A Deal That Could Break Hussein

The Iraq status quo has become untenable, and another Russian-brokered deal, even if attainable, will not prevent future confrontations. The temptation is thus great, perhaps unstoppable, for a military strike to reverse the tide, even if the United States has to go it alone. This would be a big mistake for the Clinton administration, even domestically.

Any military operation would have to be “massive and sustained.” Its objectives would presumably include some or all of the following: to accelerate the demise of the Iraqi government; to compel full Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions, and to retard the development of any weapons of mass destruction that Iraq may be concealing from U.N. inspectors.

But judging from his survival record, Saddam Hussein again will emerge from an underground bunker to taunt U.S. resolve. Sure, the United States could get lucky. But the safe bet is that the administration will be left with intensified Iraqi defiance, suspension of critical U.N. military inspections, including monitors now in operation, increased tension with European and Arab allies, and fewer U.S. options to address future challenges. All this at a time when the United States is struggling to prevent Middle East peace negotiations from collapsing.

Heavy bombing and missile attacks would probably disrupt any weapons-making facilities, though U.N. inspectors aren’t exactly sure where they are located. Inflicting significant damage on Iraq’s military and industrial infrastructure might have the same effect. But this possible benefit must be weighed against the costs of handing Iraq’s leaders a golden opportunity to accelerate their weapons-making effort once all U.N. operations are terminated and the cooperation of U.S. allies is further diminished.

It would be unwise to underestimate the value of U.N. monitors and inspectors: More weapons of mass destruction have been found and dismantled by these inspectors than were destroyed by all the bombs and missiles unleashed during the Gulf War. Any action that could lead to the total collapse of the monitoring regime would be costly.

So why does it seem like the missiles are already on their way? Even without the White House sex scandal, momentum has been building for a military confrontation, as Iraq continues to defy U.N. resolutions despite Russian and French diplomatic efforts.

Two assumptions, both fallacious, have made a military attack seem inevitable. The first concerns the weight of congressional and public opinion, the second with the apparent absence of alternatives.

U.S. public opinion favors using military force, and there is strong bipartisan support for it in Congress. But the popularity of this option, which is broad but not deep, is hardly telling: Most people see few costs attached to a military strike. Reality will prove otherwise. The administration can be sure of one thing the morning after, with Hussein still in power and U.N. operations suspended: Those who had urged the administration to punish Iraq will give it no points for taking their advise but will admonish it for doing too little. Public opinion, now focused on still-defiant Iraq, will sour.

The assumption that the United States has no option other than to hit Hussein rests on the belief that diplomacy has exhausted itself. The administration insists there can be no compromise on principles and that Iraq must unconditionally abide by U.N. resolutions. These are reasonable and just demands, but they also cloak a one-way-street diplomacy with allies: The United States is not prepared to take their views and interests into account. It is a diplomacy that amounts to little more than informing allies of U.S. determination to let the missiles fly and giving them some time to persuade Iraq to comply.

But there is a different kind of diplomacy that begins by asking why allies, including those most threatened by Iraq, are opposed to military strikes. Most share the U.S. objective of achieving full Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions, but they also believe that the United Nation must explicitly link Iraqi compliance with the lifting of the oil embargo against Iraq. The United States, unwilling to choose between the goals of winning Iraqi compliance or undermining Hussein’s regime, worries that such a link would only strengthen the Iraqi leader. This is a recipe for paralysis.

A different kind of diplomacy is needed, not with Iraq, but with other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and key Arab states. Their concerns are primarily humanitarian and financial, while Washington’s are military. The two can be combined, with potentially great benefits for the United States. If Washington agrees to linking ultimate Iraqi compliance regarding weapons of mass destruction with an end to the oil embargo against Iraq, it might secure firmer allied support for the military option down the road and, should force become necessary, might not have to apply it alone. A new U.N. resolution may be required to put this diplomacy into action.

There is no reason military action cannot be put off while such a deal with other members of the Security Council, especially France and Russia, is explored. It matters a great deal if military strikes are unilateral, and defy the wishes of the permanent members of the Security Council, or have broad support. It matters because unilateral action, by jeopardizing the cooperation of key international parties, could make it harder to salvage the U.N. monitors and the sanctions regime. It also matters how the Arab world will view and thus react to such attacks. If Washington, even with British help, is seen as isolated in its campaign against Iraq, this will only feed regional suspicions of U.S. intentions.

Making a diplomatic deal with key international actors would immediately clarify U.S. priorities: compliance is more important than bringing down Hussein. By responding to the economic issues raised by the embargo, the United States would not only acknowledge international concerns, but it would also provide Iraq with incentives to be more cooperative and obey U.N. resolutions. And if the allies still failed to persuade Iraq to comply, the military option would remain open, but with broader regional and international support.

The alternative--unilateral military actions bringing down Hussein while simultaneously compelling his compliance--is wishful thinking.