Nizar Hamdoon

Nizar Hamdoon is a busy man these days. Just before sitting down for an interview early last week, he had a one-on-one meeting with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Soon after the conversation, he was off to a Manhattan TV studio to appear on “Larry King Live.” Of course, the main reason Hamdoon is so in demand is that, as Iraq’s ambassador to the United Nations, he is Saddam Hussein’s point man in the United States. And, once again, it looks as if the two countries are destined to face off in combat.

But Hamdoon is also sought after because he is an adroit interlocutor. From the time he arrived in America 15 years ago, he impressed friend and adversary alike with his ability to understand and operate in what is an alien environment for Arab diplomats, especially those from countries less than friendly to the West.

Today, these skills are used to promote Iraq’s insistence that the United Nations curb its weapons’ inspectors in Iraq. Nothing would please this diplomat more than to be able to promote another Iraqi objective: a substantive dialogue with the United States. But, so far, the Clinton administration has refused to talk about anything other than Iraq’s obligation to destroy and then permit unfettered monitoring of its long-range missile, chemical- and biological-weapons capabilities.

Hamdoon, 53, and his wife, Sahar, came to Washington in 1983, at a time when Iraq and the United States began to improve relations. He soon built a reputation as an astute observer of the U.S. political process. According to one State Department official, his problem would not be in understanding Washington, but in his ability to communicate that understanding back to Baghdad.

Hamdoon became known for his dinner parties--more seminars than parties. And here, too, he displayed a grasp of how Washington worked. He would bring together junior officials who wrote the action memorandums and senior-level people who read them. A typical dinner would include former Democratic presidential candidate George S. McGovern seated next to a Senate committee staffer, and a State Department intelligence analyst across from William E. Colby, former CIA director. Journalists were also regulars, since Hamdoon assiduously courted the press.

When Hamdoon left America in 1987, to become Iraq’s deputy foreign minister, U.S.-Iraqi relations were at a high point. When he came back, in 1993, Hamdoon moved to the only place in the United States where an Iraqi diplomat was allowed--New York. As the U.N. representative of a defeated and, to many, reviled regime, Hamdoon struggled to reestablish credibility. Given the political climate, his time was spent with representatives of just about every country other than the United States.

Still, Hamdoon made significant inroads in this new political culture. His most concrete achievement was the adoption of an “oil-for-food” program that allows Iraq, under U.N. supervision, to sell oil in exchange for humanitarian goods. This program, initially opposed by Washington and the subject of much controversy in Baghdad, now allows Iraq to sell oil worth $2 billion every six months to pay for badly needed food, medicine and other goods. In fact, Hamdoon’s meeting with Annan was about the secretary-general’s offer to more than double the amount of oil Iraq is allowed to sell.

The first part of the interview took place in a formal reception room on the main floor of the ambassador’s residence, a large townhouse on Manhattan’s fashionable Upper East Side. Later, Hamdoon chatted in his fourth-floor study, where the most immediate impression is of his love affair with American gadgets. It contains two personal computers (IBM and Apple) and a giant-screen TV tuned to CNN. The shelves held dozens of CDs and what the ambassador said were the two videos he had seen most recently, “Men In Black” and “Independence Day.”

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Question: How seriously do you take the U.S. threat to employ military force against Iraq?

Answer: I think it’s taken seriously. I have no question in my mind that the government back home does take it seriously.

Q: Do you think they have an accurate assessment of the kind of military action the United States has in mind?

A: I think they do, given the immense amount of information that is coming out of Washington on the different aspects of the planned action against Iraq. They have a good idea of the nature of the attack, if it happens.

Q: Do you think that the current flurry of diplomatic activity will be sufficient to prevent the kind of confrontation that you say your government understands?

A: This remains to be seen. I have to say that I really hope they produce something. And there is still a cushion of time to be used for whatever diplomatic initiatives we are currently involved in. The Russians, the French now are coming in. The Turks also, and some signs that Baghdad is going to try to make some initiatives.

Q: Have you been disappointed at the level of support you have received from the French in recent days?

A: I think that given French policies worldwide and their special relations with the United States, they are obviously sensitive to whatever American foreign policy is, especially when it carries the weight this one does for the U.S. But I still think the essence of the French position is against the use of force . . . though there is a milder tone toward the American policy in recent days. But we in Iraq are hopeful that the French will continue to distance themselves from any future military attack by the United States.

Q: Is Russian behavior pretty much what you expected?

A: I think there is a good level of confidence in the Russian initiatives. There is a feeling in Baghdad that the Russians are genuine in trying to find a peaceful solution to the problem . . . which will accommodate both the Iraqi and American point of view.

Q: But if these efforts fail, do you believe you are facing in the United States today an adversary that is stronger or weaker than in the past?

A: On the military level, obviously, the U.S. by far is stronger than it was seven years ago, given the ongoing development of its weaponry--which some credit should be given to Iraq, since the experience the U.S. had with Iraq allowed them to improve many of their weapons. But on the political and moral level, so to speak, I think there are fewer people than back in 1991 supporting a military buildup and for the use of a military buildup for dealing with Iraq in a hostile manner.

