Battle of the Kims Unsettles South Korea

A lifelong fighter for South Korean democracy, President Kim Young Sam would seem now to have assured himself a place of honor in his nation’s history.

Kim, 68, has dealt a devastating blow to his old enemies--the ancien regime forces of military rule represented by former presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo.

He has thrown both those former generals into prison on charges of insurrection, sedition and corruption for a 1979 mutiny, a 1980 massacre and for allegedly taking bribes in office.

But spoiling Kim’s moment of triumph, like a ghost in a frustrating dream, is another old nemesis. His partner and rival in South Korea’s pro-democracy struggle, opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, 70, is on the campaign trail again, bitterly criticizing the president in a bid to win the post for himself next year.

Many South Koreans--probably a large majority--wish the two Kims would cooperate to ensure that democracy is entrenched here. Instead, the focal point of South Korea’s politics has become the struggle between them.

The outcome may determine not only the succession to President Kim--who constitutionally cannot run for reelection--but also which man goes into history as the father of South Korean democracy. Some who lament the bitterness between the two Kims even fear their final battle may yet undermine the democracy and reform for which both have labored so long.

“Their personal animosity developed in 30 years of struggle for democracy,” said Kang Joon Man, a Chunbuk University professor who has written extensively about the Kims’ rivalry. “It is human nature that the closer you were, once you split, the more intensely you hate each other--like divorce cases.”

Over the years, at times of intense confrontation with military regimes, the two Kims stood together. Kim Dae Jung usually took the tougher stand. He was the one the military feared the most, and he spent the most time in jail. As recently as 1987, many believed that if he won the presidency in an election, the military would never let him assume the post.

Kim Young Sam took a less confrontational stand and was less feared by the military.

But the two Kims repeatedly battled each other in elections, causing the most damage in 1987, when they split the pro-democracy vote. That split allowed Roh, Chun’s handpicked successor, to win the presidency with a minority of votes.

Then, in 1990, Kim Young Sam shocked the nation by merging his opposition party into then-President Roh’s ruling camp. That led to Kim’s running as the ruling party’s candidate for president in 1992. He won that contest--by defeating Kim Dae Jung. Last month, President Kim renamed his party the New Korea Party.

Since the arrests of Chun and Roh late last year, the president has repeatedly stressed that he wants to “right the wrongs of history” by punishing those responsible for the May 1980 massacre of pro-democracy protesters in the southwestern city of Kwangju. At least 240 people died in the suppression of that 10-day civilian uprising, which came after Chun imposed martial law on the nation.

Kim Young Sam’s gradualist strategy brought him the successes he enjoys today. But it also burdens him with weaknesses that Kim Dae Jung keeps pounding at.

Campaigns are gearing up for April 11 elections that will decide if the president’s New Korea Party or Kim Dae Jung’s National Congress for New Politics will hold the largest number of seats in the National Assembly.

That, in turn, will set the stage for next year’s presidential election, expected to pit Kim Dae Jung against a candidate who will be picked by Kim Young Sam; the incumbent has repeatedly stressed that his successor should be from a younger generation.

Kim Dae Jung is using his appearances for parliamentary candidates to blast away at the president. In a typical speech to 2,000 voters packed into a suburban Seoul auditorium, he delivered an hourlong attack on the president that was rich in ridicule, humor and bitter criticism.

“Righting the wrongs of history is good,” Kim Dae Jung told the rally. “But Kim Young Sam should clarify why he joined hands with the murderers of Kwangju. . . .

“What is the New Korea Party? If you look at the party registration . . . , the first president of that party is Chun Doo Hwan, the second president is Roh Tae Woo and the third president is Kim Young Sam. How can he separate from the past if he inherits the name of the party, the assets of the party and the people of the party? Merely changing the name does not change the party.”

Kim Dae Jung has admitted receiving $2.6 million for his unsuccessful 1992 presidential campaign from Roh’s huge slush fund. But he also has repeatedly charged that Kim Young Sam received far more from Roh--about $390 million. The president has denied receiving any money from Roh directly but has not clarified if money from Roh flowed into his successful 1992 campaign.

Many South Koreans believe the president’s dislike for Kim Dae Jung has grown so intense that it goes beyond resentment of a rival, and they fear Kim Dae Jung’s charges might be on the mark. These critics say the president has a “Kim Dae Jung complex” and does not want the opposition leader to succeed him.

A common view of the Roh slush fund scandal, which first erupted in October, is that the president hoped to use disclosures about his rival receiving money from Roh to destroy him politically. But Kim Dae Jung has managed to exercise damage control by acknowledging that he got the $2.6 million before he was accused of anything and by asserting that the president got much more.

Supporters brush off charges against the president as unfounded or irrelevant. Some say the battle of the two Kims was decided when Kim Young Sam won the presidential election and Kim Dae Jung responded by announcing that he was leaving politics--a pledge he reneged on 31 months later.

“It might be possible for people to use the term ‘Kim Dae Jung complex,’ at least before Kim Young Sam became president, because as leaders of the opposition side, they were in both a competitive relationship and a mutually complementary relationship,” said Park Kwan Yong, a close ally and former chief of staff of President Kim.

“But I don’t think it is appropriate to still talk about a ‘Kim Dae Jung complex’ even after Kim Young Sam became president and Kim Dae Jung acknowledged his defeat and declared his political retirement. President Kim Young Sam doesn’t need to compete against Kim Dae Jung anymore.”

But Park added that, “if there is one thing most important in the mind of President Kim, something which he is always thinking about, it is how will he be evaluated by history.”

This is an area in which some observers believe the president remains vulnerable. Given the nature of the opposition criticism, his historical standing may be imperiled if Kim Dae Jung succeeds him.

But if the president’s chosen successor wins next year’s election, Kim Young Sam would be the triumphant figure who would receive the main credit for South Korea’s transition from military rule to democracy.

“Kim Young Sam has the ambition to be recorded as a hero in our history,” said Kang, the Chunbuk University professor. “He is gambling with history. . . . If Kim Dae Jung becomes president, Kim Young Sam will be a failure. History will record him as a collaborator with the military regime, and Kim Dae Jung will be recorded as the leader of the first true civilian government in Korean history. Kim Young Sam hates that possibility.”

Kim Dae Jung, for his part, insists that he harbors no unyielding bitterness toward the president despite the vehement denunciations he delivers at campaign rallies. What he really wants now, he said in a brief interview, is for the president to stop freezing him out of policy discussions.

“I have no intention to make our relations worse,” he said. “If only Kim Young Sam can be sincere to develop democracy, I am ready to support him. As a first step for this, he must respect the opposition party.”

Kim Keun Tae, a onetime dissident who is now a member of the National Congress for New Politics, said he wishes Kim Dae Jung would tone down his rhetoric and try harder to cooperate with the president. He also wishes the president would realize he still needs his rival’s help to consolidate democracy.

But Kim Keun Tae, who was imprisoned and tortured under Chun’s administration and then imprisoned again under Roh, doesn’t expect these changes to happen, saying: “They are political brothers who became political enemies. It is very similar to the relationship between South and North Korea. The political hatred is so deep and wide it is not reasonable.”

Chi Jung Nam of The Times’ Seoul Bureau contributed to this report.