More Hussein Provocations Look Inevitable

To the surprise of practically no one in Washington, Saddam Hussein basically didn’t blink.

Even as the Iraqi president appeared to be withdrawing at least some of his troops from the Kurdish city of Irbil, new dust-ups in the air underscored the challenges ahead as U.S. troops seek to enforce the newly expanded “no-fly” zone that President Clinton ordered over southern Iraq.

Analysts inside and outside the government said that further Iraqi probes and provocations seem almost certain as Hussein tests Clinton’s resolve. “You can count on it,” a weary Pentagon official said.

Another senior U.S. official had said in an interview in February that Hussein was bent on affecting the outcome of U.S. elections. “In 1992, he tried to influence the campaign with a series of crises and confrontations from midsummer to Inauguration Day,” this official said then. “We expect more of the same.”

Hussein lived up to his notice. “We’re more convinced than ever that he will try to be a spoiler in the election,” the same U.S. official said. “In his mind, it’s the best way to show his people and the rest of the world that he’s still a player.”

This time around, the Clinton administration has identified four basic ways in which Hussein could provoke the United States.

* He could challenge the new “no-fly” zone, which accounts for 20% of Iraq’s airspace. Iraqi troops could use their remaining radar, surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery to try to shoot down a U.S. warplane.

“We expect it,” a leading U.S. policymaker said. “We never want to say we’re invulnerable, because there are risks. But we’re alert and have good capabilities to respond.”

In the worst case, Iraq would capture one or more American pilots. The plight of more than a dozen captured U.S. fliers was one of the greatest traumas during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

* He could penetrate farther into the northern Iraqi region of Kurdistan, which allied forces have kept beyond his control since the Gulf War. Through direct military action or surrogates within the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP), Hussein could expand his control beyond Irbil to other parts of the country where he lost control.

U.S. officials acknowledged that their response to the invasion of Irbil--two rounds of cruise missile attacks Tuesday and Wednesday against air defense systems in southern Iraq--did not directly address the invasion of Irbil. Even the withdrawal of troops from Irbil, U.S. officials said, could merely reflect that they are not needed because Hussein can turn control of the city over to his allies in the KDP.

“Will we tolerate Saddam’s quislings in northern Iraq?” an administration source asked. “We have to. We’re not going to get involved in their civil war. He now has de facto control of that area.”

* He could mobilize on the southern front with the oil-rich but vulnerable Gulf sheikdoms. This stratagem would have the most political and economic impact on U.S. interests.

In October 1994, on the eve of U.S. congressional elections, Hussein mobilized in the south, forcing Washington to order 155,000 troops to the region. This time around, some U.S. officials doubt Hussein’s ability or willingness to try a repeat.

“The recent strikes on Iraq’s air defense systems will make another October surprise much harder,” the senior official predicted. “This doesn’t worry us as much as it might have last week.”

* He could resort to terrorism. Through his own agents, Arab sympathizers or guns for hire, Hussein could attempt the kind of psychological warfare that would take the confrontation beyond Iraq’s borders to the broader Middle East or even the outside world.

“This is a problem that will not go away,” the senior official conceded. “But in light of events earlier this year, the level of alerts and readiness is pretty high worldwide.”

Hussein already has made the U.S. intervention costly and controversial. The price tag alone on 44 cruise missiles fired by U.S. warplanes this week totaled $53 million. And that does not count the flights of B-52s a third of the way around the world and back or the doubling of the daily flights of U.S. warplanes enforcing “no-fly” zones in southern Iraq and over Kurdistan in the north.

“Operation Desert Strike,” as this week’s cruise missile attacks were named, also exacted a political price by fracturing the already troubled coalition of almost 40 countries cobbled together after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. Further confrontations could put new domestic pressure on the Clinton administration, U.S. officials admitted.

In case Hussein engages in new rounds of mischief, the United States has a list of options already developed, including extending the new “no-fly” zone into a “no-drive” zone. This step would expand the area where Hussein may not deploy his ground forces to coincide with the new “no-fly” zone.

Most of the options involve more airstrikes on various targets. In contrast to past retribution, the United States this time caught Hussein off guard by bombing sites far from the arena of contention.

“We surprised him. Now he can’t tell what we might do. He has to worry about everything, which is exactly what we want him to do,” said a ranking U.S. official. “The element of surprise can be an important weapon.”

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Iraqi and U.S. Firepower

A brief look at the firepower available to Iraq and the United States in the Persian Gulf region:

Iraq

Troop strength: 350,000 to 400,000

Air Power: 150 to 200 Russian combat aircraft*

Weapons: Deadliest threat comes from Scud missiles. President Saddam Hussein still is believed to have some mobile launchers, which were difficult to detect during the Gulf War.

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The United States

Troop strength: 20,000 (includes those on ships in Persian Gulf and stationed in Saudi Arabia)

Air Power: 200 warplanes, 50 helicopters, transport planes and other aircraft**

Weapons: The United States has powerful cruise missiles that were launched from vessels in the Gulf as well as by B-52 bombers early Tuesday and from vessels on Wednesday.

* Due to a severe shortage of spare parts and poor maintenance, it is questionable how many are operational.

** The Air Force was assembling an air expeditionary force of 30 to 40 fighter planes that could deploy to the Middle East as a quick-reaction force, officials said.