U.S. Stresses Reasons Not to Let Iraq Off Hook

The Arab sheikdoms most threatened by Iraq are refusing access to their air bases. Allies in Europe, Asia and Africa are warning, sometimes harshly, against the use of force. The U.N. Security Council has so far been unable even to agree on a new resolution that condemns Baghdad for its obstruction of U.N. weapons inspectors.

So as the clock ticks toward U.S. military action against Iraq, a key question for the United States might well be: Why bother? Why not let other nations and organizations handle Saddam Hussein?

The reasons to back away are plentiful. At the top of the list are repercussions in the event of the survival of Iraq’s deadly arsenal, not to mention the Iraqi president himself. Even the advertised “substantial” military action is unlikely to resolve a confrontation that has dragged on for more than seven years. For Hussein, this is probably just another round.

If the U.S. does go to battle, American military personnel as well as Iraqi civilians may die. Iraq could retaliate by expelling all U.N. weapons inspectors, leaving Baghdad free to make any doomsday weapon it wants. The differences among allies could be the death knell for the once strong international coalition arrayed against Iraq, and could endanger future cooperation among its members.

But as the denouement to the crisis nears, the Clinton administration has begun to go on the offensive in the arena of public opinion, with President Clinton and his top foreign policy advisors planning a series of appearances and events this week to explain why the United States must act.

Their broader arguments are grounded in five areas: the Persian Gulf’s strategic importance; the proliferation of unconventional arms; containment of aggression in the post-Cold War era; superpower responsibility; and U.N. credibility.

Together, U.S. officials contend, the five weigh heavily in favor of either tough diplomacy or a military strike. An array of Iraq specialists weighs in with partial or full support.

* The strategic value of the Persian Gulf.

With 75% of the world’s proven oil reserves, the sparsely populated desert sheikdoms of the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq and Iran are disproportionately important to the world, especially the West. In 1996, the Persian Gulf accounted for 18.8% of U.S. oil imports, as well as 44% of Western Europe’s and 70% of Japan’s, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

“A stable Middle East means we can better protect the free flow of oil, fight terrorism and build support for a comprehensive and just Middle East peace,” National Security Advisor Samuel R. “Sandy” Berger said in a National Press Club speech Friday.

Until highly industrialized societies develop other energy sources, U.S. officials privately concede, any threat to Gulf stability is also a risk to the United States and global economic stability.

The Gulf has additional value. “If the U.S. was not able to transit the area between Europe and Asia, if it was hostile, the U.S. strategic outlook would be seriously impeded,” said James Placke, a former U.S. diplomat in Iraq now with Cambridge Energy Research Associates.

* Weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq is the only country with a proven record of using chemical weapons on its own people as well as its enemies while also working toward nuclear weaponry and building stockpiles of biological arms and ballistic missiles. Baghdad’s obstruction of weapons inspectors could mean not only the preservation of its stockpiles but the production of new material, U.S. officials contend.

“These weapons are important to the credibility of Iraq as a major player,” said Rolf Ekeus, who was chief U.N. weapons inspector until becoming Sweden’s ambassador to the U.S. last year. “They allow [Hussein] to dominate a region the world depends on for energy.”

But beyond the immediate challenge is the issue of unconventional weapons proliferating in the post-Cold War world--outside the borders or controls of the major powers. At least 10 developing nations already have or are working on nuclear weapons; 20 have or are working on chemical or biological weapons; and 25 have or are working on missiles.

“If one country that has used them is allowed to keep them, then others will follow,” either for protection or to compete, Ekeus said. “This will seriously undercut the larger nonproliferation campaign.”

Iraq’s success or failure in keeping its weapons could be a turning point: Will military campaigns or terrorist acts in the future include the unleashing of toxins or diseases in civilian areas?

“As you look into the 21st century . . . the spread of these weapons to outlaw states and from them to terrorists and international criminals is one of the most dangerous security threats our people will face over the next generation,” Berger said.

* Preventing aggression.

Hussein’s history is telling: He was sentenced to death for the attempted assassination of a predecessor in 1959; he was arrested for plotting a coup in 1964; and he played a prominent role in Iraq’s successful 1968 revolution.

His nation has been in a state of war for most of the time since Hussein became president of Iraq in 1979. Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, triggering a war that dragged on for eight years and cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and Iranians.

Two years after the war with Iran ended, Hussein invaded Kuwait, igniting a crisis still unsettled.

Hussein has also massed troops along or near the borders of his three other neighbors--Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

That record led Clinton to label Hussein a “menace to global security” in a recent radio address.

“Saddam has demonstrated a willingness to use the most despicable means to achieve his foreign policy goals,” said Kenneth Pollack, an Iraq specialist at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “This alone puts him in a category separate from just about any other detestable dictator out there.”

The U.S.-led Operation Desert Storm in 1991 established an important precedent for the post-Cold War world--the principle of nonaggression, which was endangered by Iraq’s quest to keep its deadliest arms.

“We have to make sure that our treatment of Iraq sends the message to other would-be Saddams that this kind of behavior will not be tolerated by the international community,” Pollack said.

* Superpower responsibility.

After Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the United States formed and led the original coalition of more than three dozen nations and almost half a million troops to liberate Kuwait and defend Saudi Arabia.

Because of its past role and current global preeminence, the United States still has a responsibility to follow through. “Only our will has stopped him before,” Berger said.

But being “peacekeeper for the universe” is a dangerous role for the United States to assume, and the U.S. still operates best when working with the consensus of the neighborhood and the U.N., said Judy Yaphe, Iraq specialist at the National Defense University in Washington.

“On the other hand, we’re dealing with a leader whose intent on developing and using weapons of mass destruction is clear,” Yaphe said. “And given our greater ability to protect and defend, we have to take a leadership role.”

* U.N. credibility.

Although the Bush administration formed and led the coalition against Iraq, it worked with the United Nations. In various resolutions, the world body imposed sanctions, laid out the framework for military action and, after the war, set up the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) disarmament process.

The Clinton administration argues that enforcing the U.N. terms that Hussein accepted is vital in limiting Iraq as a threat. “The UNSCOM system works,” Berger said. “That’s why Saddam is so desperate to end it.”

If Baghdad was able to wear away the international community, that would constitute a serious blow to the world body. “U.N status and credibility are at stake in this crisis,” Ekeus said. Failure could also undercut future U.N. operations.