How to Soothe a Secret Grudge

Old friends inevitably have their misunderstandings, but the tension now growing between South Korea and the United States goes beyond routine friction. At issue is one of the most serious questions in contemporary international relations: How to handle the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, better known as North Korea.

So far the problem has been only marginally discernible: The last thing these two old allies want armed-to-the-teeth North Korea to see is a major public split. Indeed, last month, when South Korean President Kim Young Sam strode into a packed Los Angeles hotel ballroom, his speech to about 650 invited Korean Americans contained nary a hint of either a spat or a split with the U.S.

Similarly, just last week, Foreign Minister Gong Ro-Myung denied anything remotely resembling a serious problem in U.S.-Korean relations when I bluntly asked him about repeated rumors to this effect, which I had picked up while traveling in Asia last month. “The relationship is healthy and strong,” he insisted. In fact, South Koreans are still bristling over Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s initial reaction last month to North Korea’s outrageous submarine infiltration of the South. Remember how Christopher seemed to be suggesting that both North and South were culpable? That did not become an issue, the foreign minister insisted, because Christopher “promptly clarified” and “corrected his words” (Christopher did own up to his insensitivity and condemn the North Korean operation).

Well, if things are so good, then why have South Koreans been spying on the United States? Isn’t that what we learned from the arrest last month of U.S. Navy analyst Robert Chaegon Kim for allegedly passing classified information to Seoul? Replied Gong: “This is an isolated and individual case which has nothing to do with Korea-U.S. relations.” OK, then, is it not true that South Korean officials have been meeting in Beijing with their Chinese counterparts--some say behind Washington’s back? “China is in a position to exert influence over North Korea,” he replied. China will always be influential in Asia; America, especially if it goes isolationist, may not.

The Clinton administration knows it has problems with Korea. Indeed, late last week, just days after absolutely reassuring me (and perhaps himself) that everything was under control, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord popped up in Seoul. He was there because, though it has not been widely advertised, South Korea is now holding back on the controversial $4-billion-plus program to build a pair of nuclear power plants in North Korea. As the new logic goes, why give them anything? Here’s why: Because if South Korea, Japan and the West do that for the North, the North has promised to end its nuclear weapons program and allow international inspections, to the immense relief of everyone.

But in their hearts, many South Koreans fear that Washington is misguided to coddle the uncoddleable--the crazed communists in the North--and that any policy of “constructive engagement” will only elicit from Pyongyang the very behavior that everyone wants to avoid, from tantrums to threats and maybe worse. So a furious Seoul has frozen all inter-Korean exchanges and has shelved plans to ship more grain to the famished North. According to Kim Dae-joong, editor-in-chief of Chosun Ilbo, a leading South Korean newspaper: “The U.S.-South Korean relationship is now run aground by emotion, arrogance, distrust and lack of dialogue. The souring between Korea and the U.S. is largely due to the naive foreign policy of the Clinton administration.”

Is U.S. policy really such a disaster? Let’s look at the evidence. The North Koreans have actually been negotiating the ground rules for the nuclear deal known as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. No small plus. On the minus side, the North Koreans seem as pugnacious as ever. They arrested an American missionary coming across their border with China with the intent, allegedly, of spying for Washington. Then they vowed revenge for the death of 22 North Korean agents in September’s bizarre grounded submarine incident. Eerily, a South Korean diplomat was assassinated Oct. 1 in Vladivostock, though no one has taken “credit” for it yet. Worst of all, the North Korean military buildup continues; before too long it will deploy mid-range missiles capable of hitting not only South Korea but also Japan.

There is genuine merit to the imaginative and potentially transforming reactor project. Kim Young Sam knows this, but with hard-line hawks picking and pecking away, he is hard-pressed to calm his nation’s emotions down. However, that’s what he must do, and fast.

In return, the U.S. owes its South Korean friends the benefit of the doubt. Given the North’s nastiness, the U.S. needs to raise its military profile. The recent agreement to meet Seoul’s demand for joint maneuvers does help somewhat. But what’s also needed is the demonstrative dispatch to South Korea of some new showpiece battalion or air wing to send an unmistakable signal to the North. And perhaps it’s time for President Clinton to pick up the phone and have a long heart-to-heart with Kim. No one does this kind of thing better than Clinton and no one would appreciate it more than Kim.

Should Clinton do this in the home stretch of his presidential campaign? Sure, because the outcome of the tense North-South faceoff in Korea is more in doubt than the outcome of the American presidential election. By far.