THE WORLD : EAST ASIA : As China, Taiwan Head for Collision, U.S. Must Play Great Compromiser

More and more, it seems like a deadly game of chicken: China threatens to attack Taiwan, which it considers a wayward province; Taiwanese politicians talk of independence, and in the midst of all this, a U.S. aircraft carrier task force, the USS Nimitz, steams through the Taiwan straits. Last week, Chinese Premier Li Peng underscored the mounting tensions in a speech on the “reunification of the motherland.” The risk is that one side won’t swerve away, a miscalculation that could wreak havoc in East Asia and to American interests.

The Taiwan problem, though it has taken on a new urgency during the past year, has long been a festering sore in U.S.-China relations. To Beijing, Taiwan’s separation symbolizes two centuries of imperialism, foreign occupation and humiliation. It is a historical score to be settled. Yet, as Taiwan has transformed itself, first into an economic powerhouse, now into a vibrant democracy, it is grappling with its own identity crisis, driving its politicians to seek greater international recognition.

This irresistible-force-vs.-immovable-object standoff has overtaken the political fictions that Beijing, Taipei and Washington have lived under for decades. When Richard M. Nixon opened relations with Beijing a quarter century ago, differences were muffled. The United States acknowledged “that Chinese on both sides of the straits agree there is but one China,” reads the communiques that have guided Sino-American relations. Since full diplomatic relations were established with Beijing in late 1978, the United States has had only “unofficial” ties with Taiwan, governed by the Taiwan Relations Act.

But full democracy in Taiwan, embodied in direct presidential elections next month, changes the calculus dramatically. The island’s new wealth, coupled with the demise of authoritarian military rule under the Kuomintang, have created a new Taiwan, with its identity derived less from mainland China and more from its own success and experience. The opposition Democratic People’s Party, which garnered 35% of the vote in recent parliamentary elections, openly advocates independence for Taiwan. Even the ruling Kuomintang has become more Taiwanized, symbolized by Cornell-educated President Lee Teng-hui, the first native Taiwanese head of Chiang Kai-chek’s Nationalist Party.

As communism has lost its ability to bond China together, nationalism has become an increasingly important source of legitimacy for any Chinese leader. This is especially true of a communist leadership consolidating power in transition from the rule of Deng Xiaoping.

These colliding forces have thrust the United States into an awkward middle position, as evidenced by last June’s controversy over Lee’s private visit to his college reunion. Beijing viewed Washington’s decision to grant Lee a visa as part of Taiwan’s assertive campaign, centered on its bid to join the United Nations, to gain world recognition and independence. China vehemently opposed the visa on the ground that it violated the “one China” policy.

Reflecting the incoherence and inept management that has plagued its China policy, the administration had at first resisted the visa request. Secretary of State Warren Christopher told his Chinese counterpart that he agreed with Beijing’s position: granting Lee a visa for a private visit to upstate New York would contravene policy, and he opposed it. Then, the highly effective Taiwan lobby weighed in. The administration reversed itself and, wiping egg off its face, claimed that it was issuing the visa, but it didn’t count. Somehow, the visa did not represent a blow to its “one China” policy.

Of course, Beijing didn’t buy it--and set out to prove its skepticism. As Taiwan geared up for December parliamentary elections, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army conducted a series of military exercises and missile-firing tests in the East China Sea, fewer than 100 miles off the coast of Taiwan. The message was unmistakable: Formal Taiwanese independence is unacceptable and, if pursued, will provoke a military response.

How would the United States respond to such an armed confrontation? Is a clash inevitable?

The administration has rightly struck a posture of ambiguity. It wants China to fear U.S. intervention in order to protect Taiwan; and it wants Taiwan to doubt that the United States would rush to its rescue in a civil war to achieve independence. Any deviation from this strategic ambiguity would raise the risk of miscalculation by one side or the other. There is also a danger that Congress may want to get involved by passing pro-Taiwan legislation or inviting Lee to Washington.

In such circumstances, the United States can only encourage both sides to peacefully find a new modus vivendi. For America, war with China over Taiwan would be a lose-lose proposition, hastening its exit from the region and creating instability throughout the Pacific.

The fact is, this downward spiral of events underscores the need for all sides to face reality. China’s hopes that Taiwan, like Hong Kong, would gravitate toward reunification have proved wrong. Beijing has retreated from its original pledge to allow Hong Kong full autonomy when it reverts to China in July 1997. Thus, any autonomy offer to Taiwan lacks credibility until Hong Kong’s future becomes clearer. Similarly, no change in Taiwan’s status can succeed unless it is worked out with China. As a U.N. Security Council member, China can veto any bid for membership. But it cannot deny Taiwan the status it has earned; China can only steer it in a more acceptable direction.

Fortunately, there is an achievable bargain that could meet the concerns of both China and Taiwan--and allow the United States to tune its China policy to reality. Taiwan could put aside its talk of independence in return for new understandings with China that would allow Taipei to join the United Nations or, at a minimum, such U.N. institutions as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and International Atomic Energy Agency.

This is not as difficult as it may sound. Li’s “reunification” speech also renewed an offer, made by President Jiang Zemin a year ago, for a China-Taiwan summit. China and Taiwan have previously worked out formulas to allow Taiwan to join the Asian Development Bank and Asia-Pacific Economic Conference. Moreover, there are other precedents: Both Germanys and both Yemens joined the United Nations and later unified; both Koreas joined the United Nations as a divided nation, and several Russian republics held U.N. seats along with the Soviet Union.

The fact that domestic politics is shaping the behavior of both China, Taiwan and the United States, rather than assessments of their respective interests, makes miscalculation more likely. But allowing Taiwan the higher political profile it seeks can be done under the umbrella of one China, two administrations. Getting there is the hard part.*