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The Real Aim of the Katyushas : Syria: Assad supplies Hezbollah with rockets when he wants to stir the pot.

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Edward N. Luttwak is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and the author of the 1993 book "The Endangered American Dream."

The Katyusha bombardment rockets that have been falling on Israel these last few days do not grow in Lebanon. Hezbollah is financed by Iran, but all its weapons come from Syrian territory. In practice, Syrian leader Hafez Assad supplies a limited number of Katyusha rockets to Hezbollah when he wants to put pressure on Israel for one reason or another. He has been doing so again this past week.

The only possible interpretation of Syrian motives is that Assad would like the Likud opposition to win in the elections next month. Certainly, Prime Minister Shimon Peres has already been badly damaged. By bringing war to the scene once again, the Peres vision of a peaceful “New Middle East” dedicated to economic development rather than war is exposed as much too optimistic--exactly as the Likud leaders have been saying all along. Moreover, it had been Peres’ hope to make new inaugural state visits in more Arab countries as he had done in Oman and Qatar just before the latest outbreak of fighting. There was also the prospect of a visit to Israel by Morocco’s King Hassan II. Now, Peres has very little chance of achieving further diplomatic successes before the election in efforts to persuade skeptical Israelis that the Arabs really want peace. As it is, the Israel-PLO peace policy of Peres and his Labor Party had already been tragically interrupted by Hamas bombs in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Ashkelon. Syria does not control Hamas, but it certainly controls Hezbollah’s guerrillas in Lebanon, and its decision to let them attack Israeli settlements evidently means that Assad wanted to reinforce the impact of the Hamas bombs.

But why would the Syrians prefer a Likud government? Obviously, not because it would be softer. Although it is perfectly clear that the peace process with the PLO would continue now that Arafat is less inclined to flirt with Hamas behind the scenes, the Likud is much less likely than Labor to give up the Golan Heights. Moreover, its reaction to Syrian provocations would be much tougher. Yet Assad’s policy is not irrational. Having lost the support of the Soviet Union, Syria can no longer make war with Israel. On the contrary, it must make peace before its economy sinks much further under the weight of huge military expenditures. But Assad evidently did not like the conditions under which he was negotiating in 1995, when Israel’s Labor government of Rabin and Peres enjoyed Washington’s full support. The known fact is that Assad refused to accept Israel’s successive peace proposals that Warren Christopher kept bringing to Damascus. Assad may now be calculating that if Peres loses the election, his bargaining position will be stronger because Bill Clinton’s Washington will be less friendly to a right-wing Likud government. Between now and Israel’s May 29 elections, there is time for more Hezbollah rockets and more Israeli return fire. Unless the latter can stop the former, Assad could achieve his aim, but he may then regret the result.

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