Smooth Sailing--if Weather Holds

Deng Xiaoping was the most powerful remaining member of the founding generation of the People’s Republic of China, the driving force behind China’s market-led reforms and economic opening to the outside world, the pivotal figure behind the brutal suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrations and the primary architect of China’s current leadership lineup. Given his pivotal importance to recent Chinese history, one might expect rapid changes in the wake of his death, as was the case after Mao Tse-tung’s death in 1976. But this is unlikely, for several reasons.

Because of his declining health, Deng participated very little, if at all, in the policy and leadership decisions of the past two to three years. During this time, Deng’s designated successor, Jiang Zemin, sought to consolidate his position as the “core” of the senior leadership. While clearly not a figure of Deng’s power and stature (no member of the current leadership is), Jiang achieved significant success in this effort, largely by placing his supporters in key posts, by making only marginal adjustments in Deng’s largely successful policies when they threatened political or social order, and by placating critical institutional backers, notably the military.

Jiang has his opponents, but he is not confronted by a powerful figure with a score to settle as was Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, who was toppled by Deng. Moreover, no glaring policy failures have occurred during Jiang’s watch that could provide an opening to putative opponents. Finally, all members of the successor leadership know that to openly vie for power at this critical juncture would place the entire regime in jeopardy, both from below, given the precarious nature of relations between the heavy-handed state and the free-wheeling society, and from the military, which is concerned above all else with the maintenance of domestic order. The military backs Jiang because he has supported their institutional interests and because he has generally favored order over potentially destabilizing rapid social and economic change.

The most significant immediate reaction to Deng’s death likely will be a general tightening of domestic security and more caution (even rigidity) in internal and foreign policies. But what about the long term? Deng’s passing means that the power and policy game in China will be played by somewhat different rules. This could lead to big changes and possibly major unrest over time, especially if the regime experiences serious policy failures or faces major external challenges.

On the political front, Deng’s passing means that current leaders, beginning with Jiang, will need to show that they rule by dint of their own abilities, not because Deng placed them in power or backed their actions. This could force them to strike out in controversial new directions, especially if existing policies encounter growing problems. For example, with Deng, the major backer of military force during Tiananmen, now gone, some Chinese leaders might urge that the regime adopt a more lenient stance toward that event. Similarly, challengers to Jiang will be more inclined to argue that his preponderance of power (he holds the top government, party and military posts) merely reflects Deng’s imprimatur and to demand that others should at least share these posts. Both sets of calculations could intensify leadership competition. If they do, Deng will not be around to reestablish order and broker a new leadership structure at the top, as he often did in the past. The result could be open and destabilizing struggle, especially if policy issues also exacerbate leadership contention. Under such conditions, the military would probably intervene in leadership politics, precipitating a period of military rule.

On the policy front, Deng’s death means that Chinese leaders critical of the more liberal, free-market elements of the reforms, of a relatively moderate, pragmatic and nonconfrontational course in Chinese foreign affairs, and of the general priority given civilian over military development (all cornerstones of Deng’s policy line) will now have freer rein to press their views. They will likely do so to much greater effect if they can plausibly link these features of the Dengist line to growing social and political disorder and overheated economic growth. Such challenges could lead to significant shifts in Chinese policy.