Q: But don’t you get the sense the United States doesn’t need the kind of support today that it needed in 1990-1991 in order to be able to use force against Iraq?

A: This is not something that can be addressed from outside the United States government. Back in 1993, for the couple of attacks they had on Baghdad, they did not solicit support from anyone else. . . . But [this time] they obviously feel better off with support than without it.

Q: How do you assess the level of support for the United States in the Arab world? Or put another way, how do you assess the level of Arab support for Iraq today?

A: I think it is clear that support for Iraq right now is significantly different and more solid than it was back in 1991, given the change in circumstances and the suffering of the Iraqi people and given other factors that relate to the peace process--where the U.S. has really lost confidence, both from the Arab people and on the government level.

Q: Do you think the failure of the Arab-Israeli peace process has enhanced Iraq’s position?

A: I think that the continuous failure to move the peace process and the reluctance of the United States to apply enough pressure on Netanyahu’s government to concede what has been agreed upon previously with the Palestinians exposes the United States to the Arab people at large that there is this biased policy. When it comes to Israel, America is not going to apply pressure; when it comes to Iraq, all the pressure is applied. When it comes to Israel, Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions mean nothing . . . . While for Iraq, every time there is a little problem they try to put it in the context of United Nations resolutions. This eventually weakened the stature of the United States in the Arab world.

Q: But don’t you admit that the American position has been strengthened in some places, like in Jordan?

A: I agree that relations between the two governments in Baghdad and Amman are cooler than they were two years ago, or during the Gulf War. But I can also see that the essence of Jordanian policy . . . is against a continuation of sanctions and against the use of military force.

Q: How does Israel fit into current thinking in Baghdad? And will it be a target as it was during the Gulf War?

A: The feeling in Baghdad is that Israel is part of this plan or conspiracy to put further pressure on Iraq and to try to destroy whatever infrastructure that has been leftover or rebuilt after the Gulf War. As for Iraqi reaction in the event of military conflict, nobody can make any predictions if there is a full-scale war . . . similar to what happened back in 1991. But it is premature for me to comment on that.

Q: But you don’t hear any of the threats coming out of Baghdad as there were on the eve of the Gulf War.

A: I haven’t seen any specific threat of that nature. Especially on the notion of Iraq using mass destruction weapons, which Iraq denies it possesses at this point or that it intends to have in the future.

Q: If there is a U.S. military strike, what impact do you think there would be domestically and in the region?

A: It’s difficult to make any predictions on this because once hostilities start, things can get out of control for the better or for the worse on both sides of the conflict, let alone what could happen in the region. But the region is not as receptive as it was back in 1991 to such activity. So I’m not sure about what could happen, except to say that the Iraqis will have to face whatever impact and, in my view, Iraq will be able to absorb such a strike.

Q: No matter how massive the strike?

A: Yes. It will be nothing close to 1991.

Q: But does the U.S. need to use the same amount of force since many think the regime in its current condition may not be able to absorb the kind of punishment the U.S. can deliver?

A: I don’t agree with that. I think that, right now, the government has probably more experience, expertise accumulated through those years of how to deal with this situation. At that time, it was probably unprecedented in terms of its scale, in terms of different approaches both on the strategic and on the tactical level. Right now we are dealing with something which is well-precedented and, therefore, we have the expertise.

Q: At the same time the U.S. is supporting a major increase in the sale of Iraqi oil for food. Do you think this is a genuine effort at humanitarian assistance or do you think it has other motives behind it?

A: Well, it is read in Baghdad as something that has been designed to try to promote sanctions and prolong the process of normalization within the region and with the outside world. But at the same time, it is difficult because we don’t have any alternative. So we have to take it as at least a partial remedy of the situation in Iraq and the suffering of the people and the desperate need for resources.

Q: Do you believe it is the intent of the U.S. to prevent a full lifting of the sanctions, no matter what?

A: This has been the cornerstone of the Iraqi position to portray American policy as unbalanced and unacceptable: that whatever Iraq does, regardless of what Iraq does, the U.S. is not going to lift the sanctions.

Q: So, would you say that the strong behavior coming from Baghdad is based on the belief that unless the United States is pushed, unless confronted, it will find ways to keep the sanctions?

A: That’s right.

Q: Well what makes you think you can prevail?

A: Without the recent crises, which from our point of view were based on a justified position, based on the fact that the process is slow that there’s an effort to procrastinate and there is an effort not to bring up the issue of sanctions for reconsideration, we think that these crises have highlighted the real problem of Iraq wanting to see the light at the end of the tunnel.

Q: So you are saying there is a level of frustration in Baghdad that has forced the confrontations?

A: What I am saying is that there is a belief in Baghdad that we are being killed silently. We are not moving from a peaceful untroubled situation to warfare. Instead, we are going from the silent bombing of our people to a real situation where people will be killed.