Secret Lines of Authority Lead to Speculation on Successor

In the final years of his life, Deng Xiaoping, following the ancient tradition of the emperors, ruled China indirectly.

After resigning his chairmanship of the powerful Military Affairs Commission in 1989, Deng’s only remaining official titles were honorary chairman of the Soong Ching-ling Foundation, a charity group, and most honorary chairman of the China Bridge Assn.

Yet until his death he continued to be the preeminent power in China, the “paramount leader” of 1.2 billion people, a man whose every word and gesture was weighed and analyzed as a cryptic signal of enormous national significance.

“Since Deng Xiaoping did not operate as a public figure in the open,” wrote Lucian W. Pye, professor emeritus of Chinese studies at MIT, “people had to assume that his greatness lay in his ability to manipulate events from behind the scenes, much like a puppeteer.”

In such a setting, where real power is not necessarily linked to an impressive title, divining Deng’s possible successor is difficult.

As Deng’s physical condition deteriorated in his last years, speculation about future political leadership centered on six men, including potential successors as well as kingmakers:

* Jiang Zemin, 70. He is nominally at the apex of China’s power triangle--general secretary of the Communist Party, chairman of the Central Military Commission and president of the country. Deng called him the “core” of China’s third generation of Communist leadership.

Jiang vaulted to the top from the relatively obscure post of Shanghai party chief in 1989, just weeks after the army assault on Tianamen Square.

When he first came to the national stage, many believed that he would be only an interim figure in the post-Deng era because he had little support among the military and the party rank and file. But he has had nearly eight years to consolidate his power, appoint his key aides to leadership slots and promote military officers loyal to him.

In 1996, he launched a national “spiritual civilization” campaign aimed at boosting his image. In recent years he has traveled widely abroad as China’s head of state.

Still, it is unclear how long Jiang can hold on without Deng around to prop him up.

* Qiao Shi, 72. With ties to both reformist and conservative wings, Qiao has risen to increasing prominence in recent years, and, behind Jiang, is widely considered to be the second-most-likely leader to succeed Deng. As chairman of the National People’s Congress, he has overseen some impressive reforms of the Chinese criminal code, making him a favorite among foreign diplomats.

Besides his position atop the National People’s Congress, Qiao is a member of the party’s Central Committee and chairman of the Central Committee for the Protection of Secrets.

Until 1993, Qiao was chief of China’s secret police and overseas intelligence operations, with access to information not only about China’s dissidents but also its rulers.

A Chinese intellectual with contacts in the State Council and Central Committee said Qiao was offered the position of party chief in 1989 but declined.

With his wide-ranging connections and relatively positive public image, Qiao is a strong candidate for top leadership. Qiao controlled the 800,000-member paramilitary People’s Armed Police force in 1989 but, according to a well-placed source, refused to issue bullets during the June 3-4 crackdown at Tiananmen.

* Yang Shangkun, 89. He holds these honorary posts: head of the Leading Group for Party History Work, advisor to the Society for Studies on Party Members and president of the Table Tennis Assn.

His lack of impressive titles does not preclude his playing a major role in a power struggle.

Yang previously was China’s president and, more important, was first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.

He was “retired” in late 1992, along with his half-brother Yang Baibing, then the military commission’s secretary general. The Yangs were accused of trying to dominate the army to build a power base for the coming succession struggle, and since their exit many of their proteges have also been eased out of leadership.

He and his brother were believed to have played central roles in coordinating “Operation Tiananmen” in 1989, but recently Yang Shangkun has tried to distance himself from the decision to use troops to clear demonstrators from around the square.

Early in 1994, he toured Guangdong province, his former power base in southern China. Chinese government sources say that while there, Yang Shangkun met with former party chief Zhao Ziyang, who was stripped of power in June 1989 for allegedly supporting student demonstrators. If the meeting did occur, it might indicate Yang’s desire for allies.

In early 1995, Yang made another widely reported trip to Shenzhen, the special economic zone in southern China that mirrored the famous “Southern Tour” that Deng made there in 1992 to spur economic reforms.

* Wan Li, 80. Former head of the National People’s Congress and member of the party’s ruling Politburo, Wan now holds only ceremonial positions, the most important of which may be the head of the China Bridge Assn. Wan was said to have been Deng’s bridge partner and thus to have had direct access to China’s top man.

