A Stormy Debate Is Brewing Within GOP Over Clinton’s Big Lead in Polls

Asked if congressional Republicans should take any lessons from President Clinton’s formidable lead in the polls over Bob Dole, the fourth-ranking GOP leader in the House answers crisply.

“No,” said Rep. John A. Boehner (R-Ohio), the tenacious chairman of the House Republican Conference.

Asked the same question, first-term Rep. Tom Campbell (R-San Jose), an emerging leader among House Republican moderates, draws very different conclusions.

“The lesson is that in order to win in 1996, we have to convince the American people that we are a party of the center, and we are not ideologically or practically at the extreme,” he said. “That is the clear lesson of how President Clinton has improved his position in the polls, and why today he has the lead.”

Republicans are on the brink of a stormy debate that very few in the party anticipated only months ago. At the root is a fundamental question: Is Clinton’s advantage the result of unique personal failings by Dole, or is it symptomatic of broader problems with the vanguard conservative agenda that congressional Republicans unfurled during the past two years?

If Dole doesn’t recover, Republicans will quickly divide into two camps marked by their contradictory answers to this question. Democrats will likely find this struggle easy to follow--because it will parallel the convulsions that have reconfigured their own party during the past 12 years.

Like the Republicans in 1996, Democrats in 1984 nominated a respected party veteran who claimed the nomination less through inspiration than loyalty and brute strength. And like the Republicans in 1996, almost all Democrats in 1984 considered the incumbent president a ripe target who didn’t deserve the public’s respect.

When Ronald Reagan nonetheless crushed Democrat Walter F. Mondale in a historic landslide 12 years ago, Democrats instantly aligned behind competing explanations for the disaster. One group blamed the messenger; the other blamed the message.

This debate wasn’t just academic; it shaped the party’s direction during the next decade. The first group--consisting mostly of liberal congressional leaders and key party interest groups such as organized labor--argued that all the Democrats needed to regain the White House was a candidate who could sell traditional liberalism more effectively than Mondale.

The second group--which included both the neoliberals who clustered around Gary Hart, and the “new Democrats” who flocked to the Democratic Leadership Council--argued instead that the party couldn’t win until it reformulated its agenda to win back moderate, middle-class voters who were deserting in droves. This contingent triumphed with Clinton’s election in 1992 on a platform that explicitly abandoned Mondale’s interest-group liberalism.

If Dole falls, Republicans will split into the same two camps. The dominant group--composed of most conservative activists and congressional leaders like Boehner--will point the finger at the messenger.

As if stacking sandbags against a storm, Republicans in this group are already hoarding explanations for Clinton’s revival that exonerate Congress. These Republicans point to Dole’s age, his frequently dour image on television and polls showing congressional Republicans running ahead of Dole in most districts. They attribute Clinton’s ascent to nothing more than his willingness to co-opt Republican positions on the budget, welfare and crime.

Republicans in the other camp, almost all of them moderates like Campbell, argue it is wishful thinking to pin the party’s problems solely on Dole. They point to Clinton’s success at portraying himself as a bulwark against a Congress bent on “extremist” changes in social and environmental programs; the fact that Republican planners felt compelled to throw a blanket over the congressional leadership at the party’s national convention last month; and Dole’s extraordinarily poor showing among centrist voters despite his own moderately conservative pedigree.

One other critical piece of evidence buttresses the moderate case: Much of the presidential race’s structure hardened into place while Dole, to most Americans, was little more than a generic stand-in for the GOP itself.

After running even or slightly behind Dole in polls through most of 1995, Clinton surged ahead during his battle with congressional Republicans over the budget last fall; Clinton has led Dole in virtually every national poll since. In the confrontation that prompted the repeated shutdowns of the federal government, Clinton’s approval rating likewise moved over the critical 50% mark--where it has remained ever since. Those numbers suggest that much of the deficit Dole now faces he inherited from the actions of Congress last year.

Even so, Republican moderates have no illusions that a Dole defeat alone would greatly amplify their voices. “We are always going to be pushing at the margin,” said Rep. Michael N. Castle (R-Del.).

What could change the internal balance would be a tide large enough to sweep Republicans from control of the House or Senate, or both. “If Republicans were to lose one or both branches of Congress, that would trigger real soul-searching,” said GOP strategist William Kristol, publisher of the Weekly Standard, a conservative magazine. “Then everything would be up for grabs: Did they go too far, too fast? Are they too right wing on social issues? Should they have not taken on entitlements? Should they have been more principled rather than less?”

One GOP legislator says that if Republicans lose the House--or even find their margin substantially reduced--Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) could face a challenge for party leadership. “It’s very hard to say our speaker should be Newt Gingrich, who hid from the television in San Diego,” the legislator said. “If you cannot put him on television, if you can have him come in your district only if it’s a safe Republican district . . . the speaker of the House cannot be the No. 1 spokesperson for Republicanism.”

Most other House insiders are dubious that Gingrich would face any serious challenge if Republicans maintain control (though even they caution that “anything is possible” if the GOP surrenders its majority). But even the prospect that Republicans might reconsider their allegiance to Gingrich--who was hailed as a Moses for leading the party from its 40 years in the congressional wilderness--suggests the turmoil this election could produce within the GOP if it doesn’t change course significantly in the next two months.

For all the bravado among conservative leaders about shrugging off a Clinton victory, many Republicans expect an inevitable tilt away from confrontation if voters return the same divided government to Washington. Kristol predicts a “transfer of power” from Gingrich to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), who demonstrated his willingness to cut deals with Clinton last summer on the minimum wage, health care and welfare reform. Even some House Republican leaders talk privately of courting Clinton to reach agreement on the budget, tax cuts and long-term entitlement reform.

Republicans will probably bend to the extent their reading of this fall’s election results encourage it. Likewise, if Clinton is reelected, his stance could be shaped largely by a parallel debate in Democratic circles about the reasons for his recovery.

This conflict--which rippled just below the surface at the Democratic convention last month--pits new Democrats, who say Clinton recovered because he co-opted the center, against liberals (both in and outside the administration) who argue that his presidency revived because he defended Medicare and other popular programs against congressional cuts. The first interpretation points Clinton toward long-term budget and entitlement deals with the GOP that lock down his claim on the center; the second promises rising pressure on Clinton from liberal forces to loosen the spigot on spending and resist compromise with Republicans in deficit-reduction talks.

During the past four years, both parties have suffered from misreading the election results and exceeding the public’s tolerance for ideological purity. That precedent should strengthen the contingents in both parties arguing for centrist compromise after election day, no matter how the voters apportion power. But there is no guarantee the more confrontational voices on each side will heed the message.