Sharm el Sheik: Just a Memory?

The suicide bombing of a Tel Aviv cafe and the murder of seven Israeli schoolgirls by a Jordanian soldier coincided with the first anniversary of the “Summit of Peacemakers” in Sharm el Sheik, Egypt. The summit, which brought together 29 leaders from throughout the Arab world, Turkey, Israel, Europe, Russia, Japan and the United States, had two goals: to support Israel, traumatized at the time by a wave of suicide bombings, and to lay the groundwork for the long-term fight against “all acts of terror.” One year later, however, the critical element of cooperation that was established at Sharm el Sheik has been largely forgotten, like the summit itself.

Perhaps the meeting’s most important development was the participants’ commitment to translate the summit’s principles into practical measures. But only one subsequent meeting was convened--in Washington, just a week later. Since then, there has been no indication that the Sharm el Sheik framework will be resumed.

To its credit, the Clinton administration has taken several important steps to translate the rhetoric of Sharm el Sheik into reality. The U.S. appropriated $100 million for Israel to obtain advanced counterterrorism equipment, opened several FBI offices in the Middle East and enacted new anti-terrorism legislation, including expanded economic sanctions against Iran and Libya.

But much remains to be done by Washington. Nearly two-thirds of the $100 million appropriation to Israel has yet to be disbursed. No action has been taken to punish companies or countries doing business with Iran and Libya. The State Department has yet to officially designate terrorist organizations as such, which would finally enable the government to stop these groups from fund-raising in the U.S. for their deadly activities overseas.

For their part, the Arab states have all but abandoned the most promising element of the Sharm el Sheik framework: counterterrorism cooperation with Israel.

In January, Arab interior ministers met in Tunis reportedly to establish a counterterrorism strategy “in contrast” to the Sharm el Sheik model. The most startling example of this contrast was the presence of the Arab world’s leading sponsors of terrorism--Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria--all of which were absent from Sharm el Sheik. At Sharm el Sheik, the participants had emphasized their strong condemnation of all acts of terror, including the recent attacks in Israel. In Tunis, the Arab ministers reverted to a definition of terrorism that specifically allows for the “legitimate struggle of peoples under foreign occupation,” code words understood by everyone as meant to excuse terrorism against Israel.

Palestinian efforts to fight terrorism since Sharm el Sheik have been mixed. Palestinian security forces have arrested militants from the radical Islamic opposition group, Hamas, and have sought to break Hamas’ control of mosques, schools and universities.

But Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority has not undertaken any systematic effort to confiscate illegal weapons, has yet to fulfill its obligation to transfer suspected terrorists to Israel, has refused to arrest the leading figure in Hamas’ military wing and has released most of the those arrested after the suicide bombings in Israel last year. Indeed, Arafat personally ordered the release of the head of Hamas’ “secret apparatus.”

Unfortunately, money, not peace or stability, remains the overriding concern of most European states. For years, the Europeans have rejected U.S. efforts to restrict trade with Iran, claiming that it provided them leverage to moderate the Islamic Republic’s militancy. The absolute failure of this policy would be comical if it were not so tragic.

Sharm el Sheik was meant to mark the beginning of an unprecedented effort of international cooperation to fight terrorism. A year later, its promise lies dangerously unfulfilled. The spirit of Sharm el Sheik is at best a memory; the need for a comprehensive approach that includes Arabs, Israelis and Turks working together with the rest of the world to combat terrorism has been virtually abandoned.

As the summit’s principal architect, the U.S. must seek to resurrect the process it launched a year ago. Failure to do so will squander a unique opportunity to take meaningful action against terrorism--an issue the Clinton administration has correctly identified as one of the greatest threats to U.S. interests.