Iran Reportedly Spied on U.S. Personnel in Saudi Arabia

Iranian intelligence agents were conducting intensive surveillance of American military personnel and facilities in Saudi Arabia at least a year before the bombing of a U.S. military housing complex there killed 19 Air Force personnel in June 1996, according to U.S. officials.

American military and intelligence officials became so concerned about the Iranian surveillance in 1995 that the United States asked Saudi Arabia’s intelligence agency to conduct clandestine operations to make it more difficult for the Iranians to monitor U.S. personnel, officials said.

Evidence of the Iranian surveillance raises new questions about why U.S. military commanders did not take more extensive precautions to increase the security of their bases before the bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran.

While the evidence of Iranian intelligence surveillance does not tie Iran’s Islamic regime directly to the Khobar Towers blast, the information further fuels questions about why Clinton administration officials have appeared skeptical of Saudi Arabia’s assertions of Iranian complicity.

Surveillance of U.S. military personnel by agents working out of Iran’s intelligence station in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, became a serious problem in the spring and summer of 1995, sources said. The Iranians were monitoring U.S. military officers and other personnel throughout Saudi Arabia, including Americans working at Saudi military facilities.

U.S. military and intelligence officials became convinced that the surveillance was part of Iran’s contingency planning for possible terrorist strikes against U.S. personnel and facilities in Saudi Arabia, officials said.

The extensive nature of the surveillance finally prompted U.S. officials to ask Saudi Arabia’s security and intelligence forces to step in to counter the Iranian operations.

As a result, Saudi intelligence ordered the area around the Iranian Consulate in Jidda, where the Iranian intelligence station had its offices, to be “flooded” with Saudi agents conducting counter-surveillance.

For a time, that made it nearly impossible for the Iranians to conduct covert surveillance of U.S. personnel, and Iran closed its intelligence station in Jidda in July 1995. But the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security reopened the intelligence station in March 1996 and apparently resumed its operations.

The Iranian surveillance underscores the controversy about the security precautions taken at Khobar Towers before the attack.

In July, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen--over the protests of some military officials--announced that he would hold the Air Force general in charge of the Khobar housing complex responsible for failing to safeguard his troops. Cohen ruled that Brig. Gen. Terryl J. Schwalier had sufficient warnings of a possible attack but did not take basic security steps such as establishing an effective alarm system or regularly practicing evacuation drills.

The investigation into the bombing has been long and frustrating, and for months it has been highlighted by a semipublic debate between U.S. and Saudi officials over the extent of Iranian complicity in the terrorist strike. The Saudis are said to be convinced that the bombing was carried out by Saudi dissidents who were part of a broad conspiracy that was backed by Iran.

U.S. officials have stressed that they have not seen the evidence proving Iranian involvement in the terrorist strike. At the same time, FBI officials conducting the U.S. investigation into the blast repeatedly have expressed frustration at the lack of cooperation they have received from Saudi Arabia’s government in sharing evidence.

Hani Abdel Rahim Hussein Sayegh, the Saudi dissident and Khobar suspect arrested in Canada in March, whom the FBI hoped would provide information that would crack the case, instead has been a major disappointment. He reportedly implicated a senior Iranian intelligence officer in a 1995 conspiracy to attack American targets in Saudi Arabia but could not provide evidence directly linking the Iranians to the Khobar blast.

But Sayegh’s deal with the FBI has fallen through, and he is no longer cooperating with U.S. investigators. He now claims that he can prove he was in Iran at the time of the bombing and was not involved in the Khobar attack.

Some critics within the U.S. government complain that the administration has taken an overly legalistic approach to searching for Iranian ties to the attack. Clear proof of Iranian complicity might pressure the administration to take retaliatory measures against Iran at a time when many Western observers believe that Tehran seems to be slowly moderating its policies.

Yet sources said there is evidence to show that, while Iranian agents were monitoring the movements of U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia, Iranian-backed terrorist groups also were training Saudi dissidents in Lebanon. U.S. sources said that Lebanese-based Hezbollah, the radical Islamic organization that is backed by Iran, provided training for a dissident group known as Saudi Hezbollah.