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Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinions

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Upon reading professor David M. O’Brien’s article, “This Time It’s Personal; Justice Scalia’s Increasing Incivility” (Opinion, July 14), I, as an attorney and retired judge, was first amused and then astounded. Amused because I thought, at first blush, that O’Brien was spoofing us. Later, I was astounded since I could not believe that a person who has written so extensively about the Supreme Court could be so unaware of the ways of attorneys and judges.

The undersigned usually disagrees with the opinions written by Justice Antonin Scalia. However, I stand with Abraham Lincoln in defending, to the death, his right to express those opinions. Further, it should be remembered that vigorous dissent keeps the majority on its toes, and sometimes serves as a preview of “coming attractions.” Oliver Wendell Holmes earned the title of the “Great Dissenter,” and was often caustically critical of the majority’s view.

What O’Brien seems to be ignoring is that Scalia’s so-called incivility is not aimed at any person, but at the opinion or viewpoint. Has O’Brien not read many dissenting opinions?

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There is nothing new or different in what Scalia does. He just happens to be unusually adept at sarcasm, wit and/or acerbic delivery. At least, such tactics will keep the readers of his opinions awake!

MARK P. ROBINSON

Los Angeles

* It appears that O’Brien has cleverly “outed” a Newt Gingrich doppelganger. If Justice Scalia relishes standing alone and “gives no quarter,” how can we defend his fitness to sit on this court?

O’Brien laments that Scalia’s conservative quirks extend as far as the domination of oral arguments with questions from the bench. Yet, should we suffer the court’s faculty club reputation and disallow fresh and rigorous inquiry by independent judicial interests?

Frank reappraisals of the court’s deliberative processes simply cannot be made by “demonstrating [an] interest in consensus building.” Scalia’s audacity in criticizing other Republican-appointed justices’ opinions, even when they fundamentally agree with his own, may be the rigorous application of fundamentals that ensure the “right” opinion is not made from wrongheaded reasoning.

In times when partisanship in the law is accepted but precision is merely affected, the back-to-basics approach by Scalia is luminary.

JACK BLANKENSHIP

Camarillo

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