Don’t Keep U.S. Troops in Bosnia

For anyone concerned about preventing the unnecessary waste of American lives on futile overseas adventures, the December deadline for troop withdrawal from Bosnia cannot come too soon. Look at what has been going on recently in that beautiful but benighted part of the world. Events like the murder of Muslim refugees trying to return home and the shambled preparations for elections in September provide ominous evidence that the Dayton agreement settled nothing of consequence. It merely provided breathing room.

Behind the scenes, some of the key actors are showing what they really have in mind. In May, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic declared: “Our struggle will not be over until the whole of Bosnia is free. Our children will liberate the whole of Bosnia.” The indoctrination in hatred of the next generation has begun.

Meanwhile, in Serbia’s southern province of Kosovo, new battle lines are forming. Calls have gone out from the Albanian majority for an intifada. In anticipation of this, a heavily armed Serb force--nicknamed with crude irony the Pristine Corps--is moving into position.

As the impermanence of Dayton becomes increasingly visible, it is vital that the Clinton administration resist siren calls to delay the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Unfortunately, at recent meetings in Europe, both Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Defense Secretary William Perry opened the door to a longer American stay. This would be a tragic error. If the peoples of Bosnia want to plunge into a new round of warfare, that is their business, not America’s.

The trouble is, if the U.S. leaves Bosnia without putting some viable peace-enforcing structures in place, it is a sure bet that fighting will resume. An even surer bet is that two or three years hence, U.S. troops would be back in Bosnia.

This must not be allowed to happen. The answer is to insist that Europe take on the job--and this time handle things properly.

Given Europe’s reputation for feckless dithering, this may seem a forlorn recommendation. In fact, the European performance over Bosnia was not as bad as its U.S. critics make out. Certainly, the Europeans did not fulfill their early promises that this was “Europe’s hour.” Nonetheless, their peace proposals of 1992 and 1993 might have had a chance had Washington not opposed them. Also, they did show a certain toughness in keeping troops on the ground despite steady casualties.

This, however, is all water under the bridge. Today, the Europeans have a chance to make amends. Preferably of their own volition but otherwise under American insistence, they should state now that they are ready to remain in Bosnia for at least another year, even if the U.S. troops leave. This is a reasonable request. Dayton is by no means a perfect document, but, as noted earlier, it bought precious breathing room. The Europeans should use this to do what they, unlike the Americans, do well: conduct patient, low-intensity civil-military operations.

Whether Europe is prepared to give this assurance is an open question. Hans van den Broek, the European Union commissioner for external affairs, gave a somewhat weak-kneed impression when visiting Washington in May. He said that Europe would not “shy away from a leading role” but did not want to commit to staying on in case that confirmed the U.S. intention to leave.

The U.S. should tell Europe that this type of bargaining is not good enough. To borrow an analogy from a former chief of the CIA’s Afghan task force: When asked why, after evicting the Soviets from Afghanistan, the U.S. did not sort out the squabbles of the tribal chieftains, his answer was a model of strategic prioritization: “Superpowers,” he remarked dryly, “don’t do windows.”

So it is in Bosnia. As befits a superpower, the U.S. has stopped the war. The U.S. can now leave with its head held high. Europe can take care of the doors and windows.

In military terms, the Europeans are more than capable of this task. Institutionally, they are also moving in the right direction. The West European Union has emerged as the near-official security arm of the European Union. Politically, the moment is also opportune. Europe is examining its future in a series of intergovernmental conferences. A major external challenge is just what Europe needs to cut short its perennial identity crisis.

The U.S. should, therefore, make an early announcement that withdrawal will proceed on schedule--and that, once departed, it will refrain from back-seat driving. Bosnia would be turned over to Europe without reservation as the WEU’s first task. “Europe’s hour” would at last have come.