Going It Alone Isn’t an Option

Saddam Hussein has once again foisted a crisis on Washington and the U.N., reinforcing the magnitude of our failure--easier to see now than then--to remove him from power after the Gulf War. This crisis recycles the same old theme: Saddam is determined to reclaim his sovereignty over all of Iraq and reassert his personal, political and military power in the region as well as at home. He will probe unceasingly for loopholes by which to claw his way back to his prewar stature. He will not change and if permitted will repeat the same challenges and depredations in his neighborhood.

U.S. policy on Iraq has actually been pretty successful for seven years now in circumscribing Saddam’s threat. What is different this time is that the U.S. faces growing problems in asserting its own policy preferences and its penchant for unilateral action.

Iraq cannot be seen in isolation. In Israel the hard-line policies of Benjamin Netanyahu have effectively torpedoed the peace process, setting off negative reactions across the region. Washington’s hesitancy in dealing firmly with him has sharply damaged its pretenses to evenhandedness and thus curtailed the acceptability and latitude of U.S. action even in friendly Muslim states. Unilateral U.S. military action against Saddam today would be widely condemned by Arab states that feel a need for Arab solidarity in the face of Netanyahu’s intransigence.

In the same vein, the U.S. has consumed large quantities of goodwill even with European partners on the Security Council through other ill-conceived unilateral actions such as the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which punish American allies for not conforming with American policy toward Cuba, Iran and Libya. Thus U.S. efforts to ensure Security Council alignment with Washington on Iraq encounter greater opposition than ever before.

There is no question that Saddam must be kept weak and isolated so that he does not strike again pending the day when someone will strike him down. Our allies agree that his adventurousness and quest for weapons of mass destruction must be stopped, but they differ over means and extent. We must restore genuine cooperation with allies if we are to have any clout. A Security Council that can unite on a more modest but at least united and firm policy toward Saddam is far better than self-defeating unilateral U.S. action and a divided Security Council.

The major problem with the oil embargo against Iraq is the great suffering it has imposed on the Iraqi people. Saddam has quite cynically transferred the costs--limited food and medicine--to them. The human suffering makes it harder to justify the embargo and creates growing discontent in the region.

It is probably time to relent somewhat on the intensity of the economic embargo, while trying to hold or intensify the line in the political and military realm. We need to focus on the illegitimacy of Saddam’s regime, including explicit statements that only his fall will bring relief to Iraq. We should continue to charge him with the full immensity of his war crimes and civilian crimes against his own people and his neighbors. We must strive to reach consensus that Saddam is a pariah whose regime must remain politically isolated. Iraq’s military power must continue to be curtailed as long as Saddam is in power. It is not, after all, the weapons that matter as much as the character and intentions of those who wield them.

Such a policy of differentiation is not easy to implement and can be eroded by state or commercial players with no interest in the international order. But American options are dwindling as the Gulf War recedes and new political problems arise that impinge on the willingness of other states to cooperate. It may be nice to be the world’s sole superpower, but it doesn’t mean much when the international stakes are no longer high, different nations have different interests, Washington is perceived as highhanded and selective in imposing its moral standards, and its ability to impose its will is taken ever less seriously.

If there is a good case to be made against Saddam--and there is--we will have to settle for a consensus among the major powers, even if it lacks the full vigor we seek. Real arm-twisting needs to be saved for truly vital issues, but in recent years we unfortunately have frittered away a most precious commodity, our credibility, through hyper-charged caricatures of Iranian or Cuban threats that are unconvincing to most analysts and governments. Hyping these differences is counterproductive and only plays into U.S. domestic politics.

Saddam is demonstrably the single most dangerous ruler in the world today. Let’s see if we can get minimal agreement on what that danger is and how to face it with a united Security Council stand.