No Quick Fix for the Koreas

The world’s most dangerous border remains the 2 1/2-mile-wide demilitarized zone established by the armistice that halted the Korean War 44 years ago. Last year, in hopes of converting that unstable truce into a permanent peace, the presidents of the United States and South Korea invited North Korea and China, its wartime ally, to enter into negotiations. After frustrating exploratory talks that no doubt foreshadow the difficulties that lie ahead, North Korea this week agreed. The four parties will meet on Aug. 5 in New York to decide when formal negotiations will begin and what they will involve. A breakthrough? Maybe. But also, perhaps, no more than a tactical shift by a regime that is facing unprecedented woes.

Two events have moved North Korea to agree to meet not just with the United States, which it has long been ready to do, but also on an equal basis with the South Korean enemy it has for so long scorned. The first was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which cost Pyongyang the subsidies that had sustained it. The other is the rising threat of famine that could affect millions of its citizens. Washington has been generous in helping provide food aid, insisting its help has nothing to do with its interest in bringing Pyongyang to the negotiating table. But the implicit linkage has of course always been there, and understood by the North Koreans.

Whether their interest in making peace will remain if the food problems are ameliorated is the crucial question. Is Pyongyang ready to end its global isolation by taking the key first step of normalizing relations with South Korea? Is it ready to strengthen its economy by, among other things, diverting some of its staggering military outlays to more productive uses? The opportunity is at hand. What is yet to be demonstrated is whether the political decision to seize that opportunity has been made.