Saddam Is the Devil They Know

Why and how has Saddam Hussein survived so long? This is a critical question in the effort to degrade Saddam’s military capabilities and possibly undermine him. Some U.S. officials have said that a bombing campaign can cause enough chaos in Iraq and frustration with Saddam that coup plotters in Iraq will be emboldened to act against the dictator.

While this is not impossible, part of the reason it is so difficult and why Saddam endures has been overlooked. Namely, Saddam survives not only because he is so brutal and heavily protected, but also because Iraq’s elites fear what might happen to them if he is overthrown. They are tied to his fortunes, and if he goes down, so might they.

To try to eliminate Saddam, Iraq’s elites need to feel that their lot will not be worse without Saddam. But that is the problem in a dictatorship and especially in Saddam’s Iraq. If he falls, the elite risk losing prestige, wealth and possibly their lives in one of the following scenarios.

The first scenario is the breakdown of Iraq that appeared possible after the 1991 Gulf War, when Saddam was facing uprisings in the north and south. Saddam, through brute force and sheer terror, has kept Iraq unified, despite pressures from the Kurds in the north for their own state and the Shiites in the south for greater autonomy. Iraq’s breakdown would likely impose severe costs on its political, commercial, religious and cultural elites, unless someone could effectively replace Saddam.

Second, in post-Saddam Iraq, Shiite influence would likely rise. Iraq’s population is about 67% Shiite. Shiites represent the minority, more fundamentalist branch of Islam worldwide. But Iraq is ruled by Sunnis, who come mainly from Saddam’s small town of Takrit. While Shiites currently lack political influence, Saddam’s fall could alter this reality and threaten Iraq’s elite.

In the third scenario, the elite must worry that with Saddam gone and Iraq in possible chaos, Iran, Syria or Turkey, which has ongoing water and territorial disputes with Iraq, will gain influence. Syria, like other regional states, has created a special committee to rid Iraq of Saddam, and has cultivated political contacts within Iraq. Iran, which is 93% Shiite, would delight in affecting Iraqi internal politics, which it regularly attempts to do.

In the fourth scenario, U.S. influence over Iraq increases. The Iraqi elite understand fully that Washington wants Saddam’s ouster, and they remember that the CIA was involved covertly in northern Iraq to achieve this end. In a post-Saddam Iraq, they would expect U.S. power in the country and region to increase significantly, a concern heightened by the presence of massive U.S. military force in the region. This fear strengthens pro-Saddam forces because many Iraqi elites would prefer Saddam’s wild ride to yet another historical round of Western domination.

Saddam’s strength is the unpopularity of the alternatives to his rule. That makes his domestic detractors think twice about seriously challenging him. This feature makes him more able to endure, despite his many miscalculations. For leaders in the Arab and Western world who believe that the region can never be stable so long as Saddam is in power, there is a lesson. Saddam can be punished and contained with force, but not overthrown. To do that, the U.S. and others need to create and nurture a sensible alternative to his rule.