TURMOIL AT APPLE : Something Went Awry--but What Is Debatable
Michael Spindler was supposed to be the German diesel, the efficient, hard-pushing operations man who could save an Apple Computer spoiled by a rich diet of visionary bosses from founder Steve Jobs to marketer John Sculley.
When Spindler was first brought to Apple headquarters by Sculley in 1990, he seemed to be just the right man. He was the architect of Apple’s successful push into low-cost computers with the Mac Classics.
Spindler pushed the alliance with IBM that produced the PowerPC, a more powerful microprocessor engine for the Macintosh. And he managed a smooth transition to a new generation of Apple computers based on the PowerPC by using war rooms to focus on the task.
Spindler, appointed chief executive in 1993, deftly handled the damage from Sculley’s wrongheaded rush into portable computing devices. He eliminated thousands of jobs, shaved research and development costs, froze executive salaries and slashed at lavish corporate benefits. He came up with new strategies for each of the company’s businesses. Corporate procedures, down to the approach to meetings, were mapped out.
Then something went wrong. What exactly was to blame will be analyzed by business schools for years to come. Suddenly Apple forecasts were wildly off and the company couldn’t meet demand. Spindler was blamed for poor planning and inventory management. He fired top executives right and left as he pushed the blame for mismanagement on his lieutenants.
The problem may have been in the expectations. Spindler was never an operations man. He also faced in Microsoft a rival with a commanding market presence. That could have made any strategy tough to implement.
The Berlin-born Spindler, 52, an engineer by training, was a marketing executive for Intel and Digital Equipment before moving to Apple. Even at Apple, he moved up through the sales ranks on his way to becoming head of Apple’s European business in 1987.
Although he excelled in strategy at Apple, he never managed to get its operations in order. He agreed to peg half of his ’94 compensation to improving the management of product delivery, then failed to deliver.
Spindler is likely to take the most criticism for being too cautious in licensing Apple’s famed software to other computer companies, a move analysts say should have been aggressively pursued years ago.
Spindler did see the need to license Apple’s software to compete with Microsoft--he even established a Windows 95 war room. But he wanted to carefully control the companies that would make clones to avoid direct competition. Only a handful of companies agreed to make Apple clones.
In the end, strategist that he was, Spindler was never willing to face the reality that to take on Microsoft, Apple would have to restructure the way it did business.
Spindler once told an audience of Apple employees that when he was offered the CEO job, he had just 15 minutes to decide. He was quick to say yes, he said, because he was convinced Apple could win. But when it came to turning the company around, Spindler ran out of time. He was told earlier this week by Apple’s board of directors to step down as CEO.
