First, Open the Door With Dialogue

Will the remarkable initiative of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to the American people lead somewhere? Khatami’s overture, made in an interview televised by CNN, has generated questions about his true motives and about what the proper American response should be.

What the proper response should be depends on which interpretation one has for the Iranian motives for this overture. Broadly speaking, two have been offered. The first argues that Iran is motivated by opportunism, that it wants to reduce tensions with America in order to eliminate barriers to better relations with neighboring countries and with Europe. Notably, Khatami and other Iranian leaders are not willing to go so far as establishing a serious dialogue with the U.S. government, which could eventually culminate in the resumption of diplomatic relations.

The proponents of this interpretation emphasize those aspects of the interview that were critical of the United States. They question Khatami’s ability to deliver on a genuine policy of opening up to the United States, even if he wanted to.

As a result, these observers argue that the United States should not alter its policy toward Iran in any significant way until Iran meets U.S. conditions and changes its behavior in key areas. These center on Iran’s support for international terrorism, its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and its effort to develop weapons of mass destruction.

The other interpretation of Khatami’s remarks recognizes the boldness of his statements and the opportunities they offer for improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations. It attributes this move to a deeper realization of the need for better relations with the U.S., coupled with fundamental changes within Iranian society and polity, notably a gradual but inexorable loss of revolutionary elan and the reassertion of a more nationalist outlook.

Proponents of this interpretation know the context of Iranian politics and the process of decision-making, and that such a bold statement by the Iranian president could not have been made without agreement, or at least acquiescence, of other key figures, notably the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. As a result, these observers recommend a positive, albeit measured, American response.

This interpretation is much closer to the realities of present-day Iran. Iran’s realization of the importance of reducing tensions with the United States is the result of bitter experience--especially defeat in the war with Iraq and failure to circumvent U.S. barriers to adequate economic and political relations with other countries. The Iranians also finally understand that active U.S. hostility places Iran in a weak strategic position, subject to manipulation by its neighbors.

Among those responsible for conducting Iran’s foreign relations is its foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, who served for seven years as Iran’s permanent representative to the United Nations and is familiar with U.S. political realities. He and others responsible for foreign policy know the price of better relations with the United States. But they also know that, given the constellation of power within Iran, they cannot pay the full price up front. Instead, meeting U.S. concerns should be the result of improved relations rather than a precondition for them.

On an even more fundamental level, Khatami’s overture needs to be viewed alongside his call for a dialogue between the Islamic and Western civilizations and his remark that the Muslim world can benefit from certain aspects of Western culture. These indicate a realization of the shortcomings of Iran’s Islamic ideology for the organization of its economic, social and political life.

This awareness also reflects the full realization by Iran of the damage done to its material and other interests by the pursuit of a confrontational policy toward the West. The process was already well underway by the late 1980s, but has gathered strength since then. As a result, Iran’s policy regarding many areas, notably the Persian Gulf and the southern republics of the former Soviet Union, has been determined more by considerations of national interest than by revolutionary aspirations. Iran’s behavior during the Persian Gulf war of 1990-91 was the first important sign of this growing pragmatic and nationalist trend. Those who have benefited from the revolution, economically and politically, are resisting change.

Against this background, the response of the outside world to Iranian overtures will play an important role in determining the outcome of the struggle between the reformists and those who cling to discredited revolutionary views. To demand up front more than the reformists can deliver as a precondition for any dialogue would jeopardize the achievement of U.S. goals. The prudent policy for the United States would be to take up Khatami’s offer of a dialogue and to ease restrictions on academic and other contacts, without compromising on basic U.S. concerns.