Russia’s Risky Strategy

Old habits die hard, old national imperatives endure. A Russia that starting in the 19th century schemed to gain influence and power in the Persian Gulf has become increasingly outspoken in emphasizing its differences with the United States over how to deal with Iraq. At times in recent days high Russian officials seem to have implied that these differences are fundamental enough to jeopardize the cooperative relationship that has developed between Washington and Moscow since Soviet communism collapsed a little over six years ago. If so, Russia has adopted a high-risk strategy indeed.

What’s more likely is that Russian leaders for now are more interested in trying to impress the folks at home and playing to Arab opinion than they are in confronting the United States. Except for its nuclear forces Russia has all but ceased to be a military power, too poor to send its fleet to sea or even to adequately feed its shrunken and demoralized army. That is a continuing humiliation for a country that for so long boasted of its military might and its readiness to use force to further its interests. The simple truth is that Russia today is in no position to threaten military intervention in the Middle East, as it did in decades past. But it can make threatening noises, as President Boris Yeltsin did recently with his somewhat daffy warning that U.S. military action against Iraq could ignite a world war. Such statements do not enhance Moscow’s credibility.

Russia of course has genuine interests in Iraq. For one thing, Baghdad owes it nearly $8 billion for weapons provided during the Soviet era, a debt Moscow can hope to collect only when U.N. sanctions are lifted and Iraq again starts to earn substantial oil revenues. Russia has also signed lucrative contracts with Iraq that anticipate a reopening of post-sanction commercial relations. So Russia has a major economic stake in seeing the sanctions end and a major political stake, in Iraq and the larger Arab world, in appearing sympathetic to Baghdad in its confrontation with the United States. All this has led to Moscow acting more and more like Saddam Hussein’s lawyer.

Russian Defense Minister Igor D. Sergeyev, meeting in front of TV cameras with Defense Secretary William S. Cohen in Moscow the other day, pushed the point, expressing “deep concern over the possible costs to U.S.-Russian military relations” if the United States takes military action against Iraq. This apparent threat to reduce or end military cooperation--which among other things involves U.S. help in disposing of a big part of Russia’s nuclear arsenal--is sure to be taken up by those in Congress who remain deeply suspicious of Russia.

Sergeyev asked, “Is America ready for all the possible consequences” of using military power to try to force Iraq to stop hiding its prohibited weapons of mass destruction? A more apt question is whether Moscow is really ready to risk its expanding web of relations with the United States for dubious gains in Iraq. At some point Russia’s rhetorical game could well invite substantive consequences. Moscow should weigh the risks of that very carefully.