U.S. Has Array of Options in Iraq

As the Clinton administration makes its case against Iraq to the American people, a larger issue looms: What else should or could the United States do to deal with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, his weapons of mass destruction and Baghdad’s threat to the strategic Persian Gulf?

The question is gaining urgency because neither option in the current standoff over Iraq’s refusal to allow unconditional U.N. weapons inspections--a limited U.S. military strike or a diplomatic solution--is designed to remove the broader problems.

Indeed, ranking officials already admit that the United States is likely to be in a similar situation again and again. And again.

“The United States has failed fundamentally to understand what we need to do to drive Saddam from power,” warned Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

To prevent an open-ended crisis, the Clinton administration may need to do more, according to members of Congress and experts on Mideast and defense issues.

“We need a more proactive policy,” said Judith Yaphe, an Iraq specialist at National Defense University in Washington. “If we are caught in a backlash because of this crisis, because our allies back away and decide that enough is enough, then Saddam will have won.”

Washington has an array of options, from controversial initiatives such as arming the opposition, as the United States did in Afghanistan during the Reagan administration, to creating new defenses against chemical and biological weapons.

Among the options:

* Tighten the slipping international sanctions. In defiance of United Nations sanctions, Iraq has sharply increased its illicit export of oil via the Persian Gulf. Only about 5% of the shipments now are seized, oil experts say. The amount getting through is about 100,000 barrels a day, netting up to $600,000 a day, said James Placke of Cambridge Energy Research Associates.

Part of the problem is the unwillingness of Gulf states, for various reasons, to take receipt of seized ships. The U.S.-led interdiction force is supposed to hand over seized cargo to a nearby Gulf state for sale and put the profits into a U.N. escrow fund. Another problem is that Iraqi ships sail under false Iranian papers bought from corrupt Iranian officials, U.S. officials say. The ships also hug the Iranian coast, which makes interdiction difficult.

“As sanctions fatigue grows, there’s a need to encourage closer enforcement all around,” said Robert Pelletreau, former assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs. “Any little bit of oil that makes it through the spigot helps Saddam.”

Washington could improve satellite intelligence and interdiction of ships sailing from southern Iraq; assist or pressure Gulf states to deal with seized cargo; and coordinate enforcement with Iran.

* Aid Hussein’s opposition. Support for the Iraqi opposition has dropped considerably since a 1996 Iraqi raid forced the U.S.-backed Iraqi National Congress and the CIA station out of areas in northern Iraq.

“The administration should organize a more concerted effort at unifying these dissident elements and providing the logistical support needed to bring about the collapse of Saddam’s regime,” said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a Vietnam War veteran.

Among the alternatives is arming the opposition, which Washington did not do even when CIA agents were urging military operations against Hussein’s forces. The U.S. also could provide financial support by allowing the opposition access to Iraqi assets frozen after Baghdad’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. And the U.S. could lift sanctions on Kurdish northern Iraq, which faces dual sanctions from the U.N. and Baghdad.

“We need to help the Iraqis help themselves,” said Paul Wolfowitz, a Defense undersecretary in the Bush administration who is now dean of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. “The opposition is not feckless; our support is.”

* Improve relations with Iran. Hussein’s long-term goal is to be the Gulf’s dominant power. The greatest regional threat to Hussein’s goal is Iran, as witnessed in their eight-year war during the 1980s.

Iran has about three times the population and nearly four times the land mass of Iraq and at one point appeared capable of winning the war. But Iraq’s massive use of chemical weapons and missiles destroyed Iran’s military and forced a cease-fire in 1988. Ever since, Hussein has been emboldened to threaten other neighbors.

U.S. rapprochement with Iran, in response to initiatives by Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, could shift the balance of power away from Baghdad. “Saddam would be really frightened by greater U.S.-Iran understanding or even agreement on certain things,” Yaphe said.

* Shore up the coalition. Hussein’s strategy centers on weakening U.S. vigilance by eroding the Gulf War coalition. As it is, fewer than half as many nations are offering military backing for U.S.-led efforts in the current crisis as did in the 1991 conflict. Washington now faces open opposition from Russia. Egypt and Syria, which provided troops during the war, also now oppose military action.

“We must cultivate the coalition on a monthly basis, not just when there’s a problem, by consulting constantly with the Europeans, Arabs and Turks so when Saddam yanks the chain, there’s more cohesion,” said Edward P. Djerejian, former assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs, who is now at Rice University.

* Strengthen treaties and improve defenses against chemical and biological weapons. Since two dozen developing countries have weapons of this kind, U.S. strategy should look beyond punishment to prevention and protection. The U.S. could seek to strengthen enforcement of or compliance with arms control pacts, tighten export controls, improve coordination with allies and create zones in which all countries in a region would agree to not use weapons of mass destruction.

“This Iraq crisis is only the first of decades of similar crises which will involve far more lethal threats from weapons of mass destruction,” Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said. “If we don’t have a coherent policy toward major arms control agreements, we aren’t going to move this region toward any kind of security.”

Better detection is essential for weapons of this kind, which are the most difficult types of arms to detect. Other steps include improving protective gear so it can be worn longer than eight to 10 hours and increasing stores of antidotes. And training could be improved. A five-year program on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons has been completed in just 14 of 120 U.S. cities.

* Push harder for Arab-Israeli peace. In the Mideast, cynicism about or opposition to U.S. policy on Iraq is linked inextricably to the deadlock in the U.S.-brokered peace process. A more robust initiative is needed to spur movement.

“Our ability to marshal Arab support against Saddam is weaker than it would be if we were seen as more active in promoting peace between Israel and its neighbors,” said Richard Haass, a National Security Council staff member in the Bush administration who is now at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank.