.

Much more significant politically has been a series of bold moves by Yeltsin, of which the crackdown on the Chechens is just one. Once again, he is center stage and in a position to retake the driver’s seat. Yeltsin has shaken up his administration for what may be a significant change of course. The most far-reaching actions were the removal from his government of the last three representatives of the liberal democratic, pro-reform wing of Russian politics. All have been replaced by hard-line politicians with KGB pedigrees and nationalist bents.

Yeltsin is also purging his regional lieutenants and, in what may be a sign of things to come, has allowed his chief of security and reputed Kremlin eminence grise, Gen. Alexander V. Korzhakov, to openly criticize Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin and Defense Minister Gen. Pavel S. Grachev.

These changes and policies to follow have two objectives. First, to position Yeltsin in the populist middle of the political spectrum and siphon off as much momentum as possible from his Communist and nationalist opponents in the coming presidential race. Second, to seek a new power base among an emerging Russian power elite that controls the country economically and is increasingly assertive politically.

Who these people are is not a secret. A survey, published in Moscow a few days ago, reveals that 75% of them come from the old Soviet nomenklatura and upper-managerial classes. Many became quite rich and more powerful than ever before when, under privatization, public wealth was transferred into their hands. Although most are not true converts to democracy or the free market, they now have a vested interest in a system that protects their private economic interests; they are not keen to turn the clock back, as are the likes of Communist Gennady A. Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky. These “red capitalists” would probably feel more comfortable and secure in a pseudo-democratic, mercantilist, banana republic-like oligarchy that protects them from both the hoi polloi and international competition. Short of that, Yeltsin, having abandoned the liberal reformers they despise, now appears as the man most likely to deliver what they want, and they are ready to support him.

Having secured such backing, along with the power of his office and populist rhetoric, Yeltsin has a better than even chance of prevailing in a multicandidate presidential race and going on to defeat Zyuganov in a runoff. Thus, barring a sudden reversal of his health, the next president of Russia is likely to be Yeltsin.

While many in the West may consider such a outcome salutary, especially considering the alternative, there is a clear downside to what is going on in Russia today. For starters, the present Kremlin administration is certain to strike a more confrontational tone in its policies toward the West. Despite protestations to the contrary, there also is no certainty that Russia will be able to carry forward its essential economic reforms, since there is not a committed reformer left in the Kremlin. Yet, these reforms are a condition of continuing Western economic aid, on which Russia has depended for alleviating its budget deficits.

For the United States, a sober reappraisal of our relationship with Russia is in order. The notion of a “strategic partnership” with Moscow seems more and more quixotic. No longer should U.S. policy be premised on the idea that what’s good for Yeltsin is good for the West.*