Decision Time on Iraq

Iraq complains that the work of the U.N. Special Commission overseeing the dismantling of its weapons of mass destruction should have been completed years ago. The short answer is that it would have been had Iraq not consistently tried to deceive U.N. inspectors about its continuing program to produce biological and chemical weapons. The Security Council has been kept fully briefed on Iraqi obstructionism by the heads of the commission, first Rolf Ekeus of Sweden and now Richard Butler of Australia. Butler has once again been in Baghdad, trying with little evidence of success to get the unfettered access to Iraqi weapons sites required by U.N. resolutions adopted at the conclusion of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. On Friday he will report to the Security Council, which must once again face the question of what it is prepared to do to enforce its will.

This week’s talks in Baghdad have been described by one commission official as the toughest in three years. The central issue has been the so-called red line that Saddam Hussein’s regime has put around a number of compounds, described as “presidential palaces,” which it vows U.N. inspectors will never enter. That has naturally fed suspicions that these sites hide facilities for making terror weapons.

If the off-limits signs remain up, if the U.N. mission is frustrated, the economic sanctions that have cost Iraq so dearly will remain in place. That is the minimum possible consequence. Beyond that, the United States and Britain have signaled they are ready if need be to take military action to punish Iraq for its defiance. That would probably involve attacks against the suspected covert weapons facilities as well as strikes against the military underpinnings of Saddam Hussein’s power--the Republican Guard, for example.

Washington and London say existing U.N. resolutions permit them to act at any time. The preferred course would be for China, France and Russia, the other permanent members of the Security Council, to overcome their reluctance and join in re-inforcing that authority with an unequivocal resolution warning that force could be used unless Iraqi evasiveness ends. That unanimity would send a powerful message to Baghdad, and it would strongly enhance the Security Council’s credibility as an upholder of the international rule of law.

Richard Butler has defined the issue clearly. It is solely about the disarmament of an aggressor state. If Iraq cooperates, it will bring nearer the time when sanctions can be eased or ended. If it continues to obstruct and deceive, its hardships will deepen.