Wan rose to power in the late 1970s, after he successfully pioneered experiments in de-collectivizing agriculture in Anhui province in eastern China. Displaying genuine concern for rural problems and advocating gradual democratization, Wan gained broad popular support.

During the 1989 protests, students, intellectuals and even high-level party figures petitioned him to call an emergency session of the National People’s Congress to revoke martial law and remove Li Peng from office.

Zhao, then head of the Communist Party, summoned Wan to Beijing from a trip to the United States, but Wan did not make it to the capital in time to influence events. He reportedly was held under house arrest in Shanghai until after the crackdown.

Some press reports in mid-1994 said that, despite this complication in his career, Wan was named by Deng as a senior advisor to be consulted during the post-Deng transition.

* Li Peng, 68. He is a Soviet-trained engineer who was appointed China’s premier in 1987 after liberal Hu Yaobang was ousted as party general secretary. Zhao was promoted to party chief succeeding Hu; Li replaced Zhao as premier. Since then, Li’s political fortune has been made at the expense of party reformists. With the renewed economic reform drive of 1992, Li experienced some slippage.

Li’s declaration of martial law in 1989 triggered widespread calls for the National People’s Congress to remove him from office.

But Li is closely tied to the eldest of the revolutionary generation. At age 11, he was adopted by the great Chinese Communist leader Chou En-lai. Every elderly patron’s death diminishes him.

The death in April 1995 of one of his main supporters, senior leader Chen Yun, dealt a blow to his chances in the succession battle.

Many of Li’s economic responsibilities were taken over by Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, a strong reformist, during the economic drive reopened in 1992. In the spring of 1993, Li suffered a heart attack and was relieved of more duties.

With economic doors opening in 1992 and money pouring in, many democracy activists more or less forgave Deng for the 1989 suppression of the Tiananmen movement. But few absolved Li.

* Zhu Rongji, 68. Vice premier and former head of the central People’s Bank of China, Zhu is the party Standing Committee’s strongest proponent of economic reform and the mastermind behind China’s tax and financial reforms. Yet many of Zhu’s proposals have been stubbornly resisted by provincial leaders, and Zhu is said to be the focus of hard-line enmity within the party. As resistance to the austerity aspects of the economic reforms has grown in recent years, Zhu’s star has somewhat dimmed.

Like Jiang Zemin, Zhu was brought to Beijing from Shanghai in the aftermath of the 1989 crackdown.

As mayor of Shanghai during the democracy demonstrations, Zhu persuaded Shanghai protesters to leave the streets peacefully and had promised that he would not call in the army.

Zhu has support among Chinese students, intellectuals and party reformers, but is no Western-style human rights activist.

He was one of those who called for strict punishment of Xi Yang, a Chinese reporter for a Hong Kong paper who in 1993 was accused of leaking the interest-rate plans of the central bank while on assignment in China. Xi was sentenced to 12 years in prison for “stealing state secrets” but was released last month.

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Who is Next in Line?

JIANG ZEMIN, 70

President, general secretary of the Communist Party, chairman of the Central Military Commission. Rose to prominence just weeks after the army assault on Tiananmen Square. He has traveled widely abroad as China’s head of state.

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QIAO SHI, 72

Chairman of the National People’s Congress, member of the party’s Central Committee and chairman of the Central Committee for the Protection of Secrets. Behind Jiang, widely considered to be the second-most-likely leader to succeed Deng. Was chief of China’s secret police and overseas intelligence operations, with access to information not only about China’s dissidents but also its rulers.

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YANG SHANGKUN, 90

Holds honorary posts, including head of the Leading Group for Party History Work, advisor to the Society for Studies on Party Members and president of the Table Tennis Assn. Although he “retired” in 1992, Yang’s lack of impressive titles does not preclude a major role in a power struggle. He previously was China’s president and was first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.

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WAN LI, 80

Former head of China’s National People’s Congress and member of the party’s ruling Politburo, he now holds only ceremonial positions, the most important of which may be the head of the Bridge Assn. In that role, he was said to have been Deng’s bridge partner and thus to have had direct access to China’s top man. Potential king-maker.

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LI PENG, 68

Premier. His declaration of martial law in 1989 triggered widespread calls for the National People’s Congress to remove him from office. He is closely tied to the eldest of the revolutionary generation. Every patron’s death diminishes him.

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ZHU RONGJI, 68

Vice premier and former head of the central People’s Bank of China. He is the mastermind behind China’s tax and financial reforms but is also the focus of hard-line enmity within the